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The purpose of this work does 
not yield itself to a one word deter­
mination. It is not the author’s com­
placency that rings in this statement 
but the opposite —  his uncertainty 
and humility. First of all, this work 
stems from the conviction that it is 
impossible to speak of literature 
without speaking o f philosophy, not 
because literature can be a spokes­
man of o specific philosophical 
school, but because a philosophical, 
ontological, reflection can be uncon­
cealed in sentences of a literary text. 
The term "unconcealment” which 
w ill recur in these essays denotes 
that the ontological reflection has not 
been purposefully hidden or coded in 
words we read as literature, but it 
only humbly suggests that such a re­
flection can unexpectedly appear, 
what is more, has to appear in the 
space of understanding stretching 
between the reader and the text.
Literature is a question of dis­
tance and dispersion: the impossible 
to remove (contrary to what conse­
cutive avaint-guards claim) distance 
between literature (art) and  ^ life, 
a book and its reader, and the equal­
ly irreducible distance between the 
Teader and the world, the relentless 
dispersion of readers.
Thus, we cannot escape philo­
sophy: the aesthetically shaped form 
o f the text works on the principle 
of augmenting, intensifying the ma­
terial of reality, and this intensifica­
tion can go so far that the afore­
mentioned distance seems to disap­
pear. The understanding we were 
talking about is also self-understand­
ing. Literature could be defined from 
this hermeneutic point of view  as the
The (pre) Face 
of 
the Text
Truth has bounds. Error none.
—  William Blake, The Book 
of Los
Art is worth more than "the 
truth”.
—  Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche
%
strategy of such an amplification of reality, such its intensification that 
reality becomes fictitious. With an eye on a paradox it is possible to say 
that art is real to the extent it shows the unreality of reality.
It is precisely at this point when the element of surprise at the 
unconcealment of something so far hidden comes in. This element is, 
according to Hans-Georg Gadamer, more profund than a mere anticipa­
tion of meaning:
It is what I would like to call surprise at the meaning of what is said. The 
experience of art does not only understand a recognizable meaning, as histo­
rical hermeneutics does in is handling of texts. The work of art that says 
something confronts us itself. That is, it expresses something in such a way 
that what is said is like a discovery, a dislosure of something previously 
concealed. The element of surprise is based on this. «So true, so filled 
with» [So waher, so seiend] is not something one knows in any other way. 
Everything familiar is eclipsed. To understand what the work of art says to 
us is therefore a self-encounter.1
Reality teaches us that literature opens the problem of distance; ho­
wever when intensifying and, finally, subverting reality literature app­
ears in all its nearness, existential proxim ity to man. This introduces 
a par excellence philosophical issue: what is this awkward essent which 
oscillates between distance and nearness, the essent that can exist only 
in the distance but through a peculiar proximity, and what is the nature 
of its being? In other words, the question we are asking bears a shifted 
accent and reads "what IS literature?” . Any act of reading is, then, ne- 
cesarily an act of the philosophical reflection. This poses a serious pro­
blem the author is painfully aware of: if  reading literature is philosophi­
sing on literature, to be personally involved in the is-ness of literature, 
to what extent this philosophical re-reading can be undertaken by one 
who is not a professional philosopher. It is a trap lurking in literature 
that is inherently, ontologically philosophical, but its readers, in enor­
mous percentage, do not have at their disposal the apparatus of philo­
sophical thinking.
From this predicament also stems this work which hinges upon the 
elements of phenomenology of Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
and deconstruction of Jacques Derrida. Their philosophy determined the 
network of ontological references of these essays (as the author believes 
that ontology of the work of art is prior to its aesthetics), although the 
philosophical lexicon of the thinkers has been reduced to a few  concepts 
seminal for the interpretative bias reflected in this book. Hence, in no 
way can remarks on Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty or Derrida be treated as 
a comprehensive introduction to their systems. This is a task in which 
professional philosophers would be, by far, more successful; the author uses 
Heidegger’s and Derrida’s categories not to be rigorously philosophical
(which he cannot be), but to call forth an intellectual landscape in which 
a work of art, an object, can be studied as a manifestation of a certain 
ontological-architectural style (a Greek temple in Heidegger, a labirynth 
in Derrida). Following Derrida’s etymological inventiveness we could re­
fer to this part of my work as to "arehi-ointology” (after "archi-écriture” 
in Derrida’s De la grammatologie).
This concept redefines the notion of architecture as useful not only 
as a metaphor of the external construction of ideas, of the facade of 
thinking, but also as the outcome of a certain structure of passion it 
represents, a metaphorically coded hierachy of elements constituting hu­
man psyche. The labirynth and the temple do not only convey different 
ideas of the world, but, first of all, they take off from the two different 
worlds that are interpreted in terms of ideas. As Sarah Kofman puts it 
in her Nietzsche book:
[...] toute construction [...] est l'expression d’une architecture interne, c’est- 
-à-dire d’une certaine hiérarchisation des instinct.2
It is important to keep this double meaning of architecture in mind since 
its first version (multiplicity of ideas) suggests the uniqueness of the 
world which is a subject of predication. A  "truth” of the one world lies 
behind the ideas. The other reading emphasizes the plurality of worlds 
with as many ideas the truths of which are equally real and fictitious. 
While "architecture” signifies a truth we live in (one specified, well- 
-described and controlled world), "archi-ontology” denotes a truth we live 
with (it guides us through the plurality of worlds). As Nietzche has ar­
ticulated it in The W ill to Pow er:
Metaphysics, morality, religion, science —  in this book these things merit 
consideration only as various forms of lies: with their help one can have 
faith in life.3
In other words, this book listens to and waits upon the philosophy 
of the act of appearing of an object, of its sudden and irreversible 
emergence from what preceded it and which, only very inaccurately, 
can be desribed as Nothingness. Both thinkers would energetically 
appose this term: Heidegger saw in what preceded an object the 
area o f original collection (Sammlung), of the gathering of things 
in one domain of Being; Derrida holds such a concept of Being 
untenable and introduces the absence of the transcendental signified as 
a key element of his philosophy. Nevertheless, be it from the original 
Presence of Logos (Heidegger), or from the repetitive non-Presence of 
writing (Derrida) objects appear to face man, and it is this moment of 
the initial coming into being which constitutes the focus of these essays.
The word "to face” can also reveal its nominal aspect: the object
appears to jace man only by showing him its jace which is a trace of the 
beyond, the place of origin of the thing. The text, the object, as the face 
becomes intelligible only in relationship with what it brings to us, with 
the area that "cannot be converted into the present as beginning, com­
mencement, origin which are the lived modes of egoity” .4 The text as 
the face, as appearing, presents itself m the order (writing) in which it 
cannot be fu lly  understood, but it is only in this order that the Other, 
as Levinas would put it the "ille ity” , of the text, its fundamental back­
ground, can become a subject of discourse. The theory informing this 
book leaves aside the structuralist conviction that the text can remain 
thoroughly locked and rationalized within its interior, its tendency to­
wards synchronicity and reductionism. What is studied is thć appearing 
o f an object as the first contour, the first differentiation, the most essen­
tial difference between the object and what is its ontological background 
against which we have to see it.
This mode of perceiving the object as a first stroke of a pen, a first 
sign, a first movement o f a hand along the via rupta o f writing, allows 
us to make a transition from Derrida’s concept of ecriture to Blake’s 
theory of drawing. Both theories are to an equal degree studies of the 
graphic notation and the codified symbols of Weltanschauung, investiga­
tions of script as well as ciphers o f ontological foundations. The liaison 
between the two readings of script, or rather unavoidable translating of 
one into the other, is where the aesthetic theory of Blake is interpreted 
as a graphic strategy originating from ontological premises which, al­
though frequently unspecified and unwritten, are crucial for understan­
ding of the graphic structure. Interpreting ontology out of the graphic 
notation (which never is merely a graphic notation) is one of the main 
purposes of this study.
Interpretation itself is considered a necessary mediation between the 
two spheres, a mode of explicating the Heideggerian "leap” of the first 
graphic mark from the totality of Being into the space of a page, or the 
Derridian "difference” separating one trace (signifiant) from another. In 
both cases interpretation is a reading of blank spaces, it is embedded in 
the between-ness of a sign and its origin (Heidegger), or a sign and ano­
ther sign (Derrida). This is but a more verbose way of saying that also 
interpretation! as a mediation, a substitution, a certain blankness, is w ri­
ting; not a conclusive reading which definitely closes the perspective of 
a text but a hesitant imposing of a word upon another word, not THE 
text, but merely an INTER-text between and over another text.
This may explain the inevitable circularity of these essays. Approch- 
ing interpretation as a labirynthine movement of signifiants where roads 
are necessarily doubled and recoiled upon themselves these texts cannot 
but share this feature, this awareness that they are merely pre-texts, 
pre-faces to other, yet unwritten, discourses. As Jacques Derrida puts it:
The preface, a synthetic mode of exposition, a discourse of themes, theses, 
and conclusions here as always precedes the analytic text of invention, which 
will in fact have come before it but which cannot, for fear of remaning 
unreadable, present or teach itself on its own.5
Thus, these essays branch off from an uneasily circular situation: 
the objects in front of us are inevitably external and yet it is ourselves 
who, through our relationship with them, establish them in their reality. 
This is the very essence of Merleau-Ponty’s perception, although more 
aptly it could be described as a certain fundamental irony. Frederick Ja­
meson sees its tradition in the German Romantic concept of irony as de­
veloped by Friedrich Schlegel, but he does not hesitate to extend its prin­
ciple from the field of aesthetics unto ontology:
Irony thus characterizes our relationship to the work of art insofar as, know­
ing that the surface before us is an imaginary representation and the result 
of someone else’s labor, we nonetheless consent to lose ourselves in it as 
though it were real [...]. In the same way, irony governs our relationship to 
the external world, for there is something paradoxical about an object, or 
a world in general, which is by definition external inasmuch as we have to 
have a relationship to it, but which is at the same time of the same substan­
ce of ourselves in so far as we can have a relationship to it.6
In other words, if we set o ff from the principle of the hermeneutic 
irony it w ill become obvious that world w ill reveal not only its compo­
sitional aspects ("[...] in considering the feeling one must conside it from 
the point of view  of composition, just as in trying to understand a motor 
one must look at the drive-belt as a detail in a machine ![...]”7). The lite­
rary fact w ill also reveal our involvement in it without which no "object­
ive” analysis could have been possible. Thus, interpretation is a larger 
mode of being-with-the-world which entails both Shklovsky’s "detach­
ment” and Worringer’s "empathy” . It is only logical to conclude 
that the interpreter always speaks frotm within his entanglement 
in the fact he is interpreting, thus turning it into a dynamic event 
and markedly influenced by it. If Shklovsky’s principle of estran­
gement is to hold in hermeneutics it has to undergo the S'wiftian 
test of self-alienation: it is not only astonishment with a thing seen anew, 
but also a realization that it entails a change in my perception of my­
self. This interpreter and the interpreted are gathered in the territory 
that overcomes such technical and operational divisions, and which esta­
blished its own framework of references. Both the interpreted and in­
terpreter are brought together in writing (écriture ) which refuses to re­
cognize one central point dominating its field, and celebrates the multi- 
vocality of signs reverberating in other signs. The situation of the her- 
meneut in a centerless world of signifiants can be described as a general 
reorientation of his position from the one which made much welcome of
the strictly enumerated elements of reality and tried to establish causative 
links between them securing the over-all sense of direction, to the one 
where "rigid connections” are replaced by clusters of potential combina­
tions. With a characteristic intellectual bravado and a no less typical eye 
on the accoustic metaphor Marshall McLuhan inscribes this hermeneutic 
reorientation in his pattern of technological changes:
In the instanteneous world of information movement we live once more in 
Echoland. Everything bounces off everything. The whole world resonates. 
«Resonance» has become the privileged centennial metaphor of our time, 
since Heisenberg applied the term to the behaviour of matter in physics and 
chemistry in 1927.8
A  considerable and most provocative part of modern aesthetics derives 
from and addressess itself to the ear rather than to the eye. Hence in 
Malevich’s statements on poetry it is the accoustic pattern that underlies 
semantics:
[...] the sign, or letter, depends on the rhythm and tempo. Rhythm and tempo 
creaite and take those sounds which they give bdrtth to, and fashion1 a new 
image out of nothing.8
Similarly, the avant-garde production of Raoul Duguay is founded upon 
the mutual overlapping of vibratory fields:
Everthing that is, vibrates. Everything that vibrates has a sound. Even si­
lence has a vibration. If one or a number of persons discover the source of 
this vibration, there is transparence. Transparence is the art of vibrating at 
the same pitch [...] as the thing or the person with whom one is trying to 
communicate.10
Criticism could not remain untouched by this situation and as Paul 
de Man describes it "certain forces that could legitimately be called mo­
dem and that were at work in lyric poetry, in the novel, and the theatre 
have also become operative in the field of literary theory and criticism.” 11 
What Jameson in his remarks on Russian formalism calls a "canon­
ization of a fragment” extends here to hold also for the critical activity 
"bringing together” different events, various facts of reality so that by 
resonating or vibrating, by "bouncing o ff”  one another they could uncon- 
ceal a temporary, fleeting possibility of meaning. Judging from this 
perspective these essays reach out towards such models as those created 
by ěcriture of Roland Barthes, Ihab Hassan, Norman O. Brown, Marshall 
McLuhan, and Jacques Derrida whose efforts could be delineated as 
essai, concrete. Donald Theall, the inventor of the term, explains it in 
the following way:
«Essai concrete» is meant to apply to either printed or oral or even mixed 
media forms as long as they have the same relationship to the combination 
of theorizing and expression inherent in the essay as well as some conscious 
relation to the dialectical process of weighing and juxtaposing of opposites 
12
Both features of what Theall calls essai concrete, i.e. the combina­
tion of theory and expression as well as the insistence on the dialectic 
character of écriture, can be more adequately introduced as the senee of 
metaphor in the critical practice and the simultaneity and congruity of 
opposite concepts occuring in the interpretative act. The first is secured 
by the awareness of the circular power of word which, while naming, 
transcends the very realm of the literal:
The sower soweth the word. In the beginning was the word, in the beginning 
was the deed; in the resurrection, in the awakening, these two are one: 
poetry. [...]
The antinomy between mind and body, word and deed, speech and silence, 
overcome. Everything is only a metaphor; there is only poetry.13
The other accompanies the notion of transparency which w ill lead, in 
turn, to Blake’s doctrine of "seeing through the eye” ; the transparency 
that puts on a par the sound and the silence, the trace and the (absence 
of) origin. It is this transparency into which enters the hermeneut in his 
act of tracing a meaning:
Transparency. To let the light not on but in or through. To look not at the 
text but through it; to see between the lines; to see language as lace, black 
on white; or white on black, as in the sky (alt night, or in the space on 
which our dreams are traced.14
The sense of metaphor as a manner of a production of the discourse po­
stulates imagination as a fundamental device of scholarly investigation. 
It is not incidental that it is the twentieth century revival and reinter­
pretation of the hermeneutic experience that calls forth Phantasie into 
the horizon of research:
It is imagination that is the decisive function of the scholar. Imagination 
naturally has hermeneutical function and serves the sense fori whait is ques­
tionable. It serves the ability (to expose real, producftive questions, something 
in which, generally speaking, only he who masters all the methods of his 
science succeeds.15
This is why the initial interest in the orality of literature is not 
followed as the study of the repertory of oral styles and techniques, 
but is reinterpreted decisively in the Heideggerian way as a metaphorical 
expression of the object’s indebtedness to its original sphere, of ontolo­
gical priority of the spoken word over the written one. The adjective
oral is here, as several studies of Martin Heidegger’s work point out16, 
a synonym of something that precedes a written trace, of what ontolo- 
gically conditions the object (a work of art, for example), o f what fore­
grounds it in meaning. Nevertheless it is not writing, the very act of 
inscribing signs, that forms contrast to speaking. The real opposition 
seems to derive from a revaluation and redefinition o f Logos which re­
moves the Socratic and Platonic conoept of Logos as reason, and reinsta­
tes the Heraclitean sense of the term as the voice which speaks in antf 
through the facts of reality. I f  we endorse W illiam Spano’s view  that 
"one of the fundamental defining characteristics of contemporary litera­
ture [...] is a similar reaction against Logos as the Rational Word, or Fi­
nal Cause” 17, then it is easy to see that the book has definitely more 
affinity with Derrida’s écriture (writing conceived of as the ontological 
strategy) than McLuhan’s theory of mass-media (writing as a mode of 
communication). The oral signifies a meaning attained not by mastering 
the words of the text but by participating with the words in the world, 
by letting the words resound with the voice. As Jerome Rothenberg puts 
it concisely, the fundamental opposition underlying all other contrasts 
is the one between the oral and the literal.18 This is a meaning that co­
mes to light with less control we impose over the text and with reco­
gnizing the text as a chaos assuming changing configurations of sense. 
This is possible only when we see the literary fact as a place where the 
world becomes open, in other words, when we realize that we have left 
behind not only the classical dictum "the text means” but also more 
contemporary "the text is” and inscribed our reading into the formula 
"the text is with-the-world” . The text without losing its individual quali­
ties becomes a dialogue with what made it possible.
Thus, oral signifies no more and no less than "origin” (not in a ge­
netic but ontological sense). W e are not in a position to recover this 
origin (here we become close to Derrida’s scepticism), but we can try to 
unconceal the manner in which an object (a text) emerges from the ori­
gin. The interplay of the visual and aural language is significant: attempt­
ing to focus upon the accoustic orality we have to do it via the luminis- 
tic terminology of "appearing” . Hence, the essay on orality shows ne­
cessarily its seamy side: it is bound to be written in the language of the 
optical metaphor.
The text on orality and origin is, from the very first word, an essay 
on the essential impossibility of recovering either one or the other.
1. Heidegger's Country Path
Heidegger’s philosophy can de­
finitely be described as a rethinking 
of certain traditions. Much work 
has been done on Heidegger’s re­
writing of the history of philosophy 
with regard to a modified reading 
of Logos as a fundamental philo­
sophical concept. Here, let it suffice 
to say that keen as he was on alle­
giance to Husserl, Heidegger impo­
ses severe limitations on reason as 
a mode of achieving the truth. It is 
a participation rather then intellec­
tual anticipation that forms the 
heart o f the interpretation of Logos 
in Heidegger.
In his Introduction to Metaphy­
sics Heidegger makes it evident that 
a long tradition o f the Western think­
ing needs very badly a reinterpre­
tation:
We must merely free ourselves from 
the notion that originally and fun­
damentally logos and legein signi­
fied thought, understanding and rea­
son. As long as we cling to this 
opinion and even go as far as to 
interpret logos in the light of logic 
as it later developed, o u t  attempt 
to rediscover the beginning of Greek 
philosophy can lead to nothing but 
absurdities.1
Heidegger’s rhetoric is markedly 
abundant in phrases which allude 
or evoke temporality of his discour­
se, i.e. Logos is read so as to reveal 
its original and fundamental sense, 
and the philosopher’s intention is 
described as a rediscovery of the 
"beginning” . Heidegger thinks back­
ward to unconceal the origin of all 
thought, to find and relate in naming
Voice
as 
Understanding
Somewhere in time [...] Au­
gustine is writing his Con­
fessiones. Unconcerned with 
us, he finishes writing his 
book. He doesn’t know we 
are watching him.
—  Peter Nilson, A Labyrinth 
in Which We Are Lost
the experience of the foundation, or "ground” In the 1957 text we read:
Being becomes present as Logos an. the sense of ground, of allowing to let 
lie before us ( im Sinne des Grundes, das Vorliegenlassen).2
The "ground” to which Heidegger’s thought brings us is, first of all, 
synonymous with permanence, but also with inevitable belonging there 
o f all objects. Everything that is is gathered in the sphere of ground, 
and only there can be understood, hence what is historically distant, 
what constitutes the origin, the beginning, is also manifest in the pre­
sent, in a lived experience of now. Thus, the ground, Logos, as a founda­
tion of thinking is not only universal and temporally detached from 
us, but it connotes a decisive opening towards what may happen. Logos 
is, then, a collection (Sammlung), but also a reading and gathering:
Lego, legein, Latin legere, is the same as the German word "lesen” "to gather, 
collect, read", "Aihren lesen, Holz lesen, die Weinlese, die Auslese” (to glean, 
to gather wood, the vintage, the cream of the crop); "edn Bueh lesen” is only 
a variant of "lesen” in the strict sense, which is: to put one thing with an­
other, to 'bring together in short, to gather; but at the same time the one is 
marked off against the other. That is how the Greek mathematicians used 
the word. A  coin collection is not a mere quantity assembled any which 
way.3
Logos is an interpretation, i.e. a fundamental hearing of meaning as 
present in different contexts and situations. Heeding Logos is to listen 
to the words and unconceal the meaning wfhich underlies them. This 
meaning so differently present in "Ahrenlessen, die Weinlese, die Ausle­
se” is to be uncovered since as "Grund”  it has to be underneath, it has 
to, literally, under-lie a word. A t the same time this meaning has to be 
collected because it is precisely this intuition of collectednass of sense 
that secures the very possibility of understanding. Hence, the meaning 
does not only underlie a text, but also as a kind o f palimpsest it imposes 
itself upon separate words and texts making them work within a structure 
of unity. Logos "hovers over all” , and touches everything and it is preci­
sely the preposition "over” which is significant: meaning not only 
under-lies but also over-lies words and texts. This is what Heidegger is 
saying in his Introduction to Metaphysics:
>[...] such a xynon (collected presence) is the nomos of the polis, the statute 
that constitutes or puts together, the inner structure of the polis, not a uni­
versal that hovers over all and touches none, but the original unifying unity 
of what tends apart.4
As we shall see later this political verification o f Logos makes it close to 
Derrida’s pharmakon, a foundation and remedy constituting the Greek 
polis.
Logos is ithen, inherently an interpretation, an act o f unoonceal- 
ing the ground. This is implied in the commentary and re-reading of 
a passage from Heraclitus that Heidegger offers in his book:
Heraclitus means to say: Men have hearing, they hear words, but in this 
hearing, they cannot heed, i.e. follow what is not audible like words, what 
is not a discourse, a speaking, but indeed the logos.*
It is not a coincidence that Heidegger, one of the main influences on the 
postmodern poetics, describes understanding in the metaphor of voice. 
Miles Groth in his comments upon Heidegger uses the verb "hearken” 
to render the unique character of understanding:
Hearkening is primordial, antedating visual and other sensory experiences 
[...] one is always hearkening to what surrounds one, {...] is fundamentally 
sensitive and attuned to the world which is, in a primary way, heard.'
Heidegger carefully notices that in German "belong” (gehören) and 
"hear” (hören) are related not only etymologically but, first of all, ontolo- 
gically: the heart o f this relatedness lies in a sense of obedience —* I obe­
diently listen to those who/which belong together with me to one exis­
tential space. What this voice says interests us less as a human speech 
(sprechen), and more as a voice which reaches us from the outside as the 
voice of Being (Sage) which differs from a human voice although the two 
are neighbours. According to Werner Marx, the problem of localization 
of voice (Sage) necessitates our inhabiting a language so that we 
could uncover the "place of Silence”  (Ort der S tille ) hidden underneath 
words of speech:
Saying (¡Sage) is carefully differentiated from human speaking [...] saying de­
mands, calls, and collects into the word, which also does not belong to the 
human sphere, Dasein which belongs to Saying listens to it and its word 
and brings what it hears correspondingly into human-sounding word [...].7
We see then that the world is treated as a system of utterances, 
and voice is viewed as a procedure through which a text emerges from its 
background; voice gives contours to an object, a phenomenon is drawn 
by voice. Listening to this voice constitutes the heart of the hermeneutic 
process, a process through which meanings are unconcealed, i.e. a process 
which opens my response to and responsibility for the world.
Understanding is represented as voice but also as a division of voices. 
It is at this moment in Heidegger’s thought that the problematic of 
Logos as interpretation opens out to the question of language, i.e. to the 
problematic o f difference. As Heidegger himself suggests Logos is a "uni­
ty of what tends apart” , and through this implication he introduced 
a necessary rift between Logos as gathering and Logos as a gathering
of different objects, elements differentiated from one another. Voice of 
Being speaks necessarily through individualized voices. Following Hei- 
deggerian discourse Jean-Luc Nancy asserts that
[...] Vhermeneia poétique [...] consiste dans l ’enoeation sonore d’un logos. 
Uherrąeneia est la vçix du divin. Et cette voix est tout d’abord [...] voix 
partagée, différence de voix singulières. Autrement dit, il n’y a pas une voix 
du divin {...] mais la voix pour le divin, c’est le partage et la différence [...]. 
Cette différence est l’articulation du divin sur et dans l’humain.8
Heidegger himself suggested a reading of Logos as resident place for 
language in a well-known passage which claims that "logos also con­
tains within itself the essential origin of the character of all language, 
and thus determines the way of utterance as a logical way in the broader 
sense.” 9
Language, for Heidegger, is more than meets the linguist’s eye. It 
is not founded upon difference as distinction, neither is it a sphere of 
relational thinking as de Saussure believed. Difference, the division of 
voices, is important in Heidegger not because it draws our attention to 
either of the two ends, but because it opens a sphere which mediates 
between them, the sphere where Being appears, where Being can be 
seen or, rather, heard.
It is a region o f a rift (Riss) which, however, paradoxically implies 
and calls forth what Heidegger names "intimacy” :
[...] world and things [...] penetrate each other. Thus the two traverse a mid­
dle. In it, they are at one. Thus at one they are intimate. The middle of the 
two is intimacy.10
Difference is then an intimate space, a "dimension for world and thing” ,11 
and a spatial metaphor Heidegger uses in this quotation is a preparation 
for a famous passage from the essay What Are Poets For? in which the 
philosopher defines language as the "precinct (templum), that is, the 
house of Being” 12. Language is a space where Being makes itself mani­
fest no't by reference (that is to say not in the way signs refer to objects 
they denote), but by making Being present in texts. Language not only 
lives in the space between the first object and the original plenitude of 
Being, but it is in itself the first and most important difference in which 
all differences dwell.
According to Heidegger words are not signs of things. It is in words 
that things come into being as in a passage from Stefan George’s poem 
which he quotes and interprets in Unterwegs zur Sprache:
So I renounced and sadly see
Where word breaks off no thing may be.13
Interestingly enough Heidegger’s concept of language as a house where
Being dwells is parallel to Benjamin’s theory of language as a "home” :
The conviction that guides me in my literary attempts [...] is that each truth 
has its home, its ancestral place, in language, that this palace was built with 
the oldest logoi, and that to a truth thus founded the insights of the sciences 
will remain inferior for as long as they make do here and there in the area 
of language like nomads [...] in the conviction of the sign character of lan­
guage which produces the irresponsible arbitrariness of their terminology.14
For both Heidegger and Benjamin language is a territory of the 
overcome uncanniness of existence (a "home” or a "house” ), a region in 
which the energy of beginning imperceptibly becomes transmuted in the 
acquiescence of ending: language is a native realm, motherly place from 
which we set out and to which we eventually return. Language as "built 
with oldest logoi”  (Benjamin) or as the original oolleotedness o f things 
(Heidegger’s definition of Logos) necessarily must, in both caises, be 
a haunted palace, a house where one can listen to voice of Being (Sage), 
or to "ancestral”  voices, as Benjamin puts it in his fragment. Finally, 
purely descriptive and quantitative discourse of sciences differs from li­
terary discourse on the question of sign. The arbitrary, i.e. "irresponsible” 
terminology of sciences is made possible by the very fact that the sign 
is not anchored in the origiinary area, remains "homeless” or, as Ben­
jamin puts it, its existence resembles thait o f a "nomad” . If he calls 
this character of a sign "irresponsible” it is because a nomadic, homeless 
sign is locked in a circle of other signs and does not, cannot, respond to 
anything other than itself. The sign of sciences and scientific discourse 
remains inferior less because it is not responsible for, and more for its 
inability to respond to the Other.
Heidegger in his discussion of the status of the art work also emphas­
izes an inescapable dialogical, or responsive/responsible, character of the 
sign within the work of art. A  distinction which the ¡philosopher traces 
between a work and an art work is precisely a self-enclosedness of the 
sign in a work and its openness in an aesthetic object. A  profoundly 
architectural structure of language surfaces in art because it is there 
where the sign becomes a house inhabited by the Other which has to be 
detected, hearkened, and brought to light within the physical shape of 
language as its meaning.
The art work is [...] a thing that is made, but it says something other than 
the mere thing itself is, alio agoreuei. The work makes public something other 
than itself; it manifests something other; it is an allegory. In the work of 
art something other is brought together with the thing that is made. To bring 
together is, in Greek, sumballein. The work is a symbol.15
Language is a shelter, a house of Being because it is a place where 
a thingly character of an object coexists with its existential element, 
where a material being of a work is seen as
[...] out-standing standing-within the essential sunderance of the clearing of 
beings.16
This ancestral home haunted by voice of Being is, architecturally, related, 
with the Greek temple the description of which w ill be given later. Here 
let it suffice to say that like the Greek temple, the house of language is 
transparent, i.e. like a collonade of the Greek templům  it does not sepa­
rate and seal off, but through spacing, a rhythmical distancing, it brings 
into the open,
{...] the Open which poetry lets happen {...] in such a way that only now, 
in the midst of beings, the Open brings beings to shine and ring out.17
Poets have, for Heidegger, this ability to name which is never an innocent 
and in-different naming, but in which a poet "names the gods and names 
all things in that which they are” .18
Such an area is very carefully delineated in Heidegger’s writings 
where it is described as das Gevierte, the sphere of the mysterious 
Fourfold where the sky meets the earth, and mortals dwell with Gods. 
A  temporal dimension of this territory is defined, like the architectural 
structure of language as a house, as a sudden opening of the now and 
its melting with a most distant temporal horizon which calls forth most 
primeval traditions ("ancestral home” o f Benjamin). Das Gevierte which 
Heidegger tries to uncover in all works of men (see his interpretation 
of Van Gogh’s painting in the essay The Origin of the W ork of A rt ) can 
be read (or mis-riead) through Benjamin’s concept of Jetztzeit which the 
V IX  thesis on The Philosophy of History defines as a mysterious and 
discontinuous presence of the tradition in the moment of now:
History is the subject of a structure whose site is not homegenous empty 
time, but time filled by the presence of the now.19
What in Benjamin is characteristically historicized in Heidegger’s 
philosophy becomes metaphysical, a(nd a sudden explosion of now into 
meaning is described as
listening to the tradition that does not give itself up to the past but thinks 
of the present.20
The analysis of a literary text ought to, in the Heideggerian literary theo­
ry, bring the text to the Open, i.e. to reveal the way in which the four 
elements of the Fourfold call each other forth. In other words, a critic’s 
effort w ill be directed towards seeing a text as silhouetted against the 
back-Ground which is Being, and since Being resides in the house of 
language, it is through language that the critic would try to weave his 
interpretative thread.
Interpretation, through recognizing separateness of the elements of 
the work, through rethinking their thingly character, tries to reestab­
lish a link with their ontological background. Hence, as Geoffrey Hart­
man claims, the significance of literature lies outside the edge of paper. 
The problem of interpretation is a question of both recognizing and over­
coming the radical separation introduced by a frame. Interpretation is 
the sublation (aujhebung) of a frame.
What the edge means is impossible to define in terms of inside and outside 
or balance or imbalance. The equilibrium of a page or book is like the illuso­
ry concept of Greek repose; that balance which in Hegel’s dialectic is [...] 
thrown off balance, the limit-boundary is crossed or sublated.21
One of the questions thht still remain to be answered concerns the 
position of the author in Heidegger’s vision of interpretation. To begin 
with, Heidegger forcefully insists on the unimportance of the author as 
individuality in a paradoxical belief that the excellency of the product 
is measured by the degree of its independence from its producer. In his 
comment upon Trakl’s poem Heidegger ironically gives us the author’s 
full name only to deconstruct it in the next sentence:
i
The poem was written by Georg Trakl. Who the author is remains unimpor­
tant here, as with every other masterful poem. The mastery consists pre­
cisely in this, that the poem can deny the author.22
To deconstruct the author is to explode certain closure that limits a given 
text and confines it to this or that structure of personality, i.e. it brings 
the text to the Open, or to be more specific to the truth of the Open:
Truth is the primal conflict in which, always in some particular way, the 
Open is won within which everything stands and from which everything 
withholds itself thatt shows iitself and withdraws itself as a being.23
We can again interpret Heidegger through Benjamin who, as Terry 
Eagleton claims, like the author of Being and Time, believed in the crea­
tor as someone who hearkens to the voice of Gods:
Being speaks in Sache [...] which in turn speaks through the language of 
literary texts, which in turn go to compose the tradition that speaks to and 
through individual subject.24
We see, then, that the author deconstructed by Heidegger becomes 
a version of open collectedness, a gathering of many voices and tradi­
tions that speak to and through him, and who must be totally available 
to all of them. In one word, the author can be best understood as 
Dasein. This term enables us to use' the very word "author” without 
being lured into interpreting it on a personal ground, as Dasein implies
precisely a radical opening which precludes a closure o f the personal. 
Dasein is open because it has been made available to its own future,
i.e. it is impossible to speak of Dasein without realizing that what we 
speak of is a constant movement between the future and the past.
This temperality of Dasein, that is to say of interpretation, since 
Heidegger claims that
The phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic [...] it designates this busi­
ness of interpreting25,
can be represented in grammatical categories as Dasein’s "having been” 
rather than plainly "was” , is” , or „w ill be” . Such a situation is 
described in Being and Time where Dasein’s thrownness into the world, 
its being-in-advance-of-itself is shown as inherently interwoven with its 
past. Hence Dasein, the author as Dasein, i.e. interpretation of the text, 
is a certain explosion of the now which becomes saturated with the futu­
re and the past. As the author as Dasein cannot be presented in the lan­
guage of the personal closure, interpretation as the existential operation 
is always multi-directional and multivocal.
We can see, then, that the autor viewed in the categories of Dasein 
is the sphere of the Open, i.e. it belongs to a territory where the future 
meets the past, a place where personality is deconstructed and instead 
we obtain a crossroads of numerous, past and future, readings of events. 
Dasein is there (Da) because it is never closed within the confines oi 
a strictly limited personal territory, but it mixes with the world, and thus, 
together with the world, somehow waits for itself outside.
The author is Dasein because he melts his own past with the future 
of the work in an event, a happening, which has been. The author as 
Dasein is indistinguishable from his texts, he does not stand "before 
them” , but is "in them” . As Heidegger would put it in his Rilke essay:
Artist ds like a passageway that destroys itself in the creative process for 
the work to emerge.26
In the discourse of the architectural metaphor so dear to Heidegger, we 
can say that the author as Dasein is a passageway, a transition for 
language, in the same way as language was a house of Being. It is not 
the man that speaks. It is language that does all the speaking, and the 
author is but another item in language’s vocabulary.
2. Derrida's Parcours
I write when commanded by the 
spirits and the moment I have writ­
ten I see the words fly about the 
room in all directions. It is then 
published and the spirits can read 
[...]■
—  William Blake to Crabbe Robin­
son
To speak of Jacques Derrida is to speak, first of all, of a text. Npt
only because in philological or hermeneutic investigations one should
cautiously avoid bringing in author’s personality but for a more funda­
mental reason: for Derrida, there is nothing that evades the naime of 
a text, a text is a synonym o f the universe. In a Buddhist story related 
about Chuang-tzu the master wakes up from a dream in which he was 
a butterfly to plunge in uncertainty as to whether it was Chuang-tzu 
that dreamed the butterfly, or perhaps the butterfly that still dreams 
Chuang-tzu.
Analogically, Derrida is aware of a fundamental ambiguity: we have 
no available means to ascertain whether we constitute a part of a book, 
or whether a book is a part of us. Such a dilemma does not appear 
overtly in his writing, but forms its hidden, subterrenous movement, 
and that is why an American translator o f De la grammatologie 
rightly completes her brief biographical information of Derrida with 
a characteristic statement which is more true of Derrida than of any 
other philosopher:
Jacques Derrida is also this collection of texts.27
Man does not exist outside a text, but co-exists with its letter. The ter­
minology of this sentence is overtly Heideggerian, and Derrida does not 
conceal his indebtedness to the author of Sein und Zeit. To remain in 
the wake of Heidegger’s discourse we could say that Derrida frequently 
unconceals Heidegger.
Positions; the work which on the one hand can be recommended as 
the most clear elucidation o f his views, but which, at the same time, 
characteristically blurs the contours between fiction and reality (the 
book consists of the imaginary conversations Derrida held with various 
scholars) opens with the following observation:
Rien de ce que je tents n’aurait été possible sans l ’ouverture des questions 
heideggeriennes [...] sans l’attention à ce que Heidegger appelle la différence 
ontico-ontologique, la différence entre l’être ët l ’étant telle qu’elle reste 
d’une certaine manière impensée par la philosophie.28
It is with the term "différence” that the passage offers us a master key 
to Derrida’s philosophy. The traditions informing Derrida’s thought in
this respect are Heideggerian metaphysics and de Saussure’s linguistics, 
nevertheless they are both overcome by the temporal and spatial inter­
pretation of the consept of "différence” in grammatology. As Derrida 
rightly points out D ifférer signifies a double encircling: first, it denotes 
an estrangement of a thing from other things, a circle of identity in 
which it becomes inscribed ("un sens de différer [...] ne pas être identique, 
être autre, discernable t...]” 29); second, it marks a circle which makes our 
way towards a thing that is ever absent and illusive, in other words, it 
marks a constant delay and distance separating us from a thing ("The 
thing itself always escapes” 30). From these two statements Derrida can 
easily derive all the important items of his grammatological dictionary 
which w ill also frequently appear in this book: archi-écriture, archi- 
-trace, supplement, pharmakon, hymen.
We can see that the central place of différence in Derrida’s philo­
sophy is secured by two movements: one which singles out an object, and 
the other which is established by the economy of delay or detour, o f 
marching always on the peripheries, on the margins of a thing, marching 
that was set in motion by the ineluctable sign character of an object 
(marge —  marque —  marche). Différence is not, as in de Saussure, 
a differentiation of one phenomenon from another, neither is it, as in 
Heidegger, a rift (Riss) between a differentiated object and the domain o f 
the Same, but it becomes a dominating mode of production of reality. 
It is différence that underlies all the observable differences. In other 
words, it is a coup-de-grace dealt at the belief that the originary sphere 
is the realm o f Sameness. Derrida’s différence is far more profound 
than de Saussure’s or Heidegger’s as its productive character abolishes 
the myth of the origin as well as the archetype of the Same. For these 
reasons différence, in Derrida’s terminology, becomes différance. This 
silent, inaudible (marque muette) transition from e to a signifies 5 
things:
1. As we have already said, it underscores a generative function of 
what in de Saussure and Heidegger was only a regulatory operation: it 
is through the endless fall down the abyss of différence that we can see 
all minute differences o f reality:
Le différences sont produit —  différées —  par la différance.31 L ’activité ou
la productivité connotées par le a de la différance renvoient au mouvement
génératif dans le jeu des différences.32
2. A  peculiar mixture of "deferment” and "difference” which occurs 
in the French word différer accounts for the semiotic situation in which 
all the codes o f reality present themselves as a historical structuring of 
differences. An object viewed from the perspective of différance is al­
ways a certain temporary arrangement of form, magma approximating
an evanescent shape. A  thing in grammatological theory is a "tissue of 
differences”  (tissu de différences), becomes unspeakable in the economy 
of deferment and the movement of absence:
The economic character of différance in no way implies that the deferred 
presence can always be recovered [...]33
3. This economy implies a fundamental inability to describe, to dis­
mount an object, to demonstrate all parts of a thing, all elements o f 
a text, since a thing or a text are only a certain structure of temporaneity 
which forms a changeable configuration of lines or threads of sense. 
A  text is, then, in the theory of différance a cluster (faisceau) of d iffe­
rences which separate one reading from another:
Je tiens ici au mot de faisceau pour deux raisons: d’une part il ne s’agira 
pas [...] de décrire une histoire, d’en raconter les étapes, texte par texte, 
contexte par contexte, montrant chaque fois quelle économie a pu imposer 
ce dérèglement graphique; mais bien du système général de cette économie. 
D’atre part le mot faisceau parait plus propre à marquer que le rassemble­
ment proposé a la structure d’une intrication, d’un tissage, d’un croisement 
qui laissera repartir les différents fils et les différentes lignes de sens [...] 
tout somme il sera prêt à en nouer d’autres.34
4. It follows that if a text is a configuration of senses, also the 
author, the producer of the text, w ill be no more than a debris of his 
own, proper, name usually sanctioning, appropriating a specific personal 
sense of a text. Like a text, the author is a collection of fragments: the 
graphic derangement Derrida’s speaks of (dérèglement graphique) o f the 
text caused by différance runs parallel to the derangement of the unity 
that so far has been guaranteed by the proper name (as Rimbaud claims, 
a poet is a man characerized by "dérèglement de tout les senses’’35). The 
text is a variety of fragments, the author is a variety of madness.
Un texte n’exits, ne résiste, ne consiste, ne refoule, ne se laisee lire ou écrire 
que s’il est travaillé par l’illisibilité d’un nom propre. Je n’ai pas [...] dit 
que le nom propre existe et qu’il devient illisible quand il tombe dans la 
signature. Le nom propre ne résonne, se perdant aussitôt, qu’à l’instant de 
son débris, où il se casse, e brouille, s’enraye en touchant au seing.36
5. Thus, the philosophy of différance has to be a philosophy of error 
and distortion. It starts as a spelling mistake (”grosse faut d’ortographe 
[...] ce manquement à l’orthodoxie réglant une écriture [...]” 37) substitu­
ting a for e, and leads to the theory of mis-reading according to which 
"le texte est composé en liame et en lierre” ,38 but such a vision of a text 
sees it first o f all as distorted (texte torsé).
Derrida introduces the architectural metaphor into his works, but 
there, according to his rule of the free play of signifiants, architecture
ceases to be simply architecture, and becomes archi-écriture. A  conta­
mination of architecture and writing (écriture) opens, in a next step of 
the linguistic play, an analogy with the Greek arche, the original foun­
dation upon which Being is erected. Thus, the architecture of Being, the 
ontological edifice of human thought is a form of writing (archi-ÉCRI- 
TURE) the profound originality of which cannot be questioned (ARCHI- 
-écriture). It is here, at this moment, where we begin to notice a radical 
difference between the two styles of philosophical, hermeneutic, archi­
tecture: Heideggerian and Derridian.
Before we discuss this difference it has to be noticed that the very 
problem of style is of a fundamental value. A  style is synonymous to 
our intervention into the world, the intervention which is frequently 
brutal and deadly; our definition of style emphasizes its violence com­
mitted upon the self-sufficiency and identity of the world which tries 
constantly to defend itself against our naming. A  style (stylus) is not 
only a pen but also, originally, a spur, a rapier, a fallic object, a cutting 
and tearing blade:
Le style éperonnant, l’object long, oblong, arme de parade autant qu’il per­
fore, la pointe oblongifoliée tenant sa puissance apotropaique de tissus, toiles, 
voiles qui se bandemt, se ploient ou déploient autout d’elle, c’est aussi, ne 
pas l’oublier, le parapluie.3*
Nevertheless, the very defence of the world against human naming is 
already its entering into the indissoluble bond with man. Cid Corman’s 
oral poetics sees this ontological aspect underlying the Derridian entan­
glement of language in paradoxes:
Language [...] is a weapon, instrument, plume and rapier, bomb and caress. 
It is the soul and spirit that we extol ourselves by. It is the exaltation and 
exultation man has provided himself out of his physical being. It is a bond.4*
It follows from Heidegger’s doctrine that "withdrawing” , which is 
a withdrawal upward, emphasizes the role of the domain from which 
objects emerge; thus, Heidegger’s building stands firm  against the forces 
of nature which, although deadly and threatening, serve as the ontolo­
gical background against which an object must be seen. Let us refer to 
the already mentioned presentation of the Greek temple:
It simply stands there in the midst of a rugged, rocky valley. The edifice 
surrounds the statue of God and lets it, in its concealment, stand out through 
the collonade into the sacred sphere [...]. The presence of God is in itself the 
unfolding and confining of a sphere sacred. The temple and its sphere do 
not float away into indefiniteness [...]. Standing there the edifice rests on bed­
rock. This repose of the building draws out the darkness of the huge, and 
yet suppressed to nothing character of the rock. [...] The unshakebleness of the 
edifice opposes the waves of the sea and, because of its own calm, lets them 
appear in their fury.41
Derrida precludes the very possibility of such a background; his philo­
sophy leaves no room for, what Heidegger calls, die Gegnet which is 
a place where essents stems from. Hence, while an architect can, in Hei­
degger’s theory, step back, withdraw, to a place from which his building 
w ill have ideal proportions and symmetries, a Derridian builder never 
has anything else at his disposal than mere notation, drawing, W RITING, 
a draft or a scheme of a structure. Heidegger’s temple can be completed 
and seen against the sky, while Derrida’s dome w ill remain for ever 
unifinished, and thus w ill only be a trace, a suggestion, of a building.
W e should not let go unnoticed the fact that Heidegger in his in­
terpretation of the Greek temple underscores a function of the founda­
tions, the rock upon which the structure is built. Derrida’s architecture 
does not admit of such a solid material, but is founded upon writing 
(écriture). Writing is, for Derrida, a sign of infinity. Thus, archi-écriture 
is a combination of indestructibility with an uninterrupted generating of 
new objects.
The way in which Derrida speaks of writing is reminiscent of the 
manner in which mystics speak of God. Commenting upon the structure
o f his first major book, De la grammatologie, Derrida remarks 'that
[...] on se -tromperait en effet à conclure de ce qui s’intitule «La fin du livre 
et le commencement de l’écriture» à la mort du livre et à la naissance de 
récriture. Une page avant le chapitre qui porte ce titre, une distinction se 
proposait entre la clôture et la fin. Ce qui est pris dans la cloture dé-limitée 
peut continuer indéfiniment. Pourvu qu’on ne se contente pas de lire le titre, 
celui-ci annonce précisément qu’il n’y a pas de fin du livre et qu’il n’y a pas 
de commencement de l’écriture. Ce chapitre montre justement que l’écriture 
ne commence pas. C’est meme à partir d’elle, si on peut dire, qu’on met en 
question la requête d’une archie, d’un commencement absolu, d’une origine. 
L ’écriture ne peut donc pas plus commencer que le livre finir [...].42
We can compare this passage with the following fragment from Angelus 
Silesius:
G-ott it noch nie gewest /'und wird niemals sey/ Und bleibt do-ch nach der 
Welt/ war auch vor ihr allein.43
Such a comparison is only superficially justified. If, for Scheffler 
(Angelus Silesius’s real name), a paradoxical nature of the Absolute does 
not invalidate efforts leading to its apprehension, Derrida’s writing se­
vers all connections between his thought and traditionally vital philo­
sophical notions of Absolute or Transcendence. I f  the mystical doctrine 
locates Absolute outside the domain of sign (in Derridian rhetoric: God 
lies beyond a trace, outside archi-écriture), Derrida does not leave the 
slightest doubt as to the fact that for him there is no possibility to step 
outside the system of signs. For a mystic, a theologian or a traditional phi­
losopher, the world is a scheme of signs, a network of signifiants the sig­
nifies of which lie outside; a gramma tologdst erases the transcendental 
signifié usually associated with Logos, with the original Word which 
gave birth to all the forms of the universe. What follows this otriginary 
utterance is traces, signs, pointing at the place where they started their 
existence which never becomes fu lly  independent.
The subordination of the trace to the full presence summed up in the Logos, 
the humbling of writing beneath the speech dreaming its plenitude, such 
are the gestures required by an onto-theology determining the archeological 
and eschatological meaning of being as presence, as parousia, as life without 
differance: another name for death, historical metonymy where God’s name 
holds death in check.44
A  further comment pertinent to the subject of Logos as understood in 
the onto-theological tradition Derrida tries to overcome is found in 
Geoffrey Hartman’s book:
«At the beginning was the Word» means that there can be no period of time 
of which we could state that there was time with no language [...]. Our 
striving for an absolute self or unmediated vision simply brings to light all 
rhat mediates the incurably visionary self: if we are, we are in time and in 
language •[...]. The "desire of truth” is indeed the "truth of desire”, but the 
latter is disclosed only as the "untruth of style”.45
Archeology, which for Derrida epitomizes metaphorically the tra­
ditional onto-theological stance in philosophy, reminds us of the Hei- 
deggcrian style which is par excellence an archeological reconstruction 
of an ancient temple. What is more, the sanctuary described by Hei­
degger is also a seat of God and, thus, a central point of the world, the 
point which determines the order and events:
The temple edifice disposes and at the same time assembles around itself 
the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and 
blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and recession acquire their form 
and course in the destiny of human essence.46
The style of Derrida’s archi-écriture is essentially and necessarily pen- 
-oriented:
La question du style c’est toujours l ’examen, le pesant d’un object pointu. 
Parfois seulement d’une plume. Mais aussi bien d’un stylet, voire d’un poi- 
gnard.47
It is important to note that the building erected according to the rules of 
the Derridian style is a structure of a total character; it cannot be other­
wise since writing is the most general formula for all the strategies and 
operations performed by men because of its inevitable, profound, trace
character. Writing is, for Derrida, not a mode of notation, of communi­
cating the world, but a radical mode of its existence. This is a point which 
opens De la grammatologie where writing seems to approximate Hei­
degger’s "language”  although ultimately Derrida is aware of the essen­
tial difference between the two terms:
[...] we tend to say "writing” for all that and more: to designate not only 
the physical gestures of literal pictographic or ideographic incription, but 
also the totality of what makes it possible; and also, beyond the signifying 
face, the signified face itself. And thus we say "writing” for all that gives 
rise to an inscription in general, whether it is literal or not even if it [...] is 
alien to he order of voice.48
Even in this fragment Derrida’s indebtedness to Heidegger is noti­
ceable: "la totalité de ce qui la rend possible” stands close to Heidegger’s 
"die Genet” as described in Feldweg. Nevertheless, a distinction between 
language and writing opens a fissure between the two styles of philosophi­
cal architecture. In its nature language is, according to Heidegger, 
a phonetic matter, is born of breath, not of hand. Heideggerian language 
described metaphorically as the "Voice of Being” {Sage) is a pneumatic 
essent, and its written variety cannot but be reminiscent of the imma­
terial original. Pondering a passage from Rousseau:
If the natural law had been written only in the human reason, it would be 
little capable of directing most of our actions. But it is also engraved in the 
heart of man in ineffaçable characters [...]. There it cries to him.49
Derrida rightly observes that writing in such an understanding is 
only a substitute of speech, a graph is a poor relative of a phoneme. In­
scriptions engraved in a heart, the invisible writing of the soul, as well 
as inscriptions upon the walls of Roman temples, or smooth sentences in 
the diaries of elegant, romantically sentimental ladies are attempts at 
this radical replacement, essential substitution and representation (Hei­
degger’s vorstellen) of what IS, but what remains absent in the inscript­
ion. An inscription upon an Alpine rock and a verse written on a sheet 
of vellum paper do not differ in their essence: both recall the absent 
original, and both are signs of its momentarily eclipsed presence. In short, 
voice, phoné, is a presence, while writing is its substitute.
In practice it implies a questioning of what may be described as To­
tality (Derrida uses the term himself), a region in which our understan­
ding of the world reaches its highest point. It is possible to translate 
Derrida’s discourse into Blake’s rhetoric, and then .state that Totality is 
this moment when our vision is characterized by clarity allowing us to 
notice what, so far, has been sealed as "usual” or "every day” . Totality 
is another name for the result of the process of "cleansing the doors of 
perception” (The Marriage of Heaven and Hell), the moment of "seeing
infinity in an hour” (Auguries of Innocence) the area where a transition 
from experience to innocence takes place.
It is with the word "experience” that our translation falters, as Der­
rida brackets this notion as inherently connected With the presence o f 
the original: we can experience only what is given to us in its immedia­
cy, i.e. an object which we face directly without a detour of the sign. 
European metaphysics centered round the concept of the transcendental 
Presence which leaves its imprints, traces, in the physical reality treated 
the notion of "experience” as vitally important. Thus, Derrida in his 
Nietzschean attempt at the revaluation of all metaphysics erases expe­
rience, brackets it, and makes it absent. Derrida’s sous rature, the stra­
tegy of erasing concepts which are present only as traces, as marks, as 
shadows, is an Ockhamian manouver, but where Ockham uses a razor, 
Derrida contents himself with an eraser:
"Experience” has always designated the relationship with a presence, whe­
ther that relationship had the form of consciousness or not Thus, for 
example, the experience whose "theory”, Hjelmslev says, "must be indepen­
dent” is not the whole of experience. It always corresponds to a certain type 
of factual or regional experience (historical, psychological, physiological, so­
ciological, etc.), giving rise to a science that is itself regional [...].50
1
Everything, according to Derrida’s deconstruction theory, is a trace, and 
there can be no original since the very conceptualizing and naming 
makes it already a trace, a mere imprint. I f  Derrida uses words remi­
niscent of the traditional metaphysics (like "Totality” , for example) it 
is only to suggest that there is no "Totality” , no ontological background 
from which objects, words, signs, texts, originally stem. Heidegger empha­
sized his belief in language as the House of Being because he saw a possi­
bility of profound ontological movement outside this House; this move­
ment was, for him, necessary, as a man was basically an essent "on the 
way” towards the House:
Thinking itself is a way. We correspond to this way by being on .the way.51
When interpreting a text (a world) man is called by the voice of 
Being to withdraw towards the original plenitude. For Derrida such 
a movement is impossible. If, in Heidegger’s theory, the word 
must be anchored in what preceded it (Sprechen is made clearly 
distinct from Sage), in Derrida’s posthermeneutic theory the word only 
reverberates and reflects another word. For Heidegger language is the 
House in which there lives what IS, for Derrida language (that is to say, 
writing) itself is what IS. Hartman rightly notices rabinnic sources of this 
attitude.
Derrida lets language be, not by nonchalance but by giving it its "to be”, as 
he doconstructs a text or moves within, rather than simply against, equivo­
cation and the multiple register of words. As in the Hebrew liturgy that 
quoted God against God to plead a covenant in danger, so here words are 
quoted against words to save the contract between word and thing [...]. Let 
no one mistake this nonbook: Glas [a title of Derrida’s work] is of the House 
of Galilee.52
It is here and now that we come back to the notion of sous rature 
and to our discussion of the differences between the two philosophers. 
Sous rature, as an interpretative, methodological strategy ows its ex­
istence to Heidegger’s text Zur Seinsfrage. Seemingly, the two passages 
could have been written by one hand:
A. A  thoughtful glance ahead into this realm of "Being” can write it only 
as Beifig. The drawing of these crossed lines at first only wards off, 
especially the habit of conceiving "Being” as something standing by itself 
[...]. The sign of crossing through can, to be sure [...] not be merely 
a negative sign of crossing out [...].53
B. [...] the sign M that ill-named thing, the only one, that escapes the insti­
tuting question of philosophy: "what is...?”54
The graphic similarity is suppressed by interpretative differences. 
According to Heidegger’s "crossing through” (Durchkreutzung) is far 
from identical with "crossing out” (Durchstreichung), and therefore there 
can be no homology between it and Derrida’s sous rature which is an 
invalidation, essential bracketing, ontological erasure, annihilation. Just 
the opposite, Durchkreutzung opens the possibility of withdrawing to­
wards the place of a more essential meaning, the place which is the Ori­
gin of all meaning. Thus, a text in Heidegger’s hermeneutics will always 
contain a possibility of readings which lie outside its area, are external 
to writing: in Derrida’s theory a book reads only what lies between its 
lines. For the author of Sein und Zeit there exists a territory which is 
not a text; grammatology looks at such a possibility as at an unaccount­
able philosophical scandal.
It is logical that Derrida points out certain basic inconsistencies in 
Heidegger’s philosophy. Although the diagnosis of the illness from which 
suffers metaphysics is in both thinkers similar, it is Heidegger who, 
according to Derrida, stops half way between a diagnosis and remedy. 
Questioning the correctness of all the fundamental concepts of Western 
philosophy (e.g. a reinterpretation of Logos) Heidegger still remains cap­
tive of the onto-theological tradition from which he originally tried to 
break away. Heidegger’s philosophy is, then, "phonocentric” , that is to 
say, it remains loyal to the line of thinking which sees in voice under­
stood both in the mystical and phonetic sense the element of the Origin, 
of the initial Presence. In Positions Derrida, having stated his indebted­
ness to Heidegger, goes on to say:
[■..] il y a sans doute un certain phonologisme heideggerien, un privilège non 
critique accordé chez lui, comme dans tout l ’occident, à la voix, à une «subs­
tance d’expression» déterminée. Ce privilège, dont les conséquences sont con­
siderables et systématiques, se laisse reconnaître par exemple dans la pre­
valence significative de tant de métaphores «phoniques», dans une médita­
tion sur l’art qui reconduit toujours, à travers des exemples dont le choix 
est très marqué, a l ’art comme «mise en oeuvre de la vérité». Or l’admirable 
méditation par laquelle Heidegger répète l’origine ou l’esence de la vérité ne 
met jamais en question le lieu au logos et a la phonè.55
Discussing in De la grammatologie a silent voice which is for Heidegger 
the voice of Beinç and the voice of the Source ("die Gewähr der lautlosen 
Stimme verborgener Quellen” ) Derrida writes:
The voice of the sources is not heard. A  rupture between the originary mean­
ing of being and the word, between meaning and the voice, between "the 
voice of Being’’ and the "phome”, between the "call of bein’’, and articulated 
sound; such a rupture, which at once confirms a fundamental metaphor, and 
renders it suspect by accentuating its metaphoric discrepancy, translates the 
ambiguity of the Heideggerian situation with respect to the metaphysics of 
presence and logocentrism. It is at once contained within it and transgresses 
it.56
Similarly, in Marges de la philosophie Derrida refers to Heidegger’s 
stance as to "une autre face de la nostalgie que j ’appellerai l ’espérance 
heideggerienne” , and describes it as „la quête du mot propre at du nom 
unique.” 57
The hope which Derrida uncovers in Heidegger is a hope of Presence, 
of the meaning of a text which may be inarticulate, but which lets itself 
be heard in a text, and it is the erasure (sous rature) of his hope that 
constitutes the heart of Derrida’s philosophical strategy.58 A ll that the 
reader has at his disposal is a "trace” , a sign, deprived of the original, 
a signifiant bereft of its signifié. A  foot-print on the sand does not lead 
to the foot that has been its origin but only to another foot-print. In the 
story of Robinson Crusoe written by Derrida the industrious Englishman 
w ill never find his black handy man.
Reality is a text which cannot leave, and thus it is wandering from 
one trace to another, a mere journey among signifiants without once 
encountering a signifiée. A  meaning of a text, according to Derrida, lies 
in a difference between two traces, in a void between two signs.
The trace is not on ly the disappearance o f o rig in  —  w ith in  the discourse that 
w e sustain and according to the path that w e  fo llo w  it  means that the orig in  
did not even disappear, that it was never constituted excep t rec ip roca lly  by 
a nonorigin, the trace, w h ich thus becomes the orig in  o f  the o r ig in .59
A  "path” is a metaphor which, as the alternative for the worn out 
philosophical terminology, is used both by Heidegger (Feldweg, Holzwege)
and Derrida {parcours). It is significant that a "path”  is not a crowded 
street or even a tarmac road, but both "Feldweg”  and "parcours” are, 
what Wordsworth in his Lucy Poems describes as a track far from the 
"trodden ways” . Heidegger’s path upon which "dw ell” (to use a Words­
worthian phrase again) the three participants of the debate related in 
Gelassenheit has a well-marked aim which, although difficult to verba­
lize, is a definitive conclusion of the conversation:
AYXL|3aair|: "moving-into-nearness”. The word could rather, so it seems to me 
now, be the name for our walk today along this country path.60
This convergence of the end of the discourse with the end of the path 
is not incidental. It emphasizes the intentional character of man as an 
essent "on the way” . Karl Lowith, in his book on Heidegger, gives 
a succinct and accurate description of Heidegger’s paths:
They are said to be overgrown because they are very rarely, travelled upon, , 
and also that they end in unmarked wilderness. A  man can be easily lost bn 
them. In fact, they themselves get lost in the immutably same forest of 
Being.'1
Derrida’s parcours is deprived of such an aim; it is merely a transi­
tion from one sign to another for two reasons —  there is nothing that 
precedes language (which could be a beginning of the journey), and 
also there is nothing that exceeds language (which could be a Heidegge- 
rian approximation of the Origin, the end of the path). Derrida’s path 
is forever locked in a circle of written signs in the same way as a par­
cours is a place where horses perform their ritualistic warm-up round be­
fore a race (although one may logically conclude that Derrida excludes 
a race which assumes a finish line, a goal, a final purpose).
There is no knowledge except in the form of a text —  of écriture —  and that 
is devious and dissolving, very unabsolute, as it leads to other texts and 
further writing.62
Even archi-écriture, the term which seems to be the ultimate concept 
of Derrida’s thought, is only another name for a trace:
[...] arche-writing would be at work not only In (the form and substance of 
graphic expression but also in those of non-graphic expressions. It would 
constitute not only the pattern uniting form to all substance, graphic or 
otherwise, but the movement of the sign-function linking a content to an 
expression, whether it be graphic or not.63
Lowith in his description of Heidegger’s path had recourse to the 
metaphor of a forest. A  brief digression w ill enable us to link this meta­
phor with the problematic of the proper name (in Marges de la philosophie
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Derrida inscribed Heidegger’s hope into the circle of „la quête du mot 
propre et du nom unique”).
In chapter III  o f Through the Looking-glass Alice enters a forest in 
which animals are not afraid of men. In a leasurely walk through the 
wood the girl is accompanied by a fawn which suddenly runs away once 
the awkward pair has left the forest. The explantion provided by Lewis 
Carrdl is close to the Heideggerian concept of Being as the inarticulate 
call: the forest is a territory without difference, a realm where names do 
not hold, a Structure without capitalization. It is vitally important to note 
that this sphere is not without language (Alice does talk to the fawn), 
but it is very markedly a domain without a proper name (the fawn asked 
about his name answers promptly " I  can’t remember here” ). Thus, the 
forest is a territory where, through a withdrawal of the name, the Carte­
sian dualism of the hard, mechanical substance of being and its delicate, 
mental form is overcome. Such a forest is not only Heidegger’s forest of 
Being, but —  more generally —  it is the forest of phenomenological 
thinking which:
[...] rejects both objective (mechanical) body and transparent intelligence 
(mind) as an immediate interpretaltian of experience. What is accepted, how­
ever, is a subject equipped with a body whose each activity is a funda­
mental transition from formlessness to a form, whose gesture precede all the 
later clarity of intellectual explanations.64
We have pointed out an extraordinary intellectual volume of the 
concept of écriture (writing as a style of ontology), now we shall try to 
specify a more spacious, architectural analogy of the world as writing. 
In the final section of his first major work, a translation of Husserl’s 
Die Krisis der europeischen Wissenschaften und die transcendentale 
Phänomenologie, Derrida coucludes:
Contrairement à ce .que la phénoménologie —  qui est toujours phénoménolo­
gie de la perception —  a tenté de nous fair croir (...] la chose même se dé­
robe toujours. Contrairement à l ’assurance que nous en donne Husserl un 
peu plus loin, "le regard” ne peut pas "demeurer”.65
An object (a sign, a text) disappears (se derobe), but the next verb 
{demeurer) specifies a quality of this disappearing: it is not an external, 
material shape that disappears to uncover the invisible essence of an 
object, but it is a disappearing which uncovers another layer of external 
ornament, another robe, i.e. another signifiant.
The world of Derrida is a world without a contour, without a real 
face and without a sanctioning outside. A  text of the world, according to 
grammatology, has all the characteristic features of the labirynth.
The ontological architecture of Heidegger’s and Ponty’s understan­
ding of the text defends itself against the labirynthine danger by the
idea of Zusamengehôren, of my fundamental unity with the world. While 
the most essential feature of the labirynth is its closeness, opening is 
a crucial concept for both Heidegger and Ponty. In a temple there resi­
des something that does not belong to it (Heidegger), in an act of vision 
there hides something that is invisible (Ponty), but in the labirynth there 
in no outside. If "sense” is a width of the fissure through which I can 
see the other side of the world in which I am locked, then Heidegger’s 
temple and a new rhetorical architecture of Merleau-Ponty are fu lly 
phenomenological constructions: I perceive a presence which is different 
from myself, but with which I stand in the essential unity of co-belon­
ging, of being-with. This is how Derrida understands phenomenology:
[...] nous réservons de préférence le mot de Bedeutung pour l’ancienne notion 
[of meaning —  TS], en particulier dans la tournure complexe de Bedeutung 
logique ou "expressive”. Quant au mot "sens” nous continuous à l’employer 
dans son extension la plus large [...] le "sens”, est une idéalité, intelligible 
ou sprituelle, qui peut éventuellement s’unir à la face sensible d’un signi­
fiant, mais qui en soi n’en a nul besoin. Sa présence, son sens ou son essence 
de sens est pensable hors de cet entrelacement des lors que la phénoménolo­
gue, comme le isemiotioien, pretend se référer à une unité pure, a une face 
rigoureusement identifiable du sens ou du signifié.66
A  phenomenological sense is defined by a possibility of opening, 
and describes a referential relationship between a signifiant and signifié. 
Such an interpretation locates a phenomenological sense as a 'beginning, 
origin and end of human communication: a beginning —  because it de­
termines a meaning of a sign, its legibility, an end —  as there can be no 
fuller understanding than when I finally achieve a signifié of a sign. 
Thus, when saying " I  understand”  (which is, as every day life speech 
wisely teaches us, but an extension and synonym of a perceptual act, 
" I  see” means " I understand” ) I provide my existence with an external, 
ultimate perspective, as there can be no "understanding” , no "seeing” 
without this central integration of myself and the world. Thus, a pheno­
menological sense differs from grammatological:
[...] le sens phénoménologique et en dernier recours tout ce qui se donne 
originairement à la conscience dans l’intuition perceptive —  ne serait donc 
pas d’entrée de jeu en position de signifiant, inscrit dans le tissu relationnel 
et differential qui en ferait déjà un renvoi, une trace, un gramme, un espa­
cement.67
Meaning, according to grammatology, is a pure play of signifiers 
marked by the absence of the transcendental signified and lack of the 
division into the outside and inside which, however, throws its shadow 
unto a question of meaning: even this major erasure is only a trace, i.e. 
a signifier (one of the chapters of De la grammatologie augments this
situation by a graphie notation "Inside Outside” ). A  grammatological 
sense, grammatological interpretation is, then, the absence of a unifying 
center, and can be characterized as a play within language. In De la 
grammatologie we read:
From the moment that there is meaning there are nothing but signs. We 
think only in signs. Which amounts to ruining the notion, of the sign at the 
very moment when, as in Nietzsche, its exigency is recognized in the absolu­
teness of its right. One could call play the absence of the transcendental 
signified as limitlessness of play, (thait is to say as Itlhe dasltruetiom of onto- 
-theology and metaphysics of presence. It is not surprising that the shock, 
shaping and undermining metaphysics since its origin, lets itself be named 
as such in the period when, refusing to bind linguistics to semantics [...] ex­
pelling the problem of meaning outside of their researches, certain American 
linguists constantly refer to the model of a game [...]. This play, thought as 
absence of the transcendental signified, is not a play in  the world, as it has 
always been defined [...]. To think play radically the ontological and trans­
cental problematics must first be seriously exhausted [...].“
A  play, a game is what follows onto-theology. While onto-theology 
was a science of Being founded upon a sharp Cartesian distinction bet­
ween a subject and object, matter and mind, a science which places itself 
outside a studied object, a game erases the gap between Being and its 
description. The essence of a game hides in its total exclusion of the 
outside which, traditionally, is a domain of meaning, of a signifié.
A  game is of interest to Derrida to the extent to which it is exclusi­
vely a movement of signifiants. A  game does not establish the absolute 
center which would regulate a hierachy of elements participating in 
a game. Signifiants are, within the field of a game, interchangeable de­
pending on a situation and moment of play a pawn can become a queen, 
and in each role it w ill participate in a totally different reality. The 
analysis of a game is for Derrida a rephrasing of his remarks upon lan­
guage. In a commentary on the relationship between the ideographic no­
tation of the Chinese and the European phonetic script Derrida gives us 
one of the versions of his theoretical manifesto:
A signifier is from the very beginning the possibility of its own repetition, 
of its own image or resemblance [...]. From the moment that the sign appears, 
that is to say from the very beginning, there is no chance of encountering 
anywhere the purity of "reality”, "unicity”, "singularity”.69
The game is necessary to amplify the notion of writing (écriture) 
and, in fact, is nothing else but another name for writing. In both cases 
we cannot refer to an external sanction for a justification of our opera­
tional, or interpretative gestures and, in writing as in the game, we 
dwell in the distance which necessarily separates a signifiant from an 
ever absent signifié. In other words, writing (game) is a play of distan-
ces bereft of a central point which my vision could be subjected to and 
organized into a centralized, perspectival perception. Perspective implies 
immobility: I have to remain motionless to perceive objects in my field 
of vision. Dürer understood it very well constructing his tool for the 
ideal perspectival perception, a vehicle for preventing the head of 
a viewer from moving.
The game is a negation of such a situation; in the game everything 
is movable, and it is precisely this final, ultimate character which dis­
tinguishes Derrida from Ponty. Merleau-Ponty would willingly approve 
of the principle of the movement of signifiers, although for him it would 
never remain limited to this side of semiotic referentiality. In Le Visible 
et l ’invisible Ponty attributed three functions to touch: 1) touching, I no­
tice a qualitative aspect of an object (for instance, its hardness), 2) I rea­
lize that the object is determined as a collection, a gathering of such 
qualities, 3) but also I become aware of the very act of touching, I —  
figuratively —  touch the touching. In this triple series there lies a chance 
for "grasping the object” (un toucher des choses):
Déjà dans le "toucher”, nous venons de trouver trois experiences distinctes 
qui se sous-tendent, trois dimensions qui se recoupent, mais sont distinctes: 
un toucher du lisse et du rugueux, un toucher des choses, — un sentiment 
passif du corps et de son espace — , et enfin un veritable toucher du toucher.70
Although in Ponty’s analysis there is a place for what Derrida calls 
"distance” (if I touch an object I have to be separated from it, and since 
I am aware of my touching, in the final analysis I stand in a distance to 
myself) the French phenomenologist accepts such a situation as a sugges­
tion of meaning, a signifié buried underneath a distance. Ponty speaks, 
in the way Derrida could have spoken, of a "dark dance of the body 
organs” (ténèbres bourrés d’organes), but behind the gestures of this dance 
there hides a meaning, a signifié, while for Derrida such a dance is a me­
re movement of signifiants.
For a grammatological construction of the world a signifié, a mean­
ing, hidden under signifiants is another illusion, a stubbornly returning 
apparition of metaphysics. In his discussion of Rousseau’s text on the 
origin of languages Derrida admits that language becomes possible when 
distance comes to the fore as an existential category. Rousseau, like Ponty 
nearly two hundred years later, distinguishes between seeing and hear­
ing, but, unlike Ponty, he does not put them in the relationship of re­
versibility (réversibilité ), i.e. to touch an object is inherently and 
profoundly different from seeing it. A t the beginning of his important 
essay Rousseau divides perception into two elements: active (touching 
connected with movement), and passive (speaking and listening). While 
the first implies nearness and immediacy, the other is a product of a se-
paration of individuals (des hommes dispersés). Derrida’s comments con­
tain an important generalization which holds that:
Language could have emerged only out of dispersion.71
Hence, a social evolution of a human group finds its philosophical equi­
valent in a system of graphic representation .defined by linearity, a spa­
tial arrangement of parts of a text separated by an empty place. This 
emptiness is not in-different because it is precisely through gaps, empty 
places that a text becomes legible, and opens a possibility of polysemy, 
i.e. of a reproduction:
[...] it is always possible for a text to become new, since the blanks open up 
its structure to an indefinitely disseminated transformation.72
Spaces, necessary in writing, are a re-working of the radical distan­
ce which in Derrida’s philosophy is an indispensible part of the human 
condition. A  man and the world, a reader and a text are involved in 
a complicated game of mediation. Even touch, contradicting Ponty and 
Rousseau, does not step out its realm.
[...] a first movement of sign without speech, when passion, beyond need but 
short of articulation and difference, expresses itself in an unheard of way73
is in De la grammatologie called "an immediate sign, but it would be 
a grave mistake to infer that this "moment” , this area of silence, finally 
-signifies a sphere of the Origin where distance is overcome. For Derrida, 
and here his ways part with those of Ponty and Heidegger, such a silence 
is not a shadow of language suggesting the Ineffable Presence, Logos, 
"transcendental signifié” . Ponty grasps this view  in a coherent formula:
Tout rapport à l’Être est simultanément prendre et ętre pris. La prise est 
prise, elle est inscrite et incsrite au meme être qu’elle prend.74
Derrida’s "silence” and "immediate sign” are rooted in the distance which 
cannot be annihilated as long as human cognition has to remain within 
the field of signs; even touching implies a "minute difference” between 
the touching and the touched, and, hence inscribes man’s communication 
in "visibility, spacing, death” , and becomes "the origin of the sign and 
the breaking of immediacy” .75 From the very language and rhetoric of 
a "minute difference” (Une infime différence), a "small difference” (cette 
petite différence), a "breaking of immediacy” (la rupture de Vimmediate) 
one can see that what Heidegger builds with such a care, his concept of 
"nearness” (Ncihe) where man merges with Being, Derrida destroys, or 
rather decontructs, in his effort to emphasize distance as a basic category 
of existence.
It is here where a Nietzschean character of De la grammatologie sur­
faces: first, the new discipline is to revaluate Western metaphysical tra­
dition; second, it makes an attempt at establishing a new human universe 
and, as such, is an expedition into another galaxy of thinking (it would 
be tempting to look at Derrida as an instigator of a new type of discourse 
in which philosophy is treated like a science-fiction, or a metaphor). The 
first point may be supported by many fragments which show a marked 
Nietzschean background, e.g.:
To make enigmatic what one thinks one understands by the words "proximi­
ty”, "immediacy”, "presence” (the proximate [proche] the own Ip ropre ], and 
the pre- of presence), iis final intention in this book.76
The other claim justifies itself in a laconic presentation of the aims of 
grammatology as baring of the real "written” , "delayed” , nature of 
speech, as examining "this heliocentric concept of speech” 77 (ce concept 
heliocentrique de la parole).
What is still subtly present in the sphere of touch makes its presence 
more felt in the spoken language. In his belief that even speech is already 
impure, coloured by writing, space, delay, death, i.e. distance, Derrida 
consciously puts himself in a position contrary to the age-long tradition 
o f word and Logos, of the original priority of the spoken over the written. 
Also de Saussure sees speech as the main area of linguistic investigations:
The linguistic object is not defined by the combination of the written word 
and the spoken word: the spoken form alone constitutes the object.78
For Derrida such a stance entails a great error, as already in speech 
lurks writing:
The written sign is absent from the body but this absence is already announ­
ced within the invisible and ethereal element of the spoken word, powerless 
to imitate the contact and the movement of the bodies i[.J] a speech already 
carries in itself death and absence.79
Substitution becomes a crucial lingustic and ontological experience: since 
everything is a sign, and a sign is confined only to its signifiant (a notion 
of the game), everything man does, or says is an element in the play of 
signifiants in which one signifiant replaces, substitutes another. Thus, 
obviously, substitution and supplementarity reach beyond language, and, 
as Derrida points out in his discussion of Lévi-Strauss, precede even a dis­
tinction between "nature” and "culture” :
Everything in language is substitute, and this concept of substitute precedes 
the opposition of nature and culture: the supplement can equally well be 
natural (gesture) as artificial (speech).80
The essence of writing constists in the fact that it opens unlimited series 
of substitutions, and closes all the possibilities of breaking the circle of 
replacement. The Derridian concept of écriture in its stress upon the 
absence of the signifié opposes the tradition of all the metaphysics which 
saw in man a place where the world comes to know itself. We recognize 
that this description also holds for phenomenology in its insistence upon the 
co-belonging, of being-with of man and world, the area which referring 
to the realm beyond the sign and substitution, locates itself also beyond 
death, i.e. beyond writing.
Derrida considers such a possibility a scandal. In his discussion of 
Heidegger’s concept of the sign Derrida —  through a long but typical 
historical detour leading him back to d’Alembert —  would side with 
Peirce and say that:
[...] Peirce considers the iindefiniteness of reference as the criterion that allows 
us to recognize that we are indeed dealing with a system of signs. What 
broaches the movement of significaition is what makes its interruption im­
possible. The thing itself is a sign (la chose meme est un signe).81
The theory of unlimited substitution and the absence of the thing itself 
sends us back to the labirynth as to the most typical structure in the 
Derridian philosophical architecture. In Positions Derrida puts together 
such notions as "reflection” and "trace” , renvoi and trace, but although 
in the grammatological reading o f reality the world is a structure of words 
sending us to other words, signifiants directing us to other signifiants, 
nevertheless the world as a lexicon (because deconstruction may be de­
scribed by such a phrase) is not a purely linguistic oeuvre. Derrida locks 
himself in a paradox of speaking of the world which is determined by 
what he says, but which had inevitably to exist before the first word 
was uttered. The Word was preceded by the distance. A  new Genesis, 
written in the rabbinical tradition to which Derrida is obviously indebted, 
claims that at the beginning there was Distance, a great dispersion, a gene­
ral Diaspora of man and world. Hence, the lexicon, dictionary, Derrida 
is writing does not respect boundaries of national languages, but becomes 
a universal compendium, a great book of words, Mallarmeian in range 
and scope. To work out a story of each entry Derrida consults numerous 
sources like Dictionnaire de VAcadémie Française (1694), the encyclopae- 
work of Atanasius Kircher Polygrafia nova et universalis et combinatoria 
arte détecta (1663), Hegel’s Encyclopedia, or Rousseau’s Dictionary of 
Music (1768) in order to form an endless story of words, unrestricted se­
ries of signifiers with no ending possible.
But, as Hartman maintains, Derrida differs from Heidegger precisely 
in the grammatological reading of the world in which a thing IS and IS 
NOT there ("da” ). In a brilliant elucidation of Nietzsche’s ,style Derrida 
purposefully places it between a "pen” (une plume, stylus) and a "stilleto”
(un stylet). A  style as a protruded curting edge of language, as a "pointed 
Object” (un objet pointu) is, at the same time, a means of attack as well 
as defence, a mode of moving forward, approximation and a dangerous 
warning about the necessity of distance:
In the question of style there is always the weight or examen of some poin­
ted object. At times this object might be only a quill or a stylus. But it 
could just as easily be a sitilleto, or even a rapier. Such objects might be used 
in a vicious attack [...] but they might also be used as a protection against the 
threat of such an attack, in order to keep it at a distance, to repel it — as 
one bends or recoils before its force, in flight, behind veils sails.82
In both cases we deal with a trace, although first it is a result of 
an immediate contact of two objects (of a pen and a piece of paper), and 
second, a trace is what remains after an object has fled our attack. Derri­
da’s philosophy of language does not leave us any choice: I have to use 
a language in order to mark my presence, but doing it I become even 
more submerged in absence, in a trace.
Derrida’s labirynth does not erid here (it can never end, as each 
word/sign/text open their own labirynths according to the rules of the 
substitution game). A  style as a sharp weapon is a "spur” (eperon), and 
eperon through a Middle German "sporo” and Gaelic "spor” leads to an 
English "spur” which denotes a necessary part of riding equippment but 
also, in Mallarme’s etymology, it is related to a verb "to spurn” , to "re­
ject with contempt” .
On the one hand, a style is a way of attacking and promotes a move­
ment forward, on the other —  its essential prerogative is a withdrawal 
and discouragment of any approximation. Hence, the object of our style, 
of our pen, of our sword, evades us, leaves us only its imprints which 
fact finds its reflection in a German noun Spur denoting a "trace”  or 
"hint” .83
Surrendering to a natural temptation to speak of Derrida in his own 
rhetoric one could claim that he is the most Joycean of all philosophers. 
Such a qualification is justified not only in Derrida’s passion for linguis­
tic games and etymology (these interests are also of great importance 
for students of Heidegger, and Hartman suggests a man has to pun as he 
has to breathe), but first of all in a radical absence of an object. Not 
only Derrida’s own writing is entangled in this absence but the 
very ontological structure of the world reveals a trace, non-pre­
sence, and death as a natural element 0 ” man. ("The gesture ['...] 
guards us against an already alienating speech, a speech already carry­
ing in itself death and absence.” 84) Man’s being in the cricle of signs (and 
no other mode of being is possible) is inherently synonymous with being 
within a circle of death and its rituals are expressive of our homage 
paid to the dead, to the non-present, to the already absent:
And style thereby protects the presence, the content, the thing itself, meaning, 
truth —  on the condition that it should not already (déjà) be that gaping 
chasm which has been deflowered in the unveiling of the difference. Already 
(déjà), such is the name for what has been effaced 85
The two ritual's (following a thing that is incessantly in front of me, 
remaining for ever in a shadow of its presence, and our service offered 
to the dead) find a succinct expression in an English word "wake” which 
James Joyce uses in the title of his most controversial book. In De la 
grammatologie Derrida frequently replaces the word "trace” with its sy­
nonym sillage which denotes also a trace left by a ship on a water, in 
the same way an English "wake” combines a mark of the non-present 
ship with a ritualistic homage to the dead. No wonder then that Hart­
man can coin a well-formed phrase and describe Derrida’s speaking not 
as "voicing” but as "joycing” , to suggest a voice does not have any pri­
vileged position with regard to a supposed originary presence, but ap­
pears already mediated by writing. A  voice is, from the very beginning, 
locked in the labirynth of writing from which there can be no exit.
The rhetoric in which this fragment of our text is foregrounded 
(etymology, punning, Joyce, a wake as an all-inclusive trace) is also the 
native language of Marshall McLuhan’s discourse. In one of his later, 
characteristically collaborative, works (one could say that McLuhan is 
even to a more conspicuous degree, to use Mrs. Spivak’s expression, 
"a collection of texts” than Derrida) McLuhan approaches language as 
a "pointed word” (cf. Derrida’s object pointu), a word which is inscribed 
in the characteristic chain of phonocentrism an theology:
"Pun” ¿s from Latin punctum , a point. The point of a pun is that it has no 
point. Or, one could say that is point is every —  where and its boundaries 
are nowhere. Such is the definition of accoustic space. Such also is the defi­
nition that some ancient societies gave to God [...].
The divine Logos of the Greeks was a simple resonating pun employing that 
any word contains all possible words. Such again, is the assumption of the 
myth of Finnegan’s Wake by James Joyce, a book that consists of one sen­
tence and whose title is a pun that contains all the meanings of the book.86
While the initial assumption is markedly Derridian, conclusions lead 
McLuhan towards a reinstating of the myth of the oral, and therefore his 
theoretical attempts are directed towards "the visual [which would] re­
trieve audible-textile” , while Derrida concentrates precisely upon the 
unretrievability of the oral in the written.
A  labirynth as a type o f a three-dimensional structure refers to the 
architectural metaphor which both Heidegger and Derrida use in their 
philosophy. For the German thinker the Greek temple is a model struc­
ture of a thing’s being in the world and, characteristically, language is for 
him the House of Being (das Haus des Seins). Derrida also speaks of lan­
guage as of an architectural structure, but a function of the metaphor is 
different. In a text under a bilingual title Scribble (pouvoir/ecrir) written 
as a preface (it is not incidental that many of Derrida’s works are prefa­
ces or introductions to works of other writers; since we are caught in the 
play of signifiers which precludes any final, closed version of a thing, 
also a text does not ekist in itself, but is merely a preface and a pretext/ 
/pre-text for other writings) to a reedition of a French translation of the 
classic treatise of William Warburton The Divine Legation of Moses De­
monstrated in which the learned bishop attempts to construct a theory 
of the hieroglyph as an ideal model of all writing, Derrida frequently 
uses the term "treasure house of all knowledge” 87 which is to replace the 
term "language” . I f  Heidegger’s writing, however, could unconceal the 
truth present in the voice of Being, Derrida consistently emphasizes 
a graphic character of language. A  hieroglyhic sign which speaks its own 
history (Heidegger’s voice as an utterance of the pure Being is necessarily 
disinherited of all history) is not only a container of knowledge, but, 
first of all, is a mode of its structuring; it is not a description or rotation 
o f knowledge, but in itself it IS knowledge.
Already in the hieroglyphic form of script as well as in a pictogram 
before and ideogram after it, we are lodked in the circle of writing mark­
ed by the absence of a central point which could direct a distribution of 
signifiers, and a sphere where signs would become unnecessary, a sphere 
o f Presence, of the transcendental Signified of Voice. Ecriture as a labi- 
rynthine structure of the world is, then, like a model of a journey that 
souls of the deceased have to undertake to the kingdom of Death through 
a maze of ordeals. Is not writing treated in De la grammatologie as a f i­
gure of death, of the final absence, a new dans macabre of letters on 
a page?
Objects exist in relation with man as writing, and thus the world 
becomes a TEXT, or an unending PRE-TEXT/PRETEXT from which we 
w ill never be able to emerge unto the light of the pure, finished, closed, 
fu lly interpreted and understood text. Derrida’s text is also the impossi­
bility of a text. It is here, in this dramatic closure, where the architectu­
ral style of Derrida’s philosophy finds its analogy in the preromantic dra­
wings of Piranesi. ,
Published in Venice in 1744 (then re-edited in 1760) Carceri d’lnven- 
zione are, on the one hand, a variation on a fragment of an opera stage- 
-desiign by Daniel Maro’t, but —  on the other hand —  they also shape 
reality through a striking similarity that may be detected between the 
Newgate prison designed for London by Dance and the visionary drawings 
of Piranesi (this point where the "light” of reality blends with the "dark­
ness” of fiction should be carefully noted by Derrida’s readers, as w ri­
tings of the French philosopher constantly disregard distinctions between
genres, between theory and practice). The English literature absorbed 
enthusiastically Piranesi’s iconography, and his drawings became the best 
epitome of the Romantic vision of being. De Quincey in his Confessions 
of English Opium Eater recalls the way in which Coleridge described to 
him Piranesi’s architectural phantasies:
They represented vast gothic halls; on the floors on which stood all sorts of 
engines and machinery, wheels, cables, pulleys, levers, catapults etc, etc., 
expressive of enormous power put forth, and resistance overcome. Creeping 
along the sides of Ithe walls, you perceived a staircase; and upon it, groping 
his way upwards, was Piranesi himself; follow the stairs a little further, 
and, you perceive it come to a sudden stop and abrupt termination, without 
any balustrade, and allowing no steps onwards to him who had reached the 
extremity except into th^ depth below. Whatever is to become of poor Pi­
ranesi, you suppose, at least, that his labours must in some way terminate 
here. But raise your eyes; and behodd a second flight of stairs still higher; 
on which again Piranesi is perceived, by this time standing on the very 
brink of the abyss. Again elevate your eye, and still a more aerial flight of 
stairs is beheld; and again is poor Piranesi busy on his aspiring labours; 
and so on until the unfinished stairs and Piranesi are both lost in the upper 
gloom of the hall.88
This verbal rendering of one of the engravings from Carceri d’ Invenzione 
describes the man in the post Nietzschean world in which the Apollo­
nian is twisted together with the Dionysian ("Apollo speaks in Dionysos’ 
voice, and Dionysos speaks like Apollo” , anounces Nietzsche in The Birth  
of the Greek Tragedy). Hence, the relevance of Hartman’s remark on 
grammatology as different from phenomenology in that, as evidenced by 
Glas, it is a labirynth which implies that it cannot be the House of Being, 
but merely a house of words, not a divine temple, but a profane con­
struction. The labirynth is a structure in which the presence of Voice 
cannot be made manifest; the labirynth is a three-dimensional failure of 
voice as presence. In the same way as a seventeenth century engraving 
places within one sphere the tragedies of Minotaur and Icarus, Derrida 
links phonetically identical "la voice d’lcar” and "la voix d’lcar” in one 
semantic-philosophical motif (a philosophem) of the "fa ll of Voice” as 
presence, transcendence (see Derrida’s book La voix et le phénomène).
It is important to be aware of a specific sense of the word "labi­
rynth” in Derrida’s theory where it has nothing to do with a Jungian 
archetypal figure which is "at the same time a cosmos, a world, a life of 
an individual, a temple, a city, a womb [...] of the Mother Earth” .89 For 
Derrida, according to Nietzsche’s claim that truth is available only on the 
surface, the labirynth is -a one more opening in a never ending discourse, 
one more signifiant, as all others, bereft o f its signifié. The labirynth is 
only a more spectacular metaphor for all texts that lurk in every sign in 
keeping with the rules of the substitution game, is as much a "treasure 
house of all knowledge” as all other signs.
Hence, as we can see, the diferences between Heidegger and Derrida 
do not exhaust themselves in a diversity of the style, but also include two 
different concepts of the road. In Derrida, the road is not linear, it does 
not stretch to be completed, but it is cyclic and self-reproductive. The 
grammatological path does not run linearly but multiplies and reproduces 
its own folds and bends. In its opposition against linearity Derrida locates 
himself in the wake of Marshall McLuhan,and could prophecy together 
with the media-philosopher "the end of the book era” . The first part of 
the title of the first chapter in De la grammatologie could be easily acco­
modated in The Gutenberg Galaxy: "The end of the book [...]” ; a com­
fortable analogy breaks, however, when it comes to consequences of such 
a radical statement. McLuhan identifies the end of book with the end of 
print, that is to say with the decay of writing; Derrida sees in writing 
the beginning of a new culture phase and in this spirit w ill finish the 
title "[...] and the beginning of writing” . Obviously, when McLuhan 
thinks mainly of the limitations and modifications of the technology of 
communication and their impact upon man’s consciousness, Derrida fo­
cuses on writing as on a mode of ontology. In grammatology the world 
and man stand united in and by the cripplehood of necessary mediation. 
Where Heidegger speaks of "nearness” (Nahe), Derrida emphasizes distan­
ce and scattering.
Here we touch upon another crucial term in Derrida’s glossary; if 
Heidegger underscores gathering (Sammlung) of all objects in to the one 
whole of Logos, Derrida w ill advertize the notion of dissemination, that 
is to say of la différance séminale which lies at the foundation of Derri­
da’s theory of interpretation as a strategy of indecision and endless 
polysemy. In De la grammatologie we read:
The end of linear writing is indeed ¡the end of the book, even if, ©vein (today, 
it is within the form of a book that new writings —  literary or theoretical 
— allow 'themselves to be, for better or for worse, encased. It (is less a ques­
tion of confiding new writings to the envelope of a book than of finally 
reading what wrote itself between the lines in the volumes (ce qui (...] 
s’écrivait déjà entre les lignes).90
Dissemination signifies not only dispersion but also spreading, the 
very act of sowing which, when applied to Derrida’s interpretative stra­
tegy, denotes incessant multiplication, sowing and growing of words in 
the process of the gigantic polysemy the simplest form of which is a pun. 
A  text never comes back to the Father; a father and a mother of such 
a text is a word, a word which sows other words. This is what Derrida 
stresses in his comment upon Mallerme’s phrase le heurt succesif ("the 
successive bumping” ) :
The disseminating power of the "s” is entirely appropriate here; "successive’' 
is used in the literal sense of dissemination having successors: to sow (semer) 
seeds [...].91
As we have seen from the two quoted passages interpretative pro­
cedures in deconstruction are founded upon the basic conviction of the 
impossibility of closing and completing the interpretation. There is no 
way out from the house of words, as there is no way out from Piranesi’s 
imaginary prison (significantly enough, Frederick Jameson’s important 
book on revaluation of structuralism is called The Prison House of Langu­
age).
In the spaitialized model of this criticism the architecture of the text 
as graphic representation ("a transparent column” Derrida’s borrowing 
from Mallarmé) is protracted into the architecture of the ego ("m y heart’s 
core —  which is precisely a city, and a labirynthian one”92) and of disse­
mination of meaning in the process of interpretation:
The column is nothing, has no meaning in itself. A  hollow phallus, cut off 
from itself, decapitated, it guarantees the innumerable passage of dissemi­
nation and the playful displacement of the margins. It is never itself, only 
a writing that endlessly substitutes it for itself, doubling it as its very first 
surrection [...]“
The same rhetoric recurs not only in Derrida’s writing, but also in Hart­
man’s and in the interpretative practice of J. Hillis M iller and Joseph 
Ridell.
Ridell discussing critical and philosophical views of Harold Bloom, 
an eminent representative of the Yale school94, describes Bloom’s discour­
se as a combination of the labirynth and libarary:
[Bloom’s wortk is) a fiction [...) or a rhetorical poem that rewrites Borges’s 
legendary "Library of Babel’’ in Stevensonian metaphors [...]. The Library, 
a totality that contains all books and therefore the language which offers 
all the possible combinations out of which any future book will be made pro­
duces a delirium and a vertigo'in those who seek the master text, Ithe key[...] 
the vastness of the labirynth [...] produces a rash of contradictory theories, 
each of them regional and exclusionary.95
Ridell justly stresses the fact that in a world which is a text each 
word contains not only its own history but a history of all literature: 
Bloom rewrites Borges in Stevens’s language, Derrida exposes Hegel to 
the corrosive activity of écriture reading The Phenomenology of Mind 
through Freud, Joyce, and Genet. A ll interpretation is then a final and 
most consistent manifestation of writing, as it leaves us no choice but to 
write anew (rewrite) after somebody has already written what we intend 
to write. Écriture as a style of deconstructive interpretation implies wri­
ting as a repetition, writing as an inscription of signs that has already 
been angraved. Interpretation has no beginning and no end.
A  literary work is viewed, then, as an open system of production 
within a closed (in the sense of the non-presence of the transcendental, 
sanctioning outside) game of signifiers. Hence, even if critics like Bart­
hes, Todorov, Kristeva or Culler are limited in their tendency to subject 
the literary interpretation to the reasoning center (for instance, in the 
hard scientific impact of highly academic linguistics upon and in their 
own work) a deconstructive critic operates from within the depth of the 
Nietzschean Gaia Scienza, i.e. w ill begin from the fundamental act of 
surrendering to the text. While a structuralist w ill try to harden the so­
lid ground under his feet, a deconstructive interpreter w ill try to lose it 
as a necessary condition for his interpretative act to open. Hence, as 
M iller defines modern American criticism it resembles Derrida’s concept 
of dissemination:
The new turn in criticism involves an interrogation of the notion of the 
self-enclosed literary work and of the idea that any work has a fixed, 
identifiable meaning. The literary work is seen in various ways as open and 
unprodictively productive. The reading of a poem is a part of a poem [...] 
interminable activity without necessary closure.96
It is especially the "unprodictive productivity” that invites a comparison 
with Derrida:
La dissemination [...] pour produire un nombre non-fini d’effets semantiques, 
ne se laisse reconduire ni a un present d’origin simple [...] ini a une presence 
eschatologique.97
If, as M iller puts it, a reading of a poem belongs to poem, then it is 
but a rephrasing of a central deconstructive thesis of the co-belonging, 
of the being-with, of poetry and philosophy. No interpretation can be
allowed if it does not unconceal philosophy in poetry and poetry in phi­
losophy. For a deconstructive interpretation the text is a necessary me­
diation, trace, writing of philosophy. Derrida explains this view  himself 
in his article on Benveniste:
It would be wrong to believe in the immediate and ahistorical accessiblity 
of a philosophical argument, just as it would be wrong to believe that we
could [...] submit a metaphysical text to some "scientific” deciphering grid —
be it linguistic, psychoanalytical or other.98 •
What Derrida promulgates philosophically Ridell translates into 
a specific hint for a theory of interpretation:
Bloom admits the Derrida/de Man position that there is no ontological diffe­
rence between poetic and philosophical language and therefore that critical
interpretation based on metaphysical principles —  of language as exterior of 
sense or truth, or the text as the vehicle of meaning —  is false' both to phi­
losophy and literature."
!
Interestingly enough, M iller folds his discourse against itself and intro­
duces a metaphor of the labirynth as the only spatial and mythological 
figure able to deal with the situation as diagnosed by deconstruction:
What would be outside the labirynth? More Labirynth... According to Ruskim, 
the traditional labirynth is "Composed of a single path or track, coiled and 
recoiled on itself”, and ''the word Labirynth properly means «rope-walk», or 
«evil-of-rope-walk» its first syllable being probably also the same as our 
English name «Laura» the path” [...]. One can never escape from the labi­
rynth because the activity of escapiing makes more labirynth, the thread of 
a linear narrative or a story.100
The notion of the labirynth meets another important concept, that 
o f the path, and both return us to deconstruction as a style of philosop­
hical architecture (or architectural philosophy). I f  Heidegger was recon­
structing and raising the temple against the sky and the sea, a decon- 
structive interpreter (like Sarah Kofman, Philippe Lacouse-Labarthe, 
Jean-Luc Nancy, Bernard Pautrat in France, or Paul de Man or Geoffrey 
Hartman in the USA) w ill try to dismantle the building of a text, attempt 
at seeing the sky and the sea in the fragments of the structure which 
never was anything but a fragment:
The deconstructive critic seeks to find [...] the element in the system studied 
which is alogical, the thread in the text [...] which will unravel it all, or the 
loose stone Which wall pull down the whole building.
The deconstruction [...] annihilates the grounds on. which the building 
stands by showing that the text has already annihilated that ground. 'De­
construction is not a dismantling of a structure of a text but a demonstra­
tion that it has already dismantled itself. Its apparently solid ground is no 
rock but thin air.101
The interpretation which, traditionally, was meant to abolish for­
tuity of the text by submerging it in some larger doctrine ordered from 
the central point of the reasonable system here becomes precisely a do­
main of chance, of indeterminacy. An interpretation is a meaning of the 
text and its part at the same time. Hence, a certain BETWEEN-ness is 
another name for dissemination, interpretation and indecision; it becomes 
significant that one of the most widely explored writers, a writer who 
opens many promising doconstructive incisions in his texts, Stefan Mal­
larmé, as the author of "un coup de dés n’abolira pas l ’hasard” sanctions 
indecision as the main interpretative strategy. In his discussion of Mal- 
larme’s fragments (and in its insistence upon a fragmentary unit, upon 
a canonization of a fraction, deconstruction turns out to be a continuation
of what Jameson calls the formalist and structuralist projections) Derrida 
proclaims so advanced a practice of indecision that it extends unto the 
lack of such a basic and general strategy of determinacy as the title. As 
we have said, the Derridian text is a pre-text/pretext also because of the 
impossibility of such an inexact closure as a title:
[...] this double session [...] that [...] is concerned with the question what is 
literature, will find its corner BETWEEN (ENTRE) literature and truth, bet­
ween literature and that by which the question what is? wants answering [...] 
And now there is the question of the title.
This, among others thalt are just as decisive, is an extremely profound ques­
tion raised by Goux, concerning "The still unthought thought about the network, 
a polynodal, nonrepresentative organization, a thought about the tex t [...] the 
text which nothing can entitle. Without title or chapter; without head (ing) 
or capital”.
Mallarmé knew this. Indeed, he had constructed this question, or rather 
undone it with a bifid answer, separating the question from itself, displa­
cing it towards an essential indecision that leaves its very titles up in the 
air.102
Jean Joseph Goux’s text quoted by Derrida brings us obsessively 
back to the question of the architectural metaphor of writing. The archi­
tecture of the text, its interpretation, is a constant generation of mean­
ings floating through words, i.e. it is dissemination which lies at the 
heart of reading, dissemination which "affirms the always already divi­
ded generation of meaning” 103. The structure of the text is of a magma- 
tic, oniric nature. According to Sarah Kofman:
La stabilité de l’édifice est donc illusoire. Il flotte sans appui, au gré du 
hassard: les bases de la pyramide sont constituées par de dés. Produit pour 
nier le devenir, le system conceptual reptóse sur lui, et comme lui il est jeu 
du hasard. Les pieces de la construction ne sont pas inamovible: il suffit de 
changer de perspectives, de jeter un autre coup de dés pour transformer les 
métaphor initiales et, avec elles, la face de l’architecture.104
The text becomes a possibility of an error, and in the absence of the 
transcendental signifié it is always erroneous. Defrida consciously departs 
from the point which Marx, Heidegger, and Nietzsche demarcated as the 
beginning of modern philosophy:
Their thought could be called metaphilosophical, in that it no longer com­
mands the World or Being to, obey a transcendent ideal principle, source of 
Truth, Goodness, and Beauty.105
If, as Hartman puts it, Derrida erasing the concept of a center, 
meaning and truth of a text establishes a text as an error, and even abso­
lutizes a text’s error, then we can claim that a text and a world as écritu­
re, as unlimited system of mediation ("un nombre non-fini d’effets se-
mantiques” ) are systems of ERRATA to consecutive errors of a text. The 
logic of deconstruction (and, as we know, it begins with a dark, alogical, 
place in a text), as well as the substitution game, transform errata in 
another layer of errors which call forth new errata etc. A  text is a sow­
ing of words in the "soil” , i.e. in the emphy places separating particular 
words; these empty spaces are, paradoxically, more important than ma­
terial signs, as it is from this empty place, this hollowed out space, that 
a continuation of a word w ill emerge.
In other words, one can read The Gutenberg Galaxy and De la 
grammatologie as two different re-writings of the Cadmus myth. In both 
versions signs, letters, writing, grow from the dragon’s teeth, but in 
McLuhan’s lesson we encounter an ominous train of soldiers who are 
a result, a production of the mythical sowing (warriors are, for McLuhan, 
the most appropriate embodiment of the artificial order of the alphabet 
and linearity; also Derrida notices this aspect of writing as the beau- 
rocratization of the world following the introduction of a commonly 
available notation; both thinkers have been, in this respect, preceded by 
important works of Harold Innis), while Derrida emphasizes the very act 
of sowing, of a scattering and dispersing of a unity which, in the final 
analysis, has never been the originary plenitude. McLuchan’s con­
cept of writing as a technology of communication which subversively 
imprints upon man its own message, does not secure for writing 
a position it cherishes in Derrida. Writing/printing are only two 
of, hopefully, numerous possible phases of the communicative revolution, 
while for Derrida writing constitutes ontological constans of the human 
condition once the man realizes that a sign is his existential element. 
Thus, in McLuhan’s theory writing is only a temporary phasing out of the 
primeval unity with Being to be reintroduced by the electronic media; 
Derrida ponders the graphic notation as a fundamental lack of man’s 
anchoring in Being conceived of as the originary plenitude.
For Derrida writing is not only a corner stone of the radically se- 
miotic character of the human nature, but also it is a process which —  
metaphorically —  takes place in nature itself. In his commentary to the 
linguistic aspects of Condillac’s and Warburton’s texts Derrida carefuly 
accentuates a natural metaphor of writing as an agricultural process:
How does the ploughman proceed?
Economically. Arrived at the end of the furrow, he does not return to the 
point of departure. He turns ox and plough around. And proceeds in the 
opposite direction. Saving of time, space, and energy. Improvement of efficien­
cy and reduction of working time. Writing by the turning of the ox —  
boustrophedon —  w riting by furrows was a movemnt in linear and phono­
graphic shript [...]. It is a matter of writing by furrows. The furrow i,s> a line,, 
as the ploughman traces ilt: the road —  via rupta —  broken by the plough­
share. The furrow of agriculture, we remind ourselves, opens nature to cul­
ture (cultivation).106
But, as we have said, spaces between furrows are and, at the same time, 
are not empty; they are places of a future growth as spacing separating 
words of a text are holes which are hopes of interpretation. If*  however, 
a text has been deprived of a central point, final meaning, ultimate truth, 
then what is left as a text is a reportoire of errors which, in the process 
of interpretation, find their provisional correction which can never be 
final. What is "absolutized” is not the possibility of correcting a mistake, 
but the essential, necessary, character of the error. In Derrida’s decon- 
structive theory the text acquires the status of a purposeful error; as in 
psychoanalysis the child is the father of an adult, in deconstruction 
error is the origin of the text.
This, through a specific structure of temporality, places us again 
within the problematic of the oral. Each "erratum” can operate in a span 
of time assigned to it, thus it is and is not a correction of "mistakes” , 
since it takes another moment of interpretation to define this erratum as 
faulty and introduce another one. Hence, an error is never removed, and 
retains its dynamic quality. Such a situation is reminiscent of the posi­
tion of the oral poem which, due to its improvisatory character, cannot 
be
[...] revised  in A N Y  w ay  and [no errors] [...] have been erased. For, in  such 
poems, there can be no "m istake” : error is an active  com ponent here .107
As a keen reader of marginal texts Derrida would relish in short 
essays of Isaac Disraeli (the father of Benjamin) published in London in 
1849. In a short text which is an introduction to the philosophy of errata 
(still to be writtem by Jacques Derrida) Disraeli carefully distinguishes 
between the errata of printing errors which is mechanical and incidental, 
and the errata forming an extra layer added to the text, another text 
towering (Kofman’s "la tour, le bastion [...] l ’expression d’une architec­
ture interne” ) over the available body of of works, and which is thus 
a procedure somehow natural:
Besides the ordinary errata, which happen in printing a work, others have 
been purposely committed, that the errata may contain what is not permitted 
to appear in the body of the work.108
Disraeli thinks, first of all, of all the procedures helping to over­
come censorship, nevertheless he is right when he speaks of the errata 
as of text piled up upon another text. If a labirynth is a road "coiled 
and recoiled on itself” , then the text as errata is a word imposed upon 
another word. Availing ourselves of Disraeli’s terminology we could lo­
cate the first errata in printing, while the other one, more profoundly 
rooted in the text takes place in writing.
I f  writing is, as in Derrida’s theory, a broken, interrupted path, 
a via rupta, then spacings between words are the house of errata. The 
interpretation is errata (i.e. a correction of errors), but it is also a "mista­
ke” itself. In the very word "errata” there lurks a tragedy and comedy 
of writing: it is opening and closing, a correction of errors, and a disse­
mination o f errors. It would not be unjustified to apply Joycean/Derri- 
dian lexicographical strategy and spell the name of the French philo­
sopher as d-ERR-ida, as the one whose very name entails and contains 
not only a possibility, but a necessity of the errors as the ontological 
foundation of interpretation conceived of as écriture. One of the nu­
merous examples provided by Disraeli is here particularly pertinent:
Of alt the literary blunders none equalled that of the edition of the Vulgate, 
by Sixtus V. His Holiness carefully superintended every sheet as it passed 
through the press; and, to the amazement of the world, the work remained 
without a rival —  it swarmed with errata! A  multitude of scraps were prin­
ted to paste over the erroneous passages, in order to give the true text. The 
book makes a whimsical appearance with these patches; and the heretics 
exulted in this demonstration of papal infallibility.109
A ll the metaphoric gestures of Derrida’s thought are present in this quo­
tation: the path as the labirynthine, Ruskinian "coiling and recoiling” of 
distance, also a "parcour” , i.e. a road hopelessly entangled in distance, 
also in reading and delay, in death which is the heart of writing: "par­
cour” signifies a path and distance, and the verb parcourir unites the 
two meanings as it denotes both "travelling through a given area” and 
also "peruse, read with attention” . In the act of reading we automatically, 
independent of our volition, establish the errata, a list of errors which, 
twisted together with what they supposedly correct, form another hori­
zontal surface of the error (we ought to remind ourselves that the ver­
tical metaphoricity is banned from deconstruction).
The human figure [...] cannot be be re­
presented from cursory and ignorant ob­
servation; it must be understood before 
it can be imitated.
— John Flaxman, Lectures on Sculpture
[...] so as these Nations Danes seldom 
travell’d without their Graef [...] a kind 
of point or stilleto, with which they us’d 
to carve out Letters and other Figures 
upon occasion [...].
— John Evelyn, Scupltura, or the Histo­
ry and Art of Chalcography
Drawing was earlier than writing and the 
earliest form of writing seems to have 
been picture drawing.
—  J. H. Breasted, A History of Egypt
Drawing is a thing so highly necessary, 
that Donatellus was wont to tell his Dis­
ciples [...] that to deliver it in a single 
word, he would say, DESIGNE, because 
it was the very Basis and Foundation, 
not only of this, but even of all those 
tree and noble Sciences of Fortification, 
Architecture, Perspective, and whatsoever 
also pretended to any affinity with the 
Mathematics, as really leading the van, 
and perspective of them all.
—  John Evelyn, Sculptura
At last the meaning of line has been 
elucidated in full: on the one hand its 
facetal and relationship, and on the other 
as a factor of principal construction in 
any organism in life as a whole [...] Both 
in painting and in any construction in 
general line is the first and the least 
thing.
—  Alexandr Rodchenko, Line
What lives is exposed to other forces, but 
in such a way that, striving against them, 
it deals with them according to their form 
and rhythm, in order to estimate them 
in relation to possible incorporation or 
elimination. According to this angle of vi­
sion, everything that is is interpreted in 
terms of the living creature’s capacity for 
life [...]. Everything "real” is alive, is
Drawing as 
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"perspectival” in itself, and asserts itself in its perspective against others.
— Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche
Écrir et dessiner sont identiques en leur fond.
— Paul Klee, Philosophie de la creation
Why was it necessary to replace type-set by manuscript? Khlebnikov himself ex­
plained: "There are 2 conditions: 1) mood changes the handwriting during the act 
of writing; 2) handwriting which has been changed in its own distinctive way by 
mood transmits this mood to the reader —independent of the words [...] the hand- 
-writing guides the reader by its faintest tremor. The dumb voice of handwriting”.
— Eugenii Kovtun, Varvara Stepanova’s Anti-book
Pour Jackson Pollock, le dessin était une forme de calligraphie, une marque aussi 
charactéristique que l’écriture. La traduction du graphique en pictural était done 
un développement très naturel.
—  Barabara Rose, Barnett New m an: les oeuvres sur papier
[...] language is first writing.
— Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology
Such is the power of writing to deconstruct, to space out, to open up a textual 
field where all linearity, all equivocality, all precision are swept away.
— René Denizot, Readings
The presentation of Derrida’s and Heidegger’s vision of literature 
(and one should insist on the most literal reading of the word "vision” , 
as Heidegger, in good faith, derives from the Western metaphysics of 
light and sight, while Derrida helplessly trapped in the language of light 
tries to get to the pre-Platonic shadow of a philosophy free from disse­
mination) served two purposes. To begin with, it drew the outline of in­
teresting hermeneutic (Heidegger) and posthermeneutic (Derrida) sugges­
tions according to which literature (poetry) is either a most fundamental 
and ontologically valid preoccupation ("poetically man dwells on earth” 1), 
or constitutes the horizon of writing which coincides and demarcates the 
horizon of living ("there is an originary violence of writing because lan­
guage is first [...] writing”2). The other reason is of a more heuristic na­
ture: since writing (poetizing) is a mode of existence (either the most 
profound as in Heidegger, or the only accessible to man as in Derrida) 
we can read (and reading is also writing) literary texts as involuntarily 
self-centered. This self-centeredness goes back partly to Jakobson’s poe­
tic function of language, but, primarily, shifts a balance from the word 
focused on itself to the word which opens up the horizon of literature/wri­
ting. In other words, each phrase, each expression, demonstrate their 
mode of production, each word is already guilty of opening a vision of 
literature.
A  word is literature not only in the sense of belonging to the body 
of written texts, but it constitutes literature because it surreptitiously 
writes a critical discourse on itself. A  written word is at the same time
a writing word. Whether it admits such a possibility or not, a text is 
always a text disseminating other texts and, therefore, a critic, a her- 
meneut, is a messenger, a mediator between the revealed text of the 
written word and the hidden text of the writing word. Hence, the her- 
meneut inevitably finds himself in a stream of writing, and his work 
consists in his being aware of the fact that while writing he cuts through 
words only to reveal more words, through literature leads to more lite­
rature. The following section of the book w ill concentrate on Blake’s 
prose and poetry as on a hidden, undisclosed movement towards a cer­
tain vision of literature. This movements pivots round the concept of 
the absence of a pure literature, i.e. a literature which would not contain 
its own critical discourse already implanted in its own words. We shall
look at Blake’s words as upon a dissemination of literature, incessant
wandering of signifiers which forms the essence of writing.
1. A Yellow Mask of Death
We should die except for Death
In his chalk and violet robes. Not
to die a parish death.
—  Wallace Stevens, Like Decora­
tions In  a N igger C&netary
Blake’s thought seems to be caught in a fundamental debate between 
the face and the mask or, in terms of verbs, in a rupture between to 
display and to hide. Interestingly enough, Blake does not remain in a circ­
le of themes and motifs, but sees the repercussions of the two schools of 
painting (Raphaelite vs. Venetian) in the very structure of material used 
in the process. W ell before McLuhan, an English engraver knew that 
a medium can be an important message. Philosophically it implies a li­
teral reading of the message as received from the forms. In Annotations 
to Reynolds Blake critically comments on Reynolds’s opinion that "To 
understand literally these metaphors as the ideas expressed in poetical 
language seems to be [...] absurd [...]”  (K, 473).
Technically, which aspect interests us here, the aesthetics of Blake 
is acutely aware of a texture of a painting, and thus understands a can­
vass, first of all, literally, i.e. as an interplay of not so much ideas, but 
an ideological interplay of the surface and paint. In Descriptive Catalogue 
the reader finds a significant passage on the quality and ideology of oil 
painting:
Oil has falsely been supposed to give strength to colours: but a little consi­
deration must show the fallacy of this opinion. Oil wiE not drink or absorb 
colour enough to stand the test of very little time and of the air. It deadens 
every colour it is mixed with, at its first mixture, and in a little time beco­
mes a yellow mask over all that it touches. (K, 565)
Oil is then not only a question of theatrics, of make-up, but also of 
a deadly mask which under a pretext of covering and protection destroys 
the surface, the skin, the face it is supposed to shelter. Oil "deadens eve­
ry  colour" because it promotes, what Blake himself called, "Broken Co­
lours and Broken Lines" (K, 464), but, first of all, because its chemistry 
is detrimental to life. The chemistry of oil is a chemistry of death; lead 
used as an element of oil paint is distilled as a death factor:
[...] oil [...] turns every permanent white to a yellow and brown putty, and 
has compelled the use of that destroyer of colours, white lead; which, when 
its protecting oil is evaporated, w ill become lead again. (K, 566).
The maim line o f Blake’s attack against oil painting repeats his most 
essential argument against chiaroscuro which is called "the Infernal Ma­
chine” (K, 582): oil blurs and blots colour and thus reintroduces chaos 
which outline was trying to counteract. A  deadly mask of oil disfigures 
the face it is hiding, or rather disfigures it by the very fact that belong­
ing to the realm of the shadow (a kingdom of "blotting and blurring 
demons" as Blake refers to it in Descriptive Catalogue, K , 581), it hides 
the face instead of unconcealing it, it generalizes abbut it, and thus cuts 
itself o ff from the "Minute Particular".
W ith this category we are coming back to the "Precision of the 
Pencil"; to a difference engendered role of drawing. Blake was aware of 
the fact that it is not a size or even a general character of a work that 
determines its specificity, but an immanent quality which he himself 
terms "Minute Discrimination”  (K, 453) and which may be described as 
a degree to which one form stands out in its separateness from all other 
forms. In Annotations to Reynolds we read:
Fresco Painting is the Most Minute. Fresco Painting is Like Miniature Pain­
ting; a Wall is Large Ivory (K, 466),
and in Descriptive Catalogue Blake describes "high finished frescoes”  
where
[...] the colours would be as pure and as permanent as precious stones, though 
the figures were one hundred feet in height. (K, 566).
The purity of colours referred to removes or rather, historically speaking, 
precedes the "mask" of oil which throws its deadly shadow upon a co­
lour in the Venetian or Flemish schools. But the "Precision of the Pen­
c il" ultimately brings us to the concept of which one can never depart 
very far in Blake: purity of the revealed face is the work of OUTLINE. 
A  criterion which Blake consistently uses both in case of big frescoes and 
fragile illuminations is a criterion of the LINE:
The great and golden rule of art, as well as of life, is this: That the more 
distinct, sharp and wirey the bounding line, the more perfect the work of 
art. (K, 585).
2. Difference and Character
The beautiful is nothing but the begin­
ning of the terrible that we still barely
endure, and we admire it so because it 
serenely disdains to destroy us.
—  Rainer Maria Rilke, First Elegy
In the same way as Derrida’s difference was a discreet unit of lin­
guistic pronouncement ("D ifference is articulation” 3), Blake’s outline is
a category of existence ("Leave out this line, and you leave out life itself’' ’
K, 585). It cannot be overlooked that the line is a synonym of a charac­
teristic line, a line is a feature, lineaments, an outline constitutes a face. 
In other words, an outline is placed in a position o f a signifier designat­
ing its signified, the domain of outline is a realm of semiotic purpose­
fulness measured by the adequacy of our reading. In A  Vision of the 
Last Judgment Blake draws our attention to the philosophy of "Minute 
Particulars” :
I intreat, then that the Spectator will Attend to the Hands &  Feet, to the 
lineaments of Countenances; they are all descriptive of Character, & not 
a line is drawn without intention, &  that most discriminate & particular. 
(K, 611).
Outline is a measure of difference and, at the same time, of a character 
("know that where there are no lineaments there can be no character” , 
K, 575). These two features make outline a carrier of meaning. This 
seems to be a reason why Blake nostalgically looks back (or rather listens 
back) to a traditional situation of the Western metaphysics in which 
a sign is a reflection, a necessary but inadequate representation of the 
original plenitude. A  sign does not only differ from another sign, but, 
first of all, it reflects upon the original unity of things and signs where 
no language and no sign were needed. Thus, a sign shows itself as 
a scandal, a catastrophe, a cosmic disaster in the originally undifferen­
tiated world. In this model which Derrida calls "onto-theological” , a sign 
is necessary to demonstrate its own uselessness or, to say the least, its 
secondarinesrf, fallenness and deprivation. A  sign born out of distance 
and spacing attempts to render "an intact life [...] a song and inarticulate 
language [...] speech without spacing.”4
Blake’s philosophy of art is acutely aware of the problem of identity 
and difference. On the one hand, outline is a measure of the independen­
ce of things, and life is a process of differentiation ("How do we distin­
guish one face or countenance from another, but by the bounding line 
and its infinite inflections and movements?” K, 585), on the other hand, 
however, outline ("lineaments” ) is a sign, a vehicle, through which speaks 
some external power. In A  Descriptive Catalogue we read:
The Beauty proper for sublime art is lineaments, or forms and features that 
are capable of being the receptacles of intellect; accordingly, the Painter has 
given in his beautiful man, his own idea of intellectual Beauty. (K, 580).
According to this definition a line is a "receptacle” of intellect, i.e. 
it serves as a representation of an external power, and, at the same time, 
shelters and contains it within its protective space. An outline as a ta­
bernacle is a sanctuary of the external, all-powerful element, it contains 
the transcendence within which it has to be itself contained. In other 
words, outline stands between the outside (transcendental signified) and 
the inside (signifier), it is exposed to the outside (transcendence) and re- 
-presents it, nevertheless it also contains it within its own "bounding 
line” , tears it away from the original totality. Thus, although outline is 
caught by the dialectic movement of the inside and outside, it radically 
negates this division or, at least, questions it. The very semantics of the 
word "receptacle” implies a play of revalation (it suggests that the holy 
is contained within it) and concealment (only the place, the habitat, of 
the holy is available, while the thing itself is hidden and inaccessible).
3. A Point, Line, and Name
The man who is named. Is myth. 
Who is accosted by death. Is not 
shaded into motivation.
— Iain Sinclair, Suicide Brigade
Outline is, then, a carving out of a portion of Being which makes 
itself manifest as a thing. It is a trace of a thing as existing in the ori­
ginal plenitude. By this very fact outline is connected with architecture: 
like the art of constructing edifices it erects a facade (contour, shape, 
wall, outline), but also lets us behind or into it (like into a house where 
the thing discussed is hidden). The act of drawing a line is the act of 
naming and building: to live is to be able to name, or to repeat endlessly 
futile attempts at naming, the realm which defies any names, but still 
is recognizable and stands out in itself only against the background of 
a name. Hence, a line and a name are implicitly the house of our being. 
Blake diagnoses this situation in M ilton:
Creating form & beauty around the dark regions of sorrow,
Giving to airy nothing a name and a habitation.
Delightful, with bounds to the Infinite putting off the Indefinite,
Into most holy forms of Thought; such is the power of inspiration.
They labour incessant with many tears & afflictions,
Creating the beautiful House for the piteous sufferer. (K, 514— 5).
Outline ("form ”) is a foundation of the aesthetic ("form  & beauty” ) 
but also it is a speech ("name” ) and location ("habitation” ). The key line 
in the above quotation states the relationship between a sign and a signi­
fied object; a sign imposes limits on Infinity, and thus gives form to the 
"indefinite” . Blake’s semiotics is founded upon a radical conviction that 
a sign is a human habitat which, through naming, calling things out of 
Infinity, relegates them to the sphere of thought: a thing signified —  as 
a portion of Eternity —  is a speech phenomenon of human thought.
If we juxtapose two quotations (one from The Marriage of Heaven 
and Hell and the other from M ilton ) we shall undoubtedly notice a transi­
tion of a sign from the visual to the intellectual level:
The roaring of lions, the howling of wolves, the raging of the stormy sea, 
and the destructive sword, are portions of eternity, too great for the eye of 
man. (K, 151)
[...] a name and a habitation [...] with bounds to the Infinite putting off the 
Indefinite
Into most holy forms of Thought. (K, 515)
A  sign which is "bounds to the Infinite” unfolds in thought; outline is 
this absolutely essential category which begins a sign, it is a signal for 
a sign to begin, it is a sign of a sign. Outline spaces out a sign, makes 
room for it to appear, and thus becomes a space (and a house) of a sign. 
The correlation between "bounds” and "thought” suggests that a boun­
dary is not an end of something, but rather a promise of new develop­
ments which w ill promote it to a more dignified existence ("most holy 
forms of Thought” ). Outline, by circumscribing an object, does not close 
it, but opens it to the thought: this seems to be the basic premise of 
Blake’s semiotics.
In his essay on Building, Dwelling, Thinking Martin Heidegger per­
forms a typical tour-de-force in his comments upon the word „Raum” :
What the word for space, Raum, designates is said by its ancient meaning. 
Raum, Rum  means a place cleared or freed for settlement and lodging. A  spa­
ce is something that has been made room for, something that is cleared and 
free, namely, a boundary, Greek peras. A  boundary is not at which some­
thing stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which 
something begins its essential unfolding.5
This passage marks a transition between outline ("boundary” ) and 
architecture ("settlement” ) on the one hand, and ontology, on the other, 
possible. Since, as we know from Heidegger, "building” is also originally 
"being” , outline is also the ontological category naming the territory
where a sign dwells. A  line is the dwelling place of a sign as a manifes­
tation of human "most holy Thought” . In Heidegger’s terms:
The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are 
on the earth, is buan, dwelling. To be a human being means to be on the 
earth as a mortal. It means to dwell. The old word bauen, which says that 
man is insofar as he dwells, this word bauen, however, also means at the 
same time to cherish and protect, to preserve and care for, specifically to 
till the soil, to cultivate the vine.*
To draw a line is, then, an act of mercy or care; to open a possibi­
lity for a sign to appear is a protective and caring gesture, a movement 
of a pencil is the writing of responsibility. Blake confirms that "Science” , 
which is a synonym of architecture, of a radical outline, of a complete 
difference between inside and outside "remains through Mercy” , and it 
is through a protective field of science/architecture/outline that other 
disciplines develop. It is also a very special edifice which Blake con­
structs in M ilton, as the habitation there is meant to shelter "the piteous 
sufferer” , and close protectively upon "the dark regions of sorrow” . Out­
line, a possibility of a sign, is a mode of showing one’s pity which turns 
out to be a form-giving operation, that is to say, pity is an attitude ge­
nerated by the awareness of difference: I w ill be pitiful for "the piteous 
sufferer” if, by giving him his unique form, I w ill make him aware of 
a difference between himself and the world.
Thus, Antamon in Blake’s M ilton  helps the two unbodied Spectres,
[...] takes them into his beautiful flexible hands,
and the act of giving a form, of drawing an outline, is described as the 
other meaning of bauen which Heidegger painstakingly warns us not to 
forget: Antamon is a builder-cultivator. To build, to erect a wall, to 
outline, is also to deal with the earth: Antamon
[...] as the Sower taikes the seed [...],
but he remembers that the outline not always celebrates simplicity but, 
like a facade, it is a place of a certain surplus of building, i.e. a place of 
adornment and ornament. To build, to draw, to cultivate is then also to 
create a surplus of meaning which inheres in tlie meaning itself. The 
one who draws a line is an architect, an agriculturalist, a moralist, and 
an artist:
As the Sower takes the seed or as the Artist his clay,
Or fine wax, to mould artful a model for golden ornaments. (K, 515)
The act of production of ornaments (which is an act of ploughing and
building at the same time) is a form-giving procedure of permanent du­
ration:
/
The soft hand of Antamon draw the indelible line;,
Form immortal with golden pen, such as the Spectre admiring,
Puts on sweet form [...] (K, 515).
4. Engraving and Medicine
Is it impossible after all that God 
might give the command to kill his 
son not to an Abraham who loves 
his son but to an Abraham who 
hates his son [...].
—  Max Brod, Heidentum, Christen- 
tum, Judentum
In one of his last letters, dated 25 April 1827, the artist assures 
John Linnell of his better health (" I  am going on better every day” ), 
and progress in his work as an engraver: " I  have Proved the Six Plates, 
& reduced the Fighting Devils ready for the Copper” (K. 879). Engraving 
which Blake studied with Basire for 7 years was for him an activity 
which, through drawing, linked modern art with the past, tried to dis­
play the ancient heritage underlying a modern surface. Engraving makes 
the surface tangible and noticeable, but at the same time dissolves it, 
makes it transparent, as if —  paraphrasing Blake’s famous aphorism —  
drawing not W ITH  but THROUGH the line. In Blake’s comments to his 
own illustrations to Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales we read:
In this Plate MrB. has resumed the style with which he set out in life, of 
which Heath & Stothard were the awkward imitators at that time; it is the 
style of Alb. Durer’s Histories & the old Engravers, which cannot be imitated 
by any one who does not understand drawing [...] (K, 592)
A historical movement from the surface ("M rB” ) towards the depth ("the 
old Engravers” ) hinges on a fundamental role of drawing as the princi­
pal difference, and complies with a philosophical movement from the 
outward vision towards the inner eye. Blake sees Eternity, but does it 
through a sign which, in order to melt away, has first to appear and 
make its presence felt. Blake’s eternity is a trace of a sign, its shadow 
and mirror image. Eternity is a sign’s double. The line is "indelible” , 
non-removable, as even its disappearance leaves a line as the felt emot­
ion, hence the language Blake uses when speaking of such a union of 
inside and outside, surface and depth which constitutes the line is either 
emotional ("Eternity is in love with the production of time” , K, 154) or 
medicinal: he calls engraving "salutary and medicinal” (K, 154). A  me­
dicinal result of the engraved line is based on the fact that it is engra­
ved, that is to say, that it does not glide over the surface, but starting 
from there penetrates the depth, opens and uncovers what was under­
neath the face of a thing. Thus, the engraved line has to be simulta­
neously outward and inward. Such a union, the status of a sign as a bor­
der phenomenon, invalidates to a large extent a traditional concept of 
a sign as divided into a signifying material form and a signified abstract 
content. The Marriage of Heaven and Hell is dedicated to a defence of 
three basic "Contraries” , and the second "Memorable Fancy” enlarges 
on one of them:
[...] first the notion that man has a body distinct from his soul is to be ex­
punged; this I shall do by printing in the infernal method, by corrosives, 
which in Hell are salutary and medicinal, melting apparent surfaces away, 
and displaying the infinite which was hid. (K, 154)
The reader w ill have noticed that the use of adjectives like "salu­
tary” or "medicinal”  introduces indirectly a state of disease which is dia­
gnosed as a gap between a signifier and a signified, body and soul. The 
illness is viewed as a discrepancy between an organism and the external 
world which brings danger and anxiety; soul becomes ill when threat­
ened by outside which jeopardizes inside’s purity and health. A  disease 
affects the signifier while the abstract signified remains protected, as if 
it existed on a level unavailable for a disease.
Blake realizes that to abolish a distinction between body and soul 
means to put oneself in a very difficult situation with regard to a disease: 
either it extends the territory of a disease (from the identification of bo­
dy and soul it follows that a disease can reach further and deeper) or 
it has to eradicate the very notion of an illness by exploding the surface 
which is usually a disease’s dwelling place. What Blake is really interes­
ted in is the healthy interior hidden underneath the surface, but the very 
technique used to unveil the inside, the very medicine applied prolongs 
the existence of the diseased surface. The corrosives and fire used in the 
process of engraving do not remove the surface, but, so to say, unveil 
the inside, the depth, by saturating it with the elements of the surface. 
The very word "melting away” is significant since it implies only a chan­
ge of the form of existence but not a radical removal or absence. In other 
words, the line "indelibly” drawn, cut into a copper plate participates 
both in the surface and depth reality; it is not a metaphoric sign used in 
the absence of another sign, but it is a metonimic contiguity of one and 
the other as participating in "the whole of life ” .
As we see, a medicinal practice of applying corrosives, of "printing 
in the infernal method” is both "salutary” (it brings back the unity of 
the person, overcomes the gap between a signifier and a signified) and 
deadly. Its deadliness is rendered by the element of fire "raging around
& melting the metals into living fluids” (K, 155) and by the desintegrat- 
ing influence it exercises upon the surface. The medicine is a beneficial 
drug and a poisonous matter causing decay and decline ("corrosives” ). 
Thus, on the perceptual level a unification of the signified and signifier 
can be either disastrous or miraculous, and its effect spans the whole 
gamut between a terminal disease and final recuperation. The former is 
evident in those who see with, the latter in those who see through the 
eye, as Blake demonstrates it in his letter to Dr. Trusler:
I see everything I paint in This World, but Every body does not see alike. 
To the Eyes of a Miser a Guinea is more beautiful than the Sun [...]. The 
tree which moves some to tears of joy is in the Eyes of others only a green 
thing that stands in the way [...]. As a man is, So he Sees. (K, 793).
As it is easily noticeable a removal of the body/Soul controversy 
questions the possibility of only one, dominating, type of relationship 
holding between the signifier and signified. A  sensual perception is 
a starting point (in a "salutary” application of the medicine of the line) 
for a chain of other perceptions originating in and from imagination’s 
work^ipon the sensual material, or a blocking of the further way (when 
the nftdicine of the line is poisonous) and remaining within confines of 
one perceptual image. While the sun can be either a source of endless 
visionary, imaginary signs, it can also be limited to one particular sign 
(a coin). A  line which in its indelibility opens and closes the split between 
the signifier and the signified is, like any medicine, either helpful or 
catastrophic depending on the person who uses it.
Such a situation is an incentive for Jacques Derrida who builds his 
well known text on Plato’s Pharmacy upon this etymological-translational 
problems of the polysemy of the word "pharmakon” which, according 
to the French philosopher:
[...] without mistranslation, permitted the rendering of the same word by 
"remedy”, "recipe”, "poison”, "drug”, "philter” etc.7
The line is a principle of form but also a medicine and poison at 
the same time. If his is the case then the artist who uses it achieves not 
only aesthetic purposes but also pharmaceutical. He shapes, outlines 
things, draws their contour thus instating difference between them and 
the Origin, and also he drives out illness, out-lines it (i.e. rules it out, 
forces it outside) to restore the original health.
But the outside is never really outside but only a meeting place, 
a boundary, a line from which a movement can begin in both directions.. 
The very action described as "salutary” refers both to an activity aiming 
at removing the dirt and waste matter, but also at chastising evil and
corruption. This is a possible meaning of Blake’s phrase instructing us 
to "cleanse the doors of perception” , and of another fragment from The 
Marriage of Heaven and Hell representing a printing house in Hell:
In the first chamber was a Dragon-Man, clearing away the rubbish from 
a cave’s mouth. (K, 154)
The man who cleverly uses the line forms, cures, but also cleanses 
his habitation, and is, respectively, an artist, a doctor, and a Dragon- 
-Man, a wizard or a magician, one who cleanses exercising his magical po­
wers. The last two functions in Plato’s language voiced again by Derrida 
are those of a "pharmakon”  and a "pharmekeus” . J. E. Harrison in his 
Prolegomenna to the Study of Greek Religion claims that:
"Pharmakos” means simply "magic-man”. Its Lithuanian cognate is "burin”, 
magic; in Latin it appears as "forma”, formula, magic spell [...]. "Pharmakon" 
in Greek means healing drug, poison and dye, but all, for better or worse, 
are magical.8
The line as a meeting place of outside and inside is a place where the 
ceremony of "pharmakos” is located. Interpreting this ancient Grgek ri­
tual of purification consisting in burning a "pharmakos” , a m*n de­
signated to be a scapegoat, a symbolic cause of the evil that overtook 
a city, Derrida notices that although the ceremony took place outside the 
polis nevertheless in essence was the epitome of the polis itself. In other 
words, the other, the evil shadow of the polis is inherently present within 
it, as a matter of fact is constituted and preserved by the polis:
That representative represents the otherness of the evil that comes to affect 
or infect the inside by unpredictably breaking into it. Yet the representative 
of the outside is nonetheless constituted, regularly granted its place by the 
community, chosen kept, fed, etc. in the very heart of the inside. These pa­
rasites were as a matter of fact domesticated by the living organism that 
housed them at its expense.9
The line, then, is'both a medicine and a poison (it brings to light, cures 
an object of its former darkness of the "whole of L ife ” , and with the 
same light it kills, "poison?” its domestication in the "whole of L ife ” ), 
the place where the outsiele and inside meet in the ceremony called 
engraving which is the in-scription of the outside on the inside, and 
bringing to light, singling out what is inside, revealing the inside to the 
watchful eyes of the outside. In-scription, because it not only writes on 
the surface, but actually moves down, literally in-scribes a letter which 
suddenly acquires the status of a being of depth. This penetrating qua­
lity  o f engraving is coded even in the etymology of the term. John Evelyn 
in his erudite work Sculptura or the History and A rt of Chalcography 
and Engraving in Copper (second edition 1755) derives
Scalpo, Sculpo from yX&eco and yXvew [...]. The wond in the Hody Tongue 11x1 
which imports an opening (because the Plate, Stone or whatever else mate­
rial they used aperitur aliqua sui parte, was somewhere opened when any 
thing is engraved upon it) [...].*•
5. "Stony Law" and "God's Breath"
But life! But the triumph of life! 
But the great Yes to all high, beau­
tiful, audacious things!
—  Friedrich Nietzsche, Antichrist
Engraving transports us already to the sphere of writing which, for 
Blake, as for Derrida, is more than a movement of a pen over a sheet of 
paper. Writing, as we have already seen, performed with a "golden pen” 
brings in effect the "indelible line” , "immortal” , "sweet form” . It is by 
no means incidental that Blake does not speak of letters, but uses a more 
general concept of the form. Writing as an art of pictographic or ideo­
graphic communication referred to by Derrida as "the vulgar concept” 11, 
is also subject to criticism in Blake’s theory. His attack on the inhuman 
ideology of Ten Commandements is founded upon a perception of the 
message as an extension of the medium. In the last "Memorable Francy” 
of The Marriage of Heaven ond Hell we read:
I tell you, no virtue can exist without breaking these ten commandements.
Jesus was all virtue, and acted from impulse, not from rules. (K, 158)
The attack against the authoritarianism of the written moral code 
coupled with a critical perception and evaluation of writing as the very 
institution which instates authoritarianism in the structure of human 
life. A ll the versions of The Everlasting Gospel emphasize moral oppress­
ion; thus, Jesus in his attempts to unearth the roots of evil reveals the 
political and social elite and writing as perversion:
Throughout the land he took his course,
And traced diseases to their source:
He curs’d the Scribe & Pharisee,
Trampling down Hipocrisy. (K, 749)
Another version of the same poem concentrates on the moral dicta­
torship also inscribed upon society by Ten Commandements, and spread 
by writing:
What I call’d Humility, they call’d Pride.
He who loves his Enemies, betrays his Friends;
This surely is not what Jesus intends,
But the sneaking Pride of Heroic Schools,
And the Scribes '&  Pharisees’ Virtuous Rules. (K, 751)
Blake discovers the political and restrictive function of writing which 
Lévi-Strauss w ill describe and analyse in his comments upon the Nam- 
bikwara in Les tristes tropiqus as the aggression of writing upon a living 
organism of a small community. Writing is pathological and perverse (it 
institutes moral evil), and by sanctioning the absence of the person whom 
the writer (Blake’s "Scribe” ) is addressing it generates dispersion and 
alienation, thus helping the authoritarian system to triumph over the in­
dividual will. The very word "pathological” used with regard to writing 
appears in de Saussure’s Cours de linguistique generale where it clearly 
draws upon what Derrida calls "the tradition which has always associat­
ed writing with the fatal violence of the political institution.” 12
This violence mediates between the elite and society, since the 
"Scribe”  is not an original writer, but one who transmits in a written 
form, and thus commemorates, the decrees of others. The "Scribe” inscri­
bes moral tyranny (Saussure speaks of "the tyranny of writing” 13) upon 
the mind of the individual, and necessarily represents the oppression of 
the bureaucratic system.
From the earliest days a scribe was a special servant, a transmitter 
and eternalizer of power. Harold Innis in his brilliant study of the so­
cial and political impact of means of communication notices a sudden 
emergence of a specially privileged class of professional writers in an­
cient Egypt:
Writing had been restricted to governmental, fiscal, magical, and religious 
purposes [...]. Alter 2000 BC the catral administration employed an army of 
scribes [...] [who] became a restricted class ,[...].14
It is not incidental that Urizen, the archetypal tyrant of Blake’s 
mythology, is shown as a disseminator of writing via the promulgation 
of Ten Commandements:
Leading his starry hosts thro’ the waste wilderness, he promulgates his ten 
commands (K, 159)
and the detailed description of writing as a political and intellectual vio­
lence is to be found in The Song of Los:
Thus the terrible race of Los & Enitharmon gave Laws & Religion to the 
Sons of Har, binding them more and more to Earth, closing and restraining, 
till a Philosophy of Five Senses was complete. (K, 246)
What follows writing is an existence under the oppressive shadow 
of the "Book of Brass” which is a source of centralism as a political 
principle.
"W hy is one Law given to the Lion & the patient Ox” (K, 109) this 
question opens an attack upon writing which introduces both moral ("to 
restrain the child from the womb” , K, 247) and political ("To cut o ff the 
bread from the city/that the remnant may learn to obey” , K, 247) 
oppression.
Original Egyptian literature disseminated the image of the Scribe 
as an important intermediary between kings, centralized administration 
and society:
Byt the scribe, he directeth the work of all men. For him there are no taxes., 
for he payeth tribute in writing, and there are no dues for him.15
Similarly, Derrida rounds up his discussion of Plato’s Phaedrus with 
a formula "the legislator is a writer” 16, which repeats concisely what 
Innis translates into the language of religion and sociology:
W.rit'ing was a difficult and specialized art requiring long apprenticeship [...]. 
The god of writing was «closely related to the leading deities and reflected 
the power of the scribe over religion. The scribe had the full qualifications 
of a special profession and was included in the upper classes of kings, priests, 
nobles, and generals, in contrast with peasants, fishermen, artisans, and la­
bourers.17
A  high position of the god of writing who in Blake’s mythology is 
also a god of a mathematical diagram is based on the fact that the deity 
overrules the world, determines and explains everything by his "Stony 
Laws” . He (Teuth, Urizen) is not only a god of writing but also a written 
God, a preface to the world, a preface which shuts out and silences the 
book it is introducing:
As the preface to a book, that is the word of a father assisting and admi­
ring his work, answering for his son, losing his breath in sustaining, re­
taining, idealizing, reinternalizing, and mastering his seed.18
The writing of a scribe is, however, only a trace or imitation of an­
other, more powerful script the origin of which is not human. As the scribe 
is a depositary of the language of the Pharisees, so the Pharisee is a sec­
retary standing next to the original written message of God. Blake’s myth 
of the origin of writing oscillates uneasily between the daemonic or pro­
vidential interpretation of the fateful event. The most concise version, 
of the story appears in the preface to Jerusalem:
Reader! lover of books! lover of heaven,
And of that God from whom all goods are given.
Who in mysterious Sinai’s awful cave 
To Man the wondrous art of writing gave:
Again he speaks in thunder and in fire!
Thunder of Thought, & flames of fierce desire:
Even from the depth of Hell his voice I heard 
Within the unfathom’d caverns of my Ear.
Therefore I print; nor vain my types shall be:
Heaven, Earth & Hell henceforth shall live in harmony. (K, 621)
The myth in itself is far from original, and it re-tells the Biblical version 
of the beginning of writing which was "written by the finger of God" 
(Exod. X X X L : 18), what is interesting, however, is a double treatment 
given to writing placed between the terrible and the sublime and uneasily 
twisted together with the act of speaking. Thus, writing is "the won­
drous art” , but it makes its appearance in a terrifying scenery of "Sinai’s 
awful cave". Writing is a place where good and bad meet, in the same 
way as line was a meeting place of the inside and outside. Besides, w rit­
ing is another form of line making ("w ith golden pen” Antamon draws 
"the indelible line” ). This leads us to a question of good and bad writing 
which translates itself back into the language of the inside and outside. 
A  good writing is a script inscribed upon our soul, engraved on the very 
structure of our life, while its bad equivalent is a sign which exists in 
a total unrelatedness to ourselves. Hence, although both the Scribe and 
Jesus talk about letters and graphics, they necessarily mean two different 
things. In the "c ” version of The Everlasting Gospel we read:
He [Jesus] was too Proud to take a bribe;
He spoke with authority, not like a Scribe.
Upon his heart with Iron Pen
He wrote, "You must be born again”. (K, 750)
A  bad writing of the scribe is strongly juxtaposed to the writing
which writes truth (unlike the Scribe’s which deals with a "bribe” ) the
latter, however, is of a purely metaphorical character. The inscription of 
truth upon the soul is metaphorical not only in the sense that Plato gives 
it in Phaedrus where it signifies the true knowledge of oneself which 
has to remain imperceptible as it is buried deeply inside. Here we do not, 
as a matter of fact, see the letters inscribed, but only read —  as it were 
—  the man upon whose soul they have been imprinted as a sign of other 
signs. God’s writing is metaphorical, and his Hand is reflected in the 
man’s face. Of God’s writing Hand one could say what Derrida says about 
Plato and his script:
It is not perceived. Only interpreted, read, deciphered. [...] An inscription, the 
Delphicon gramima, which is antything but an oracle, prescribes through its 
silent cipher [...].19
Human behaviour, metaphorically speaking —  human face, is the 
only way to know the script of God, and thus the sacred writing can
only be intuited, but never perceived; a face becomes a letter of God’s 
writing which can be deciphered and thought of in terms of a profane 
human notation. This notation, however, in the process of interpretation, 
multiplies signs, and folds them upon one another. Using Derridian cate­
gories we could claim that writing, both good and bad, is nothing but 
a preface to the text that w ill remain for ever imperceptible or/and 
a citation from another source, quotation of another letter. I f  we could 
coin two, rather risky, terms we could describe this situation of writing 
as a general "prefacibility” and "citationability” of the written sign. In 
Jacques Derrida’s poetic phrase:
Time is the time of the preface; [...] space [...] is the space of the preface.
The preface would thus occupy the entire location and duration of the book.”
God is referred in Blake’s texts as the one "from  whom all books 
are given’’ , i.e. as the source of all books, as the super book, the Book of 
the books, writing itself. It follows, then, that even God is a preface, a ci­
tation, a spacing, a difference characteristic of writing. This movement, 
this endless procession of sings, is topped in Blake’s fragment by the 
other layer of metaphor which combines God’s writing with voice. God’s 
hand of which human face is but a quotation, turns out to be a replica, 
a replacement of God’s breath. Thus, although writing is "wondrous” (it 
allows expression), it is at the same time begotten in an "aw fu l”  place, 
"aw fu l” because alienating the letter from being seen directly. This trap 
is removed when frequent allusions to the accoustic quality of God’s 
communication are considered. Thus, God "speaks”  "again”  where "again” 
suggests strongly that the original writing of God was only a metaphoric 
rendition of his voice. This voice appears two lines later, when its funct­
ion is analogous to that of the outline: it unites the inside and outside. 
The voice is heard deep inside ("the unfathomed caverns of my Ear”), 
but then it surfaces, emerges, without losing touch with its origin of 
which it is an echo ("Therefore I print”).
The written mark is an echo, a repetition of the accoustic sign; God 
does not write (if he does, he does it only metaphorically), but speaks. 
Such an attitude helps Blake to avoid recognizing a situation which, 
according to Derrida, is symptomatic for the Western metaphysics, 
a branch of knowledge that cannot function without the bnto-theological 
concept of the central point, final, transcendental signified, absolute pre­
sence. While Derrida accepts human activity as the endless wandering of 
signifiers, traditional metaphysics confines this movement to the exchan­
ge between the signifier and signified, and establishes a place which is 
a source of order, a place of origin. Blake seems to be afraid of such 
a semiotic void, and therefore his ethical program of revaluation of all 
values is intrinsically linked with the structure of the sign which does
not tolerate the absence of the addressee (Derrida’s " L ’absence du dest- 
inataire.” 21)
Blake’s rendition of the Biblical story of Jesus and Mary Magda­
len is preeminently dedicated to a desparate effort to establish a point 
which would destroy the discreeteness of writing, but which, at the same 
time, would constitute a boundary, a limit of signifying beyond which 
w e could not move:
Moses commands she be stoned to death,
What was the sound of Jesus’ breath?
He laid His hand on Moses’ Law:
Writ with Curses from Pole to Pole,
A ll away began to roll:
The Earth trembling & Naked lay 
In secret bed of Mortal Clay,
On Sinai felt the bloody shrine,
And she heard the breath of God 
As she heard by Eden’s flood:
"Good and Evil are no more!”
"Sinai’s trumpets, cease to roar!”
"Cease finger of God, to write!” (K, 754)
As we can easily notice the written is constantly juxtaposed to the 
spoken, the hand is counterbalanced by the mouth. "Moses’ Law” , re­
presenting what Blake called a "Thou shalt not” type of morality, is 
a hard surface covered with hieroglyphics marking the absence of the 
divine element: we know, at least since Derrida, that writing implies 
a radical absence, signifies a vacuum on one end of the communication 
process. Writing is again associated with oppression as the stony tablets 
are "w rit with Curses” , and in an earlier text Blake would suggest that 
a world of political and social tyranny is a world of writing where even 
"the clouds are writ with curses” . In the same way in which in The 
Marriage of Heaven and Hell Blake melts away the surface unearthing 
the links between the surface sign and its ontological rootedness in the 
"whole of L ife ” , in The Everlasting Gospel the laws are written or car­
ved on the surfaces of rock begin to "roll away” . The secret which is 
revealed is the mystery of voice, and graphology becomes pneumatology.
With breath which is the first and ultimate exhalation of the Absolu­
te we overcome the problem of the infinite movements of s'ignifiers. God 
as the ulterior, transcendental signified makes all the semiotic relation­
ship clear and equivocal, establishes a firm and originary beginning which 
expresses itself in the spoken element. God who uncovers the truth, who 
brings himself to the light of Being and who appears, to use Heidegger’s 
phrase, on the clearing of Being stops writing, and is the source of voice. 
In sartorial terms: writing in its hieroglyphic character hides and covers
the truth, while a living speech of God tears away the disguise and de­
monstrates the nakedness of truth.
A  traditonally Western belief in the proximity of voice and Absolute 
lurks also in the conviction that the ultimate, final nakedness of an object 
can be achieved, and thus nakedness is the transcendental signified of 
all the sartorial signifiers of the written language. In the fundamental 
text of Jacques Derrida one finds the following diagnosis of the malaise 
of the Western metaphysics, the diagnosis also applicable to Blake’s phi­
losophical predicament of choice between writing and speaking:
[...] w riting. The letter, the sensible inscription, has always been considered 
by W estern trad ition  as the body and m atter externa l to the spirit, to breath, 
to  speech, and to the logos. And the problem  o f soul and body is no doubt 
derived  from  the prob lem  of w ritin g  from  w h ich  it seems —  conversely —  
to borrow  its metaphors.22
Blake also sees the body/soul controversy as resulting from the excess 
of power of the written, dead letter of the "Moses’ Law” over the living 
organism, from "stony laws” rendering:
;...] that a Law less thing
On which the Soul Expands its W ing. (K , 755),
but the fundamental creed of his philosophy which holds that "Man has 
no Body distinct from his Soul” (K, 149) is frequently depicted in the 
metaphor of garment covering or hiding the revelation of truthful na­
kedness. Thus, the body/soul dilemma is translated into the body/clothes 
controversy. It is precisely in terms of this opposition that a conflict be­
tween a romanticized version of the original inhabitants of the English 
Islands and the Romans is represented:
The Britons [...] w ere  naked c iv ilized  men, learned, studious, abstruse in 
thought and contem plation; naked, simple, p lain in their acts and manners; 
w iser than after-ages. They  w ere  overw helm ed  by brutal arms [...].
The dead and the dying, Britons naked, m ingled  w ith  armed Romans, strew  
the fie ld  beneath. (K , 577, 580).
Blake carefully stresses that the "naked” Britions are inspired people 
whose poetry is delivered orally, and who in their poems, songs, code 
certain epic state of the world. The spoken word is the domain of life, 
and it can die only with the death of the one who speaks; writing severs 
this vital link, as its origin is connected with the absence of the addressee, 
hence writing is born of death and as such can be a recording but preclu­
des a participation. To use Blake’s terminology: the written word cannot 
"attend” (Heidegger’s "waiting upon” ) but only observe, it dies before it 
starts living, or it lives only when dead —  the written word is a vam­
pire.
Among these the last of the Bards who were capable of attending warlike 
deeds, is seen falling, outstretched among the dead and the dying, singing to 
his harp in the pains of death. (K, 580)
The intellectual knot of concepts related with the spoken word would 
entail notions like nakedness (vs. clothing), heroism of particiption (vs. 
pastoralism of quiet observation), health (vs. sickness), the belief in the 
golden age (vs. derogatory quality of the present)). A ll these points which 
constitute the basic mythology of speech controverting the reality of 
writing are clearly present in the final section of the quoted fragment 
of A  Descriptive Catalogue where they once again coincide with the 
problematic of form, the supremacy of line over colouring. In the passa­
ge cited below the aesthetic creed unnoticeably becomes a social utopia 
of a sane and healthy, naked and civilized society:
The flush of health in flesh exposed to the open air, nourished by the spirits 
of forests and floods in that ancient happy ■ period, which history has recor­
ded, cannot be like the sickly daubs of Titian or Rubens. Where will the 
copier of nature, as it is now, find a civilized man, who has been accustomed 
to go naked? Imagination only can furnish us with colouring appropriate, such 
as is found in the Frescoes of Rafael and Michel Angelo: the disposition of 
form always directs colouring in works of true art. As to a Modem Man, 
stripped from his lead of clothing, he is like a dead corpse. Hence, Rubens 
Titian, Correggio and all of that class, are like leather and chalk; their men 
are like leather, and their women like chalk, for the disposition of their 
forms will not admit of grand colouring [...] (K, 580— 1).
6. God's Dictate
Three things, tiny, fugitive: a song, 
a sunbeam, a glance. So, at first,
I thought they had entered into me
in order to remain there and be lost, 
in me.
On the contrary: (they took posse­
ssion of me, and bore me away.
—  Teilhard de Chardin, Pensees
If the line was an actualization of theoretical, aesthetic instructions, 
it was at the same time a socially and historically directed movement to­
wards the past which eventually provided us with a point beyond which 
the movement was no longer conceivable. The basic premise of Blake’s 
historiography and anthropology, which are both rooted in a somewhat 
undecisive relationship between speech and writing, is that there is a ra­
dical possibility of the movement backwards which is not only a motion
towards what is past, but, first of all, towards what is most significant. 
Blake’s vision of history as inscription trying to recover the stage which 
preceded writing is a history which, in writing, tries to attain the area
where no writing was possible and necessary. It is, then, a wandering 
towards the Origin.
Nevertheless, and this demarcates a very important moment in Blake’s 
thought, a moment in which he seems to see the illusive character 
of his efforts, and thus is on the verge of breaking away from the Wes­
tern tradition of metaphysics, a moment when he is painfully aware of 
non-existence of the origin which can haunt his mind, but which cannot 
make its appearance. For Blake, the origin is a necessary condition of 
the world, but, simultaneously, it exists as its own absence, it absences 
itself from the world, and thus can appear only as a sign, a mark, a print, 
something engraved upon the surface of the world, as writing, i.e. as 
a piece already broken into fragments. Blake marks a moment in the 
Western thinking which still admitting the necessity of the origin, the 
inexorable character of the liaison between the signifier and the signified, 
intuited already the difficulty which made the search for the origin 
a mythic, eternal, neverending procedure. Thus, art becomes more and 
more rooted in writing, in difference, in a movement of signifiers, thus 
acquiring the characteristics of what Derrida calls a trace (trace), and 
which transforms all the signification process into "un jeu formel de 
différence, c’est-à-dire de traces:
Il s’agit de produire un nouveau concept d’écriture. On peut l’appeler gramme 
ou différance. Le jeu de différences suppose en effet des synthèses et des 
renvois qui interdisent qu’à aucun moment, en aucun sens, un élément sim­
ple soit présent en lui-meme et ne revoie qu’à lui-meme. Que ce soit dans 
l ’ordre du discours parlé ou du discours écrit, aucun élément ne peut fonc­
tionner comme signe sans renvoyer à un autre élément qui lui-meme n’est 
pas simplement présent.23
The concept of writing which in Derrida’s philosophy becomes the 
stigma of all the philosophy is also evidently present in the living speech, 
is also traceable in Blake’s thought. On the one hand, in The Everlasting 
Gospel God’s writing is abolished, erased, and we are left with the phe­
nomenon of the voice ("God’s finger, cease to write!” ), with the "Pre­
sence Divine” which is a typical way of interpreting living speech and 
presence as identical. The main thesis which Derrida expatiates upon in 
De la grammatologie is exactly this economy of meaning and sense o f 
being which can replace presence with voice:
W e already have a forebod ing that phonocentrism  m erges w ith  the h istori­
cal determ ination o f the m eaning o f being in general as presence, w ith  a ll the 
subdeterm inations w h ich depend upon this gen era l fo rm  and w hich organize 
w ith in  it their system and their h istorical sequence (presence o f the th ing 
to the sight as eidos, presence as substance (essence) existence [ousza], tem ­
pora l presence as point [s fim è] o f the now  or o f the moment [nun], the se lf- 
-presence o f the cogito, consciousness, sub jectivity , the co-presence o f the
other and o f the self, in tersub jectiv ity  as the intentional phenomenon o f the 
ego, and so forth ).24
The element of phonocentrism is markedly present throughout Bla­
ke’s writings. It is manifest not only as a major attribute of transcen­
dence which makes its presence accoustically felt, unlike the daemonic 
Urizen or Jehovah who express themselves in the oppressive medium of 
writing, but also as the origin of the text. The author, the writer, is 
a God’s scribe, the writing hand of the speaking voice. The accoustic 
origin of many of Blake’s texts is recognized signalled by the poet him­
self:
I...] then I  see the Saviour o ve r  me 
Spreading his beams o f lo ve  &  dictating the words o f this m ild  song.
(J. K , 622)
M y  F a iry  sat upon the table and dictated EU R O PE  (Eur. K , 238)
"Piper, sit thee down and write”,
" In  a book that a ll m ay read” .
A n d  I m ade a rura l pen,
And I  stained the w a ter clear,
A n d  I w rote  ma happy songs,
E very  child m ay joy  to hear.
(SI. K , 111)
H ear the vo ice  o f the Bard!
W ho Present, Past, &  Future, sees;
W hose ears have heard 
The holy W ord
That w a lk ’d among the ancient trees.
(SE, K , 210)
W hen God com manded this hand to w rite,
In  the studious hours of deep m idn ight [...]
(PPick. Ms. K , 430)
I lost a brother & w ith  his sp irit I converse daily  [...] and now  w rite  from  
his Dictate.
(Let. K , 797)
[...] I  am under the direction  o f M essengers from  H eaven, D a ily  &  N igh tly
(Let. K , 812)
Nevertheless, these traces of Divine Presence are exactly traces, and 
the dictate of the transcendental voice, although beyond any doubt real, 
is trapped in the movement of signifiers. The writings of Blake are locat­
ed in the distance between the intuition of the origin and its actuali­
zation. Thus, in A Descriptive Catalogue we find two important state­
ments: the first places objects of art in the perspective of inoriginality:
No man can believe that either Homer’s Mythology, or Ovid’s, were the pro­
duction of Greece or Latium; neither will any one believe, that the Greek 
statues [...] were the inventions of Greek Artists [...] (K, 565)
The other statement enhances the lack of originality and establishes 
a chain of signifiers which modify each other and construct a set of in­
terrelations where the origin is either inaccessible or postponed till un­
defined future. Commenting upon his own pictures of Nelson and Pitt 
Blake claims that the presence of the characters, the "now” of the pictu­
res, the ousia, is inscribed in the chain of signifiers with a somehow "lost” 
original (signifié):
The two pictures of Nelson and Pitt are compositions of a mythological cast, 
similar to those Apotheoses of Persian, Hindoo, and Egyptian Antiquity, 
which are still preserved on rude monuments, being copies from some stu­
pendous originals nov lost or perhaps buried till some happier age. (K, 565)
The interplay of a "copy” and "original”  is the interplay of the 
"written” and "spoken”  sign with Blake himself engrossed in the dan­
gerous game of signification with a bracketed, withheld signifié (the ori­
ginal is lost and buried). The absence of the original brings us again to 
the concept of writing which seems to be hiding at the heart of Blake’s 
thought torn between the temptation of the origin and the vanity of 
such a desire. It is imagination which intervenes and tries to bridge the 
gap between the spoken and the written, or rather between the disrupt­
ive conspiracy of writing which disturbs the paradisiacal quietism of 
speaking. But imagination is nothing else but a continuation of the out­
line in that it constitutes a place where the Inside (whait we see with the 
inward eye) meets the Outside (what we produce, project, deliver, to be 
seen externally as a form). In other words, imagination conceals and 
confines in itself the seed of writing. It is true that the concept of ima­
gination seems to be very far from writing, as imagination emphasizes 
the longing for the origin and the source, for that ultimate presence, the 
ousia of Greek philosophers. Hence, "Jesus consider’d Imagination to be 
the Real Man & says I w ill not leave you Orphans & I w ill manifest 
myself to you” (AnB . K, 774), and this is also why "Imagination has no­
thing to do with Memory” (An. Wordsw. K, 783).
7. That Dangerous „Something Else"
The voyeur, the peeper, the Peeping 
Tom, is a dark comedian He is re­
pulsive in his dark anoymity, in 
his secret invasion. He is pitifully 
alone. But he is able through the 
same silence and concealment to 
make unknowing partner of anyone. 
The voyeur is masturbator.
—• Jim  M orrison, The Lords. Notes 
on Vision.
Memory, frequently attacked in Blake’s texts, is inherently attached 
to the concept and emergence of writing. Plato sees it in Phaedrus as 
entangled in an uneasy opposition and paradox with forgetfulness: w rit­
ing which supposedly aids human memory as a matter of fact destroys 
it by substituting real, existential and ontological involvement in being 
with a citation, remembrance of something that we can only commemo­
rate, something that has already happened and cannot be brought to any 
vital contact with our present being. King Thamus stresses the fact that 
"this invention w ill produce forgetfulness in the soul of those who have 
learned it because they w ill not need to exercise their memories, being 
able to rely on what is written [...]. So it’s not a remedy for memory, but 
for reminding, that you have discovered” .2*
In other words, memory as it appears in Plato seems to be divided 
into "liv ing” and "dead” , the former, entering in a vital bond with 
ourselves, the latter functioning simply as help to re-call, to cate­
gorize, to systematize, events, to make a library of the past from which 
we can, at w ill and with no existential consequence, demand information. 
The living memory is again the domain of the outline since it blurs the 
distinction between the Inside and Outside (past and present, absence and 
presence), while the "natural” memory reinstates this division by insist­
ing upon the priority of the soul (inside) which uses the data of the past 
(outside) in a purely instrumental, tyrannical way.
Also Reynolds in his broodings upon art is aware of a similar si­
tuation which in his theory appears masked as the opposition of "reason” 
and "habitual reason” . The latter is, like Plato’s memory, attached to the 
human soul by means of a fundamentally existential bond: whatever 
appears as its element is inextricably entangled in the substance of 
life on the subconscious level which fact prevents "habitual reason” from 
an easy identification with memory as it is commonly understood. Existen- 
tially valid memory has nothing to do with individual reconstructing 
of the past events; it is a surface manifestation of complex processes 
resulting in, what Reynolds calls "collective observation” which is nothing 
else but a phenotype of the human mind: it is the final inscription the
history of which is lost "forgotten” ). In short, when Blake attacks memory 
and reason, and Reynolds as their priest in painting, he overlooks Rey­
nolds’s recourse to this variety of reason which is very far from "remind­
ing” and constitutes a kind of memory bereft of memory which, despite 
the ambiguous name, is a pertinent description of the human experience. 
In the thirteenth Discourse Reynolds holds that:
There is in the commerce of life, as in Art, a sagacity which is far from 
being contradictory to right reason, and is superior to any occasional exer­
cise of that faculty [...] [which] does not wait for the slow progress of de­
duction but goes at once, by what appears a kind of intuition, to the conclu­
sion. A  man endowed with this faculty, feels and acknowledges the truth, 
though it is not always in his power [...] to give a reason for it; because he 
cannot recollect and bring before him all the materials that gave birth to 
his opinion; for very many and very intricate considerations may unite to 
form the principle [...] though these in process of time are forgotten, the 
right impression still remains fixed in his mind.
This impression is the result of the accumulated experience of our whole 
life, and has been collected, we do not always know how, or when. But this 
mass of eollecitve observation ,[...] ought to prevail over that reason, which 
however powerfully exerted on any particular occasion, w ill probably com­
prehend but a partial view of the subject; and our conduct in life as well as 
in the Arts is, or ought to be, generally governed by this habitual reason 
[...]. (R, 230— 1).
Reynolds’s remarks help us to understand that, as Derrida notices, what 
Plato is attacking in the concept of writing
[...] is not simply recourse to memory but, within such recourse, the substi­
tution of the mnemonic device [Plato’s "reminding” —  TS] for live memory, 
of the prosthesis for the organ The boundary (between inside and outsi­
de, living and non-living) separates not only speech from writing but also 
memory as an unveiling re (re-)producing a presence from re-memoration 
as the mere repetition of a monument; itruth as distinct from its sign, being as 
distinct from types [...] the meneme instead of being present to itself in its 
life as a movement of truth, is supplanted by the archive, evicted by a sign 
of re-memoration or of com-memoration.26
Blake seems to move in a similar enchanted circle which he can 
neither break nor transcend. He is actually aware of the difference bet­
ween nature and imagination as, for example, in his comment upon Dante 
where the lines between the two concepts are particularly sharp;
[...] the Goddess Nature Memory is his Inspirer & not Imagination the Holy 
Ghost. (ND. K, 785))
Similarly, in his comments on Reynolds Blake categorically claims that
A Work of Genius is a Work not to be obtained by the Invocation of Me­
mory & her Syren Daughters, but by Devout Prayer to that Eternal Spirit 
[...] (K, 457).
What Derrida calls the opposition between living (memory) and nonliving 
(com-memoration) surfaces in Blaks’s remarks On Homer’s Poetry & on 
V irg il which conclude with a much quoted aphorism:
G recian is M athem atic Form : Gothic is L iv in g  Form , M athem atic Form  is 
Eternal Existence. (K , 778).
"The Reasoning Memory” is not only the extension of Urizenic po­
wers of geometry which petrifies the living truth and imposes upon 
them the artificial, immovable order of a pair of compasses (as shown in 
Blake’s illustrations Newton and The Ancient of Days), but is intrinsically 
linked with the political and social reality. The imperial and centralized 
state ("Warlike state” , as Blake calls it in On Homer’s Poetry) is cut off 
from Being and operating in the void and alienation from the society, 
it exerts its influence upon it. Bureaucracy and the governmental machine 
is viewed by Blake as a deadly surplus, a murderous, parasitic, structure 
growing on the living organism. The political doctrine presents itself as 
an economy which substitutes real life with an imitation, erases the liv­
ing, and introduces the non-living.
Princes appear to m e to be fools. Houses o f Commons &  Houses o f Lords 
appear to m e to be foo ls; they seem to me to be something Else besides 
Hum an L ife . (P A . K , 600).
In the "Warlike state” life is supplanted by a dangerous "something 
Else” the perilous character of which is constituted by the enormous and 
all-encompassing influence which constructs another, artificial, imitative, 
world replacing reality. It is interesting to see how intricately Blake 
weaves the pattern of the mechanisms of the dangeorus "something Else” 
which spans politics, economy, and arts:
The w retched State o f the A rts  in this Country & in Europe, orig inating in 
the w retched State o f P o litica l Science, w h ich is the Science o f Sciences, 
Demands a firm  &  determ inate conduct on the part o f A rtists  to Resist the 
Contem ptib le Counter A rts  Establish’d by such contem ptib le Politicians as 
Lou is X IV  orig in a lly  set on foo t by Venetian  P icture traders, Music traders, 
&  R im e traders, to the destruction o f a ll true art as it is this day. (P A . 
K , 600).
An adjective "contemptible” secures the identical treatment of po­
litical and aesthetic malaise of the epoch as forms of a false consciousness 
based on the non-living remembering, the "Reasoning Memory” which 
cannot produce but only turn up self-repetitive data and information. 
The dangerous "something Else” , a parasitic growth of culture is, as it 
were, a folding, a mirror image of this culture and, thus, blocks a possi­
bility of creative work, of production, and leaves open only the way to 
re-production, i.e. to writing. In a political state, as described by Blake, 
culture becomes only a repetition of what was (the dead skill of remind­
ing, while the living memory would be the domain of "what has been”), 
a false consciousness is mind’s folding upon itself and thus disturbing 
the belance between the inside and outside. Hence, Blake attacks "V e ­
netian Picture traders” as those who betrayed the line (a place where the 
inside and outside form a unity); the false consciousness of writing foun­
ded upon the non-living is aesthetically representable as a priority of 
colour over line. Such a writing w ill then describe not so much memory 
itself but "monuments, inventories, archives, citaitations, copies, accounts, 
tales, lists, notes, duplicates, chronicles, genealogies, references. Not me­
mory but memorials.” 27
This is a situation which Blake diagnoses in his contemporary socie­
ty, where the state and social system are overwhelmed by the idea of bad 
writing:
[...] a W arlik e  State n ever can produce A rt. I t  w ill Rob &  Plunder &  accu­
m ulate into one place, &  Translate, &  Copy, &  Buy, &  Sell, &  Criticise, but 
not M ake. (OHP. K , 778).
Marginally, we can notice that Flaxman, although less critically mind­
ed than Blake, tends to ascribe to the military spirit of the Greeks and 
Romans a crucial position in the evaluation of their art:
The principa l compositions o f Rom an sculpture, the best o f w h ich  [...] w ere  
executed by Greek artists [...] breathe the sp irit o f the people they com m e­
m orate —  w ar, conquest, and universal dom inion [...]. Th ey  are the m ere 
paragraphs o f m ilita ry  gazettes vu lgar in conception, ferocious in sentiment.2”
In Blake’s ■ vision of culture the Greek and Roman civilizations and 
their 18th century continuations represented war and political economy 
which introduced and spread centralization of power and disintegration 
of the city-state communities. This was founded upon writing as a means 
of administration and, in turn disseminated bad writing as a code of a new 
social behaviour that Innis describes as a shift "from  the voluntary to 
the obligatory”29, or in Blake’s terms from "Innocence” to "Experience” .
A  similar diagnosis is to be found in more recent scholarship. Hence 
we read that "in the last resort in the Greek period military ideals overlie 
and overrule all others.” 30
Although more democratic than Rome, the Greek culture helped to 
build up the Roman Empire:
The spread o f w ritin g  contributed to the dow n fa ll o f the Republic and the 
em ergence o f the empire. W ith  the growith o f adm inistration the pow er o f 
the em peror was enhanced and in turn used to secure new  support.31
Also political science emerges in Greece, and its inception, although 
yet free from Blake’s "contemptible” involvements, paved the way for 
the future concentration of power:
Political science, ignored by the Phoenisians, became to the Greeks the high­
est of practical sciences, the science of man, not as a trader but as a main, 
fulfilling his function as a member of the social organism
It may be precisely this difference between the "trader” and the 
"man” that makes Blake more sympathetic towards the Greeks than to­
wards Romans. Absolute monarchism was present in Greece as a nega­
tive power successully regulated and suppressed by the mechanism of the 
oral tradition:
The powerful oral tradition of the Greeks and the flexibility of the alphabet 
enabled them to resist the tendencies of empire in the East towards absolute 
monarchism and theocracy.33
A ll the activities enumerated by Blake (rob, plunder, accumulate, 
translate, copy, buy, sell) demonstrate that the bad writing is a repetition 
itself involved in the very economy which trades and substitutes, rather 
than creates new goods. Translating transforms one text into another text 
which although seemingly different is essentialy the same (the paradox 
o f translating is that it changes the same into the same, and thus destroys 
the Other), buying and selling interchange objects the value of which is 
the same (provide us with an equivalent which is but another name for 
the same), criticism is a movement of signifiers trasforming one text into 
another ("le  texte qui ne se produit que dans la transformation d’un autre 
texte.” 34
The idea of the Other which is removed from writing, of the sign 
folded upon itself, finally that "something Else” which we qualified as 
"dangerous” , all relate to what Derrida calls "supplement” and considers 
to be the essential feature of writing. In De la grammatologie the phrase 
"supplement” is used frequently, but all the shades of its meaning focus 
in a fragment of J. J. Rousseau’s Confessions in which the French philo­
sopher, one of the villains of Blake’s philosophical world, gives this name 
to the habit of masturbation, that ultimate case of the man folded upon 
himself and, at the same time, conceiving of "something Else” to protect 
' himself from the awareness of the fold. Rousseau’s text speaks of "that 
dangerous means of assisting it [innocence —  TC| [ce dangereux supple­
ment] which cheats nature and saves up for young men of my tempera­
ment many forms of excess at the expense of their health, strength, and, 
sometimes, their life.” 35
What is significant in the passage is the analogy between the mastur- 
batory habit and the inherent quality of writing: both are founded upon 
"cheating” , both form "something Else” which we temporarily, at least, 
accept as reality, finally —  both contain within themselves a peculiar 
mixture of a poison and remedy, both are pharmakon as described in 
Derrida’s famous essay.
8. Mimesis
In 18ÍJ2, Gropius was astounding 
Paris with his pleorama. The au­
dience was transformed into the 
crew aboard a ship engaged in 
a battle. Fire, screaming, sailors, 
drowning.
—  Jim Morrison, The Lords. Notes 
on Vision
In our discussion of the passage quoted from Blake’s comments on 
Homer we have purposefully omitted a verb which, from the point of 
view  of Blake’s philosophy, seems to be a central item in the philosophi­
cal glossary. It also draws upon the problematic of writing and supple­
ment, since its very semantics carries with it a necessity of reproduction 
or/and a danger of imitation, of se'condariness and lack of originality 
which substitutes a replica for an original. Thus, the so far left out verb 
"copy” inscribes itself in a chain of signifiers which, like
[...] writing, pedagogy, masturbation, and the pharmakon share the property 
o f being —  with respect to speech, nature, intercourse, and living memory —  
at once something secondary, external, and compensatory, and something that 
substitutes, violates, and usurps.36
Mimesis, discussed so widely in Plato’s dialogues, is a central theme 
that unites pedagogy, masturbation, writing, and pharmakon in one chain 
of the substitution processes. It is mimesis in its ontological and aes­
thetic consequence that introduces into Western philosophy the theme of 
the original as opposed to the copy, of what Plato in Sophist referred to 
as "divine” and "human craftsmanship” (respectively, phytourgia and 
demiourgia). The surface value of copying seems to lie in the relationship 
of inferiority that exists between the original (eide) and the manufactu­
red object which is ontologically dependent, repetitive, and profoundly 
indebted to its master model. From here we can depart in two directions:
1) towards the depreciation of a copy as a mere copy;
2) towards such an understanding of this process that w ill uncover 
a radical necessity of copying, and the very procedure of repeated, self- 
-propelled imitation w ill become a source of value, and a mere copy w ill 
be transformed into as much as a copy.
The first movement is basically Platonic although the philosopher is 
far from consistency in his theories. In Republic he would claim that 
Gods create originals of things which surround man, while in Sophist 
the process of copying is pushed one step further, as the Gods do not 
deal with originals but concentrate and produce natural objects which, 
in turn, are copied by man.
Nevertheless, in both cases the mimetic activity is looked upon as 
a necessary evil mediating between the impossibility of the presence of 
the ideal models and man’s rootedness in the presence of the natural, i.e. 
copied objects. The crucial point Plato is making in Republic turns this 
text into a key to the whole Western philosophy as it inscribes the process 
of living into the double mimesis. Plato’s argument centers upon the con­
viction that if natural objects remain inferior reflections of the noume- 
nal world of ideas, then things created by men are doubly removed from 
the center and the source of originality since they reflect and copy what 
in itself was a reflection. In other words, mimesis on the human level is 
an imitation of imitations, a sign of a sign, a writing which imititates 
speaking.
The mimetic, self-reproducing technique of dissemination rather than 
production (dissemination can be defined as "unproductive production” ) 
is here considered nostalgically from the point of view  of the original 
identity of the thing and the sign, of the possibility of the thing in 
itself. In this philosophy, which has effectively shaped the Western on­
tological and metaphysical tradition, imitation was already the area of the 
sign to which the thing in itself was banished. A t the same time, however, 
the central line of thinking is here somehow optimistic because it holds 
that the period of ostracization w ill be over, and the thing w ill be re­
turned to the original, signless plenitude. Mimesis is, then, by definition 
depicted as a text of the epic exploits of the thing in itself on her way 
back to the source; mimesis is a semiotic Odyssey of the thing struggling 
towards the native Itaca. The subversive myth underlying mimesis is 
a story of Logos as the original unity, telos, arche, which is to enable us 
to look at the institution of the sign, of difference, i.e. of the mark, (im) 
print, OUTLINE, as a temporary stage to be removed either in the future, 
or to be nostalgically looked back to as the myth of the golden age. In 
terms of language such a unity would imply a cohesion of the phonetic 
substance and the signified sense, would dream of turning a phoneme 
into a living gesture of thought. As Jacques Derrida notices:
The science o f linguistics determ ines language [...] in the last instance [...] as 
the un ity of the phonè, the glossa, and the logos [...] it w ou ld  have to be 
adm itted that the im m ediate and p riv ileged  un ity w h ich founds sign ificance 
and the acts of language is the articu lated un ity o f sound and sense w ith in  
the phonie. W ith  regard  to this unity, w r itin g  w ou ld  alw ays be derivative , 
accidental, particu lar, ex terior, doubling the s ign ifier: phonetic. "S ign  of 
a sign” , said A ristotle , Rousseau, and H egel.37
Since art is a particularly strong concentration of imitativeness Plato 
condemns it in Republic as both untrue and injurious. This complaint, 
however, against the situation in which an object becomes "a sign of 
a sign” , the complaint against writing, against what Blake called "indeli­
ble line” , is performed under the aegis of speech, of voice. It is voice 
which traditionally represents God and God’s intervention in the world, 
is voice which we perceive written only within our soul, it is the inner, 
good, writing (Reynolds’s "collective observation” ) we were hinting at 
before. In other words, it is the natural writing, a script of God who, 
speaking to us, engraves his message in and on our heart. Hence, the idea 
of "good writing” in a specific combination of speaking and writing 
expresses a unique liaison of the divine voice made permanent in human 
characters. "Good writing” can be defined as a possibility of a translation 
of God’s voice into the human graphics; thus, it becomes a combination 
of "pneumology” (God’s breath, divine principle, arche of the universe as 
in Diogenes of Apollonia or Theophrastus) and "graphology” (human writ­
ing).
Hence, Blake torn between the traditional doctrine of writing as a ne­
cessary evil and intuition of the ontological necessity of writing, claims, 
on the one hand, that God is "the Presence Divine” and "the breath 
Divine” (EG. K, 754), but also maintains that God writes upon human 
heart "with Iron pen” (EG. K, 750). Thus, "natural writing is immediately 
united to the voice and the breath.” 38 A  difference between the two ty­
pes of writing would be constituted mainly by the presence which cha­
racterizes the good writing and absence typical of the bad one. The bad 
writing refers basically to the past, is inherently connected with the ab­
sence of the addressee, and thus is fundamentally mnemonic; it can only 
remember and replace the living memory with a dead letter. The good 
script has nothing to do with memory, as it announces God’s presence, 
what is more, it is God’s presence. Since it has been so strongly interio- 
rized, both by man and God, it is no longer a "Sign of a sign” , a double 
absence, but becomes so profoundly associated with the voice, presence 
of God that it is only very slightly removed from the origin, if not beco­
mes the origin itself. The distinction between the two kinds of writing 
must have been felt very acutely by Blake since he juxtaposes them in 
the immediate context:
He spoke w ith  authority, not lik e  a Scribe.
Upon his heart w ith  Iron  pen
H e w rote, "Y e  must be born again” . (EG. K , 750)
One can very distinctly see how distant the bad writing of a "Scribe” is 
from the good writing of God which is deeply internalized ("Upon his 
heart” ) and markedly and undoubtedly associated with speech and voice 
("He spoke” ). The good writing is, then, the voice of God which has be­
come a divine engraving upon the soul.
In other words, God’s writing defies imitation, is mimesis-free, is 
not a copy but the embodiment of voice, is not mnemonic but living. I f
a philosopher claims that "a repetition of written symbols is clearly an 
imitation of the repetition of the word-sounds which preceded their 
"reduction” to writing”39, then good writing is neither "reduction” nor 
"imitation” , but the original presence of the "breath Divine” . Using P la­
to’s terminology from Cratylus we could conclude that in good writing 
God appears as an ideal "name giver” , semiotic legislator (nomothetes) 
who imposes, introduces, invents, original names which, therefore, are 
free of their doubly mimetic character and function as an ideal model 
for the human language (God’s writing on the human soul is basically 
a model, a pattern of morally beneficial behaviour to be followed by 
man).
As we have been trying to demonstrate, the problem of copying and 
mimesis in ineradicably connected with the problematic of writing, as it 
reinstates and discusses the uneasy relationship between a copy and an 
original, a sign and a thing, a signifier and a signified. Blake follows 
Plato’s argument till the moment in which its derogatory phillipic 
against imitation prepares ground for the condemnation of arts. Copying 
is not a misfortune in Blake’s philosophy but a voluntary acceptance of 
the fact that imitation, mimesis, is the element of man in which endless 
repetition of the Same is the only possibility of meaning and communi­
cation. It is not incidental that meaning finds itself in an adjacent posi­
tion to communication, "since in Blake’s theory imitation is inextricably 
allied with language. In Annotations to Reynolds we read:
To learn the Language o f A rt, "C opy  fo r  ever”  is M y  Ru le (K , 446).
I f  he Reynolds means T h a t Copying C orrectly  is a hindrance, he is a L iar,
fo r  that is the on ly School to the Language of A rt. (K , 448).
The language of art is a proliferation of the Same. This is when the 
ways of Blake and Plato part: while Plato considers such a situation 
a major drawback and a hindrance to meaning, Blake understood it as 
the recognition of the fact that a tentative original eventually emerges 
at the end of a long line of copies. The movement of signifiers in art is 
centrifugal, i.e. it takes us further and further away from the center, from 
the place where the first signifier was (nearly) identical with the trans­
cendental signified. This movement can be represented by the consecuti­
ve stages of the process which starts with the idea of an object conceived 
of by the "Divine craftsman” , then is followed by a natural product 
"spontaneous” replica of the idea which in turn, is reflected, imitated by 
the human sign representing the object and, in case of visual arts, is 
the person who copies the object, makes an imitation of the imitation. If 
we used a tree as an example the whole process could be represented by 
the following gradation:
TREE (the idea of a tree) —  a tree (a natural object) —  "a tree”
(a human copy of the object, eg. a picture or engraving) —  "»a  tree«”
(a copy of the copy, as when a painter paints a picture after another
picture).
Two moments are important in Blake’s doctrine of mimesis: one is 
an apparent secondariness of copying, of a minute re-creation of the 
object the result of which is another version of the Same, two images of 
the Same without a difference; the other opens a question of criticism. 
When Rynolds writes in his treatise:
[•••] it is not to be understood, that I advise any endavour to copy the exact 
peculiar colour and complexion of another man’s mind [...]. His model may 
be excellent but the copy will be ridiculous (K, 471),
1»
Blake poignantly asks "W hy then Imitate at all?” (K, 471).
Mimesis, a dissemination of signifiers, proliferation of the Same,
writing (all are names of the same thing, as in language there can be no
name which would not refer to another name) is a loyal repetition of the 
object copied. As such it seems to open a gap between copying and criti­
cism which is exactly a process of distancing oneself from an object, of 
looking upon an object from a point of view  which lies outside the chain 
of signifiers. Criticism traditionally opposes mimesis, since what is "im i­
tative” is also of a "secondary” importance and, as such is inferior to 
what is "original” . Criticism then is the quest for originality and must be 
at odds with the mimetic production. It seems paradoxical that Blake, 
who draws a line between the critical and imitative faculty, identifies the 
two procedures in his famous assertion "Imitation is Criticism” (K, 453).
In Public Address, however, we can also read a comment which un­
dermines nearly everything we have said so far about mimesis and imi­
tation. Complaining of the situation of the nineteenth century English 
art Blake categorically states his dislike for imitation: "To Imitate I ab­
hor” (K, 600). We can detect in Blake at least three groups of statements 
with regard to mimesis:
1) the absolute adherence to imitation as a mode of production ("to 
copy the exact colour and complexion of another man” ) and the belief in 
imitation as a mode of communication (it is the best way "to learn the 
Language of A rt” );
2) a view  according to which imitation is not only a copy, but also an 
excess of production, a particular style of producing an imitation which 
turns it inevitably into a comment upon the object copied; mimesis as 
information which is a function of the disturbance of the order of the 
object imitated ("Imitation is Criticism” );
3) a tendency towards considering imitation as a scandalous betrayal 
of the individual, an excess of loyalty and thus slavery;' imitation as 
a monstrous production ("to Imitate I abhor” ).
Points 1) and 2) which refer, respectively to imitation as a selfre- 
peating production and instructive production are monitored by the no­
tion of truth. In 1) imitation has to fu lfil its basic function which is to 
he the same as the object imitated, to be homological with it; in 2) the 
function of imitation is to demonstrate, against the general similarity, 
differences separating it from the imitated; an imitation is a compound 
object which constists of elements identical with, but also divergent from, 
the copied object, and thus it remains in the isological relation with it.
The homology of 1) and isology of 2) are shadowed by two different 
aspects of the concept of truth. In 1) the criterion of truth is a degree 
to which a copy agrees, matches, responds, in all the details to the call 
o f the object imitated. The truth in this relationship reveals the object as 
we know it, in the totality of its shapes, and this unveiling of the object 
is achieved by the analogous construct, identical being, according to the 
ancient rule "like is known by like” . Hence, as we read in Empedocles 
"w e see earth with earth, water with water.” 40 The truth of 1) is a truth 
of homoiosis, of likness similarity, and agreement.
In The Marriage of Heaven and Hell we find an adage which is a ren­
dition of Empedocles’s dictum of the homology between the image and 
the thing: "The eyes of fire, the nostrils of air. the mouth of water, the 
beard of earth” (K,152). Also Blake’s epistemology is founded upon the 
relation of homology between the knower and the known. The perceiver 
can recognize the object as another " I ” , thus the act of perception is, 
originally, the act of self-perpetuation. The object is recognized to the 
degree to which I recognize myself in it. Thus,
A  Fool sees not the same tree that a w ise man sees (MHH. K , 151).
As a M an is, so H e Sees (Let. K , 793).
It has to be noticed that the relationship between the image and the thing
is more complicated than it seems, since a copy, on the one hand, disguis­
es, masks, the thing by introducing itself between the knower and the 
thing but on the other hand, it also uncovers it, as it enables us to re­
cognize the thing, makes us aware that a loyal, finished replica has the 
value of the thing itself. Truth as homoiosis covers and uncovers the 
thing, but its foundation is a relationship of agreement between the 
image and the thing imitated. The knower knows that he has to do with 
a copy and the object copied at the same time; the nature of agreement 
is anchored in the interplay of masking and unmasking of the thing, 
although in both cases, in what we see and in what we do not see, it is 
only a repetition of the Same. We could say in the Heideggerian way 
that which is revealed, and that which is hidden are identical. Jacques 
Derrida in his essay on Mallarmé takes into account such a truth, and 
from its point of view describes a good imitation as the one which
[...] w ill be [...] true, fa ith fu l, lik e  or like ly, adequate, in con form ity  w ith  
the phusis (essence or life ) of w hat is im itated [...].41
This again brings us unexpectedly back to Reynolds. Blake’s aesthetic 
adversary (although a careful study would show him much less of an an­
tagonist than Blake wished him to be) in his effort to adjust classisistic 
doctrines to preromantic demands tried to curb students’s imitating pass­
ion (although Blake characteristically overemphasized this aspect of his 
thought), but, on the other hand, he saw a "right mode of imitation”42 as 
a necessary part of artist’s vocation. In Discourse X III  he quotes Plato’s 
judgment and prescribs for arts a specific type of imitation:
W hen such a man as P lato  speaiks o f Pain ting as on ly an im ita tive  art [...] 
I  th ink he m isleads us by a partia l theory. F or this reason I shall beg leave  
to lay  be fo re  you a fe w  thoughts on this subject; to th row  out some hints 
that m ay lead your minds to an opinion, (wh ich I  take to  be the truth) that 
Pa in ting is not on ly to be considered as an im itation , operating by deception, 
but that it is, and ought to be, in m any points o f v iew , and strictly  speaking, 
no im itation  at a ll o f ex terna l nature. (R , 232).
In other words, Reynolds is profoundly aware of the difference bet­
ween imitation "by deception” , ie. "o f external nature” , and imitation 
which in the quoted passage, remains ambiguously described in negative 
terms. Imitation in this theory is far from a mere reproduction of the 
external similarity, does not vulgarly expose itself to the eye, but remains 
hidden. It is precisely this hiddeness that constitutes the very essence of 
art:
A r t  in its perfection  is not ostentatious; it lies hid, and works its e ffect, 
itse lf unseen.(R, 101).
Imitation, if it is to keep its important position in the aesthetic exper­
ience and history of arts has to be interpreted, paradoxically, as residing 
not in the external, superficial homology between a real object and an 
image, but in the intricate network of relationships within a work itself. 
Thus, it is not a question of the easy "admiration and relishing” but 
a painstaking analysis:
Thus the highest beauty o f fo rm  must be taken from  nature; but it is an 
art o f  long deduction, and grea t experience, to know  how  to fin d  it. W e must 
not content ourselves w ith  m erely  adm iring and relish ing; w e  must enter 
inito the principles! on  w h ich ithe w o rk  is w rought: these do not swiim on the 
superficies, and consequently are not open to superfic ia l observers. (R , 101).
We can see, then, that Reynolds was aware of the vulgar oversimplificat­
ion which identified a truth of imitation with a truth of a superficial 
homology.
The other truth, the truth of 2) supports the importance of the mas­
king/ unmasking game between the copy and the copied (this is a point 
where Derrida seems to disregard the potential of his own theory; by 
drawing a dychotomy between truth as agreement and truth as unveiling 
which lies at the foundation of any signification he lets pass unnoticed 
this play of veiling and unveiling according to which even the concept of 
truth as homology would reveal that dangerous interplay of nakedness 
and clothes, hiding and disclosing, etc.), but leaves out the element of 
agreement. The knower perceives the thing not as similar or the same but, 
first of all, as an active element in the process of perception. The truth 
of 2) is dynamic, i.e. it is based not so much on a closed circuit current 
of recognition operating between the knower and the known, but it pre­
sents the thing as it is, with a sudden potential opening, fracture which 
can show its anchorage in the plenitude of Being. Thus, to use Blake’s 
terminology, the truth of 1) is local and temporal, while the truth of 2) 
is omnipresent and eternal. This is a truth as revealed in The Marriage of 
Heaven and Hell:
How do you know but ev’ry Bird that cuts the airy way,
Is an imupense world of delight, clos’d by your senses five? (K, 150).
When thou seest an Eagle, thou seest a portion of Genius; lift up thy Head! 
(K, 152)
If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man 
as it is, infinite. (K, 154).
The description like "immense” , "Genius” , "infinite” in conjunction with 
a fundamental qualification "as it is”  show convincingly enough that 
Blake’s philosophy of perception and imitation as understood in 2) is 
commanded by the concept of truth as the revelation which is also pre­
gnant with the moment of hiding and veiling: a thing displays itself only 
after it was covered, protected, sheltered, by our routine perception, it 
explodes into eternity in a moment of rejection of its shape secured by 
the truth as homology. The truth of a thing, the thing "as it is” , result 
from the interplay of masking and unmasking, the procedure which, de­
prived of the limiting criterion of agreement, reveals a thing as a pulsat­
ion, oscillation, between the finitude of its shape and infinity of its essen­
ce. The infinity of a thing is veiled by the perception of "polluted” senses, 
and the veil separating a thing from infinity is the line which hinders 
our senses and, at the same time, shrinks objects and makes them immo­
vable. The veil or the line are the meeting places of the outside and in­
side, finitude and infinity. That is why a movement towards the thing it­
self is conditioned by a movement toward the man himself, combined in 
the act of "cleansing the doors of perception” . This is an operation which, 
like the event of a line, has a medicinal value. The truth of imitation in
2) is determined by the removal of residues of illness, of misperception,
from the organism, and thus has both a purificatory and purgative effect. 
It purifies the soul (as in Plato Iamblichus), the body (as in ancient me­
dicine applying homeopathic principle), and the mind (as in Plato’s 
Sophist where it is described as cleansing our souls of false opinions). 
The interplay of what is hidden and what is revealed, of finitude and 
infinity is another version of pharmakon which unites in itself qualities 
of a medicine (it reveals, cleanses) and a poison (it hides, pollutes, brings 
about a disease). The game of the veil and the body constitutes the truth 
of 2) as aletheia.
9. Appearance and Appearing
The secret is there is no secret.
I cannot wake you up. You can 
wake you up.
I cannot cure you. You can cure 
you.
—  John Lennon, The Playboy In ­
terview
Two verbs are necessary to bring to light the meaning of this Greek 
term aletheia which Heidegger has reinterpreted in his works; both verbs 
are present in Blake’s famous quotation about the doors of perepction. 
One of them is to "appear” , the other to "be” the verb round which 
evolves Heidegger’s "fundamental question” . To "appear” and to "be”  
play in Blake’s adage a role of the mirror reflection: after the doors of 
perception are cleansed a thing "appears as it is” . We should also note 
that the act of seeing does not determine once and for all the thing pereiv- 
ed. The thing "appears as it is” that is to say, it exposes itself to our 
vision but not to our action or intrusion. The thing "as it is” reveals itself 
to us in its Being, and our purified perception can be adjusted so as to 
notice the "in fin ity” of the thing. Human action is necessary to make 
perception possible but not to make the thing possible, as the thing in 
its is-ness suddenly "appears” in front of us. The thing "appears” sudden­
ly, i.e. becomes unconcealed, unveiled, uncovered in its Being (as it is), 
but also from, out of its Being (the suffix un- is the grammatical index 
of this movement).
This concept of truth as uncovering, unconcealing is meticulously 
explored by Heidegger. Describing aletheia in Sein und Zeit Heidegger 
gives us the following definition:
To say that an assertion "is  true” sign ifies that it uncovers the entity  as it 
is in itself. Such an assertion asserts, points out, "le ts ”  the entity be seen in 
its uncoveredness.43
One could hermeneutically identify the two texts separated by a hundred 
years: Heidegger and Blake both speak of the thing unconcealed in its 
Being ("the entity as it is in itself” ), and both underscore the indepen­
dent character of 'this occurence. Heidegger thoroughly stresses the thing’s 
submission to the act of perception, as the truth as unconcealment (alet- 
heia) only points out the thing, "lets” it be seen; Blake characteristically, 
refrains from using the verb "see” in his assertion, and talks about the 
thing appearing to man. In other words, having read Blake through Hei­
degger’s script, having studied Heidegger’s errata to Blake’s text, we can 
assert that there exists a basic identity of the verbs to "be” , to "le t” , and 
to "appear” ’, since to "appear” means to "let itself be seen” and this, in 
turn, is the unconcealment of the fundamental verb to "be” as manifested 
in the thing. The main difficulty lies here in the supposition that appear­
ing may also mean (and does also mean) appearance, a semblance, an 
external surface of the object. Thus, there is a possibility of reading the 
truth as unconcealment also as an untruth of concealment, appearing as 
appearance, Being as a mere sign of Being etc. This is a danger which 
Heidegger notices in a copious commentary on the word aletheia in An 
Introduction to Metaphysics. Having defined aletheia as the place where 
the object suddenly stands in its truth ("Since the essent as such is, it 
places itself in and stands in unconcealment, aletheia”44), he describes 
the very act of being disclosed by the noun Schein which, according to 
Heidegger, can be used in at least three senses:
1) Schein as radiance and g low ; 2) Schein and Scheinen as appearing, com ing
to ligh t; 3) Schein  as m ere appearance or semblance (Anschein).45
A  Heideggerian reading of Blake would maintain that the distance bet­
ween the first two meanings of Schein and the third one is the territory 
where the process of "cleansing the doors of perception” takes place, 
since it is with the purified vision, with the "inward eye” that we manage 
to see through the appearance of a thing into the thing "as it is” . One 
should, however, be constantly aware of the danger of reading the third 
meaning of Schein as a scandalous monstrosity of epistemology, as a pure 
and negative obstacle on our way to knowledge. The movement between 
Schein 1 and Schein 2 is, as a matter of fact, a movement between the 
truth and untruth which is the essence of aletheia. In aletheia, in the place 
where things stand in themselves, appear as they are, a revelation of 
truth is followed inexorably by a concealment of truth. The very moment 
the truth is uncovered and shines in the darkness of Being (in this sense 
aletheia is the "clearing of Being” , the place which is this sudden ope­
ning where Being is brought to light), it is seen, subjected to our vision 
thus becoming an accoustic or visual sign, and hence it acquires its looks, 
its semblance, its appearance in the very moment when it loses it.
This interplay of appearance and appearing is absolutely necessary, 
since otherwise a man would not be able to come to contact with Being 
which makes itself manifest in its appearances, i.e. material forms. Accor­
ding to Heidegger and Blake, the unfathomable depth of Being must have 
a face, a sur-face, a façade, without which Being would be deprived, dis­
inherited from the very chance of disclosing, of unconcealment, i.e. be­
reft of the possibility of truth. In other words, there can be no Schein 2 
without Schein 3, as it is Schein 2 which brings Schein 3 to the light of 
Schein 1, but without Schein 3 there would be nothing radiance could 
unconceal in darkness. Thus, the comment about the dangerous vicinity 
of semblances and essences is accompanied by a further significant re­
mark:
[...] it becomes clear that the second va rie ty  o f Scheinen appearing in the 
sense o f showing itself, pertains both to Schein as radiance to Schein  as 
semblance, and not as a fortuitous attribute, but as the ground o f their possi­
b ility . The essence of appearance (Schein) lies in the appearing (Erscheinen).K
From this Heideggerian perspective Blake’s postulate of cleansing 
the doors of perception becomes interpretable as a translation of appea­
rance into appearing, as bringing to light of the surface, of the material 
shape of a thing. Thus, the depth does not question or erase the surface 
but together with it stands in the light of Being. Truth as alëtheia is, then, 
the epistemological replica of the movement of the "pen of gold’’ in en­
graving: both disclose the depth hidden under the front, but both recog­
nize the importance of the surface, since it is the surface that constitutes 
the only level upon which the depth of Being can be revealed. Thus, the 
interplay between a necessary appearance and unconcealed appearing 
is a frequent subject of those passages in Blake which deal with his 
theory of vision. From a concise formula
Etern ity is in love  w ith  the productions of tim e (M H H . K , 151)
which in the Heideggerian terms would read as "appearing is in love with 
appearance’’, we move to a more complex assertion from A  Vision of the 
Last Judgment:
I assert fo r  M y  S e lf that I  do not behold the outward Creation &  that to me 
it is hindrance &  not A ction ; it is as the D irt upon m y Feet, No part o f  Me. 
"W h a t” , it w ill be questioned, "W hen  the Sun rises, do you not see a round 
disc o f f ir e  som ewhat lik e  a Guinea? O no, no, I  see an Innum erable com ­
pany o f the H eaven ly  host crying "H o ly , H oly, H oly  it the Cord God A lm iah - 
ty ” . K , 617).
The latter of the fragments is of particular importance, since it demon­
strates a typical Blake’s predicament —  the difficulty of accepting a cen-
terless pulsation of signs without nostalgically looking towards a frozen 
island of security established by a strict dychotomic division into the 
"idea” and its "shadow” , the real and the illusory. Thus, we have an ob­
vious contrast between two orders of appearing: one describing the sur­
face of an object, and the other pertaining to the Being disclosed in the 
act of perception. It is relevant to notice that while the first movement 
is cirsumscribed within the scheme of outside and inside, the other over­
comes this division. Thus, in the order of appearing as appearance, the 
front, the facade of an object is evicted outside the perceiver, it is "as 
the Dirt upon My Feet” . The knower and the known do not belong to­
gether (Heidegger’s Zusamengehdren) but stand in two different orders.
The change in the order of appearing is striking as coming to light 
or radiance: a thing is not an entity that I confront or even collide with, 
is ndt a being in my way ("The tree which moves some to tears of joy is 
in the eyes of others only a green thing that stands in the way” , Let. 
K, 793), but a being I-am-on-the-way-with. In this perspective a thing 
and a viewer stand together, belong together, and find themselves disclos­
ed, unconcealed in Being. Blake’s rejection of the "outward Creation” 
suggests one continuity of the world in which I and the thing belong 
together, in which I and the thing stand in the radiant light of Being, 
disclosed in the movement of aletheia, and hidden, masked, veiled by the 
very observation, the very awareness of being disclosed and unmasked. 
The sun described as the "Innumerable company of the heavenly host” , 
as the order of appearing, points out the continuity of Being defying the 
division into outside and inside;
To Me This World is all One continued Vision of Fancy or Imagination, &
I  fe e l f la t te r ’d w hen I  am to ld  so (Let. K , 793).
The two orders of appearing are also involved in a network of spat­
ial relationships. While appearing as a semblance is represented as limit­
ed and restricted, the other appearing brings about a sudden opening of 
space which becomes unmeasurable and infinite. Aletheia is an engraving 
which does not imitate objects on a flat surface but by opening, cutting, 
deflowering a surface, it opens up the infinity of the depth. Engraving, 
that painful incision upon the virginal space, a beautiful facade, a mo­
vement in which a pen unnoticeably becomes a knife, in the very act of 
looking not so much at but through the front, brings to light the Being of 
the thing (a copper plate) in which the surface belongs together with the 
depth. The space in the appearing as unconcealment is not remembered, 
recollected in a moment of tranquillity ("But Albion fe ll down [...] hurl’d 
by own Spectre, who is the Reasoning Power in every Man, into his own 
Chaos, which is the Memory between Man & Man” , Jer. K, 685; "Imag­
ination has nothing to do with Memory” , Ann. Wordsw. K, 783), but
conquered in the moment of sudden light on the clearing of Being. Hei­
degger juxtaposes these two orders of appearing in his Introduction to 
Metaphysics:
Appearing me.ans first: that which gathers itself, which brings-itself-to-stand 
in its togetherness and so sitands. But second it means: that which, already 
standing there, presents a front, a surface, offers an appearance to be looked 
at.47
The process of cleansing the doors of perception does not do any­
thing else but lets us see the appearing of the thing in the first sense, by 
looking through the appearing of the thing as used in the latter meaning. 
This is entangled in a movement from a finite, restricted space to the 
infinity produced by the thing which "brings-itself-to-stand” . Such o mo­
vement is traceable in Blake’s philosophy, and Heidegger again provides 
us with a pertinent comment:
[...] the difference between appearing and appearing is this: appearing in the 
first and authentic sense as bringing-itself-to-stand in togetherness involves 
space, which it first conquers; as it stands there, it creates space for itself; 
it produces space and everything pertaining to it; it is not copied. Appearing 
in the second sense emerges from an already finished space; it is situated 
in the rigid measures of this space, and we see it by looking toward it The 
vision makes the thing. Now this vision becomes decisive instead of the thing 
itself. Appearing in first sense opens up space. Appearing in the second sense 
merely circumscribes and measures the space that has already been opened.48
Appearing in the first sense, the appearance we perceive with the 
"cleansed doors or perception” is then a letting a thing be "as it is” , in 
short it is what Heidegger and Meister Eckhart speak of as Gelassenheit 
Gelassenheit, a letting be, signifies a dynamic emergence of a thing, its 
energetic movement towards and coming into the clearing of Being, its 
spinning out of and revealing of Being from which it is not separated, 
but which it uncovers in the dialectic of veiling and unveiling. A  thing, 
then, resides in and with Being, and only brings itself to the fore, lets 
itself be seen against the sky of Being like Heidegger’s temple. In his 
essay Was 1st Metaphysjk Heidegger defines a being of each individual 
essent as fundamentally "ek-static” , i.e. according to his etymology as 
a being which "is standing out (aus-stehen) in the truth of Being, a stand­
ing open to the Open itself.”49 This dynamism of the process of aletheia 
is again well caught by Heidegger who makes it one of the main charac­
teristic features of the original meaning of Logos as legein, as primordial 
"collectedness” (Sammlung),50 primal act of anchoring, rooting of all 
things in Being, and of bringing them together in consideration (zusamne- 
ins-V orliegen-hr ingen).51
Legem or logos are the letting-lie-forward (vorliegen lassen) of the thing 
which comes to presence in its presence.52
When Heidegger speaks of "bringing to light” , "letting lie” , or "com­
ing to stand” the stress is placed on the dynamic quality of the verb 
rather than on the final, seemingly static, result. What, in Heidegger’s 
diagnosis, is the essence of the dramatic change in the history of Euro­
pean thinking —  a misinterpretation of the concept of Logos so that it 
came to a law imposed rationally on the process of living and, finally, 
declined to be a mere synonym of logic, has been a significant element 
of Blake’s theory. Although, as David Erdman points out, much of Blake’s 
attack against the externally imposed rules goes against the political and 
social institutions of the time, nevertheless Blake always understands 
these manifestations of tyranny "backwards” , i.e. tries to trace them back 
to their roots which he sees in the inautheutic mode of being of the hu­
man mind. Thus, in Songs of Experience we read that "the dysmal shade” 
of the tree of "the Human Abstract” grows in "the Human Brain” (The 
Human Abstract), and the restraints imposed upon a man are "the mind- 
-forged manacles” (London). Letting be of a thing is a primal and funda­
mental human need within the sphere of existence, it is the assumption 
which brings to light, uncovers an essent.
The landscape of Songs of Experience, which is a landscape where 
thing do not stand out, do not exist ek-statically or ecstatically, is do­
minated by darkness and gloom where "the sun does never shine”- (Holy 
Thursday), and the tiger which burns in "the forests of the night” ob­
viously belongs to the forest which is deprived of a Lichtung, of the 
clearing of Being. In The Marriage of Heaven and Hell a letting be of 
a thing is translated into the language of the dialectic of mind and 
passion, where passion represents the ek-static, ecstatic existence, a life 
which "stands out’ of and in Being. Hence, the aphoristic "Sooner murder 
an infant in its cradle than nurse unacted desires” (K, 152) is theoretically 
supported by the belief that "Those who restrain desire, do so because 
theirs is weak enough to be restrained; and the restrainer or reason 
usurps its place & governs the unwilling” (K, 149). Restraints are viewed 
as encroachments upon a letting be of a thing, a man, and are negations 
of energy and dynamism:
And being restrain’d, it by degrees becomes passive, till it is only the sha­
dow of desire. (K, 150).
10. The Road of Excess
I  am not mad. W hat interests me 
is a lot of freedom .
—  Jim  M orrison, An Interview
A  movement of signifiers in Blake is either towards too little or too 
much. Passion is an umbrella term for a radical imbalance of life which 
precludes the possibility of stating one’s actual unity with Being. The 
very moment one formulates a statement expressive of such a unity, he 
at the same time blurs and veils the truth that was intended to be re­
vealed. Truth is uncovered in the act of seeing, in the infinity of Being 
which is not external to the perceiver but which enfolds him, gathers, 
collects, reads him into the primal collectedness of Being (Versammlung). 
The Being, a thing stands ek-statically and ecstatically out of, is the 
Being I am enwrapped in, enwombed in; but, simultaneously, the truth 
is veiled, and the unity of collectedness is broken by the act of naming, 
by the use of sign which, by the very procedure of pointing out, intro­
duces a painful rupture, an unhealed wound, into the process of living. 
This trap in which Blake’s thought is inevitably to be ensnared is also 
discovered by Derrida in Heidegger. This is the predicament which the 
author of De la grammatologie diagnoses in his text:
The vo ice  o f the sources is not heard. A  rupture betw een  the orig inary  m ea­
ning of Being and the w ord, betw een  m eaning and the voice, betw een "the 
vo ice  o f being” and the phone, betw een  "th e call o f be ing” and articu lated 
sound; such a rupture, w h ich  at once confirm s a fundam ental m etaphor, and 
renders it suspect by accentuating its m etaphoric discrepancy, translates the 
am bigu ity o f the H eideggerian  situation w ith  respect to the metaphysics o f 
presence and logocentrism . I t  is at once contained w ith in  in and transgresses 
it.53
The silence of the spring of truth is already disturbed by the sound 
of the stream of signs. When the statement claims and propounds a union 
of myself and Being, the rupture introduced by such a claim changes 
myself into Blake’s "Selfhood” and scatters the collectedness of Being 
into a dispersion of beings. This dispersion is the origin of language, the 
fundamentally gap-oriented process. Language is a mediation between two 
dispersed individuals, and thus inevitably is doomed to passivity, since 
when deprived of the immediacy of the bodily contact, of the "nearness” 
of the original togetherness, it has to evolve towards more and more 
passive stance. Derrida notices a similar passage in Rousseau’s essay On 
the Origin of Languages in which, the French philosopher maintains that:
[...] v is ion  and hearing are ithe on ly  passive organs o f  language among dis­
tinct [dispersés] individuals,
and it is precisely this citation which gives Derrida a momentum towards 
his final, categorical assertion:
to be followed in a typically Derridian manner by a transformation of 
this statement of fact in a statement of the essence of language:
This dispersion should no doubt be overcome by language but, for that very 
reason, it determines the natural condition of language.54
This split, a never healed wound, in the very structure of language is 
then associated with the difference between Selfhood and togetherness 
of Being, but also is accompanied by other phenomena: the emergence 
of memory (with the first statement, the first articulation, there appears 
something to re-create), the appearance of binary pairs of negations 
(good and evil, body and soul), the duality of thought and feeling, of the 
sign and its object. This is a complaint of Milton in Blake’s text:
"What do I here before the Judgment? without my Emanation?
With the daughters of memory & not with the daughters of inspiration?
I in my Selfhood am that Satan: I am that Evil One!
He is my Spectre! in my obedience to loose him from my Hells,
To claim the Hells, my Furnaces, I go to Eternal Death”.
Then on the verge of Beulah he beheld his own Shadow,
A  mournful form double, hermaphroditic, male & female 
In one wonderful body; and he enter’d into it 
In direful pain, for the dread of shadow twenty-seven fold 
Reach’d to the depths of direst Hell & thence to Albion’s land,
Which is this earth of vegetation on which now I write. (M. K, 496).
As we have already noticed, the question of being in Blake (Hei­
degger’s Seinsfrage) can never be expressed directly, since the very word 
"ex-press” connotes a distance, a detachment, a separation from the area 
to which we want to be originally loyal. A  desire, when suppressed beco­
mes "a shadow of desire” , or when ex-pressed, lived out, or acted inevi­
table turns in "Too much” .
For Blake, the road towards truth is a road of a dangerous surplus, 
of that dangerous supplement Rousseau was speaking of in his Con­
cessions, and which Derrida expanded and turned into a model of writing 
as a mode of existence. Truth is a question of not being able to recognize 
the moment of absolute coincidence and identity between a sign and an 
object, between Logos as the original, in-articulate, silent, belonging to­
gether and Logos as logic, reason, the Word. First of all, truth is a road, 
and not a destination point; since language is a product of separation, 
dispersion which it itself conditions, truth can only be approximated as 
a revelation, an unconcealment of a view  that appears suddenly at the 
bend of a mountain road, or the Heideggerian country path (Feldweg, 
Holzwege), only to be replaced by another view  which does not erase or 
invalidate the previous moment of ecstatic (and ek-static) consummation, 
but replaces, supplements it, takes o ff of its predecessor, steals our rap­
ture from it and, by the very act of what Blake calls in Jerusalem 
a "secret amorous theft” (K, 707), leads us on the road which is nothing 
but a detour.
The road and theft are related to each other by the impossibility of 
habitation and ownership which is inscribed in them. The road excludes 
both and, by the emphasis on a constant movement unrestricted by any 
destination points, it precludes internalization of experience, cancels the 
idea of ownership, defies the appropriation of something as "mine” . Also 
in "stealing” there lunks the necessity of running, escaping, flying. The 
road and theft belong to the sphere of the uncanny, Unheimlich, of 
"floating” between truth and un-truth, "sailing” between texts. This is 
summarized in a hesitation between the "ve il”  [voile], the "fligh t” '[vol], 
and the "leap” [uoltigre] Derrida traces in Mallarmé.55 Both the road and 
theft defy the overtly masculine concept of domination and manipula­
tion, thus leaving for the artist the Mallarmean/Derridian sexless mask 
of a mime, existential clown. Hélène Cixous speaks of it in the following 
way:
Let’s leave it [traditional academic concepts of objectivity and subjectivity] 
to the warriors, to masculine anxiety and its obsession with how to dominate 
the way things  ^ work [...]. For us the point is not to take possession in order 
to internalize or manipulate, but rather to dash through and to "fly” {voler 
—  fly/steal].56
Derrida notices that, in terms of critical practice, it implies a some­
what anarchic situation where the interpreter/clown/thief finds him­
self in a position of the total, yet uneasy freedom inscribed in all the ne­
cessary limitations of writing as the movement of signifiera. Hence.,
The Mime imitates nothing [...] there is nothing prior to the writing of his 
gestures. Nothing is prescribed for him. No present has preceded or super­
vised the tracing of his writing... The Mime is not subjected to the authority 
of any book: the fact that Mallermé points this out is all the more strange 
since the text called M im ique is initially a reaction to a reading.57
According to Heidegger, the very word "road” seems to be
[ - ] an ancient primary word that speaks to the reflective mind of men. The 
key word in Lao-tse’s poetic thinking is Tao, which "properly speaking” 
means "way”.58
The road as truth, truth as the road, is labirynthine and far from a smooth 
pavement of a city street. It is the excess, supplement, and replacement 
which constitutes this track determining the radical inability to esta­
blish a straighforward, one way, relationship between a starting point 
and a destination, between a signifier and a signified. Such a road is the
"indelible line” written with a "golden pen” Blake was talking about in 
Jerusalem; the road of excess is the road of W RITING . Hence, in Blake’s 
philosophy:
The road of excess leads to the palace of wisdom (M HH. K, 150),
but the destination is only a shadow, an intuition of a destination that 
awaits us at the end of the route straightened out by the improvements, 
short-cuts of speech:
Improvements make strait roads; but the crooked roads without Improve­
ments are roads of Genius. (M H H . K, 152).
Writing leads us out of the city with its geometrical pattern of straight 
streets administered by the logic of Logos as reason and brings us to the 
winding paths of the countryside. What we lose in this very act of transit­
ion is one, central, panoramic vision which perspectivally places an ob­
ject at the end of the straight line connecting it with our eye, and in­
stead we are lost in a multiplicity of views which open round every corner 
of a "crooked” path.
In his comments upon Plato’s Phaedrus Derrida draws our attention 
to the unexpected geographical change of Socrates’s likings brought about 
by books, i.e. by writing. Socrates attracted by the perspective of getting 
acquainted with a widely-acclaimed book by Lysis leaves the city, his 
native element, accompanied by Phaedrus:
The biblia that will draw Socrates out of his reserve and out of the space 
in which he is wont to learn, to teach, to speak, to dialogue —  the shelte­
red enclosure of 'the city —  these biblia contain a text written by "the 
ablest writer of our day”.59
Mr. and Mrs. Blake emphasize the rejuvenating, soothing, influence 
of the countryside in the language of opposition between the incessant 
flowering of the province and the barren character of the city. Thus, in 
her letter to Mrs. Flaxman (dated Sept. 14, 1800) Mrs. Blake speaks 
about "the terrible desert of London” (K, 800), and Blake distances him­
self from this place with an empty, disdainful silence:
[...] it will be Thursday before we can get away from this — City. (K, 801).
In another letter Blake would describe Felpham, Mr. Hayley’s estate 
in Susex, as a sudden opening, an explosion and bursting of a shell:
Felpham is a sweet place for Study, because it is more spiritual than Lon­
don. Heaven opens here on all sides her Golden Gates, her windows are not 
obstructed by vapours; voices of Celestial inhabitants are more distinctly
heard, & their form more distinctly seen, & my Cottage is also a Shadow of 
their Houses. (K, 802).
The road of excess, that dangerous supplement, the indelible line, is the 
road of writing, the "crooked” way of articulation which replaces one 
sign by another in a never-ending movement of signifiers. In Derrida’s 
concise formula "Everything in language is substitution” , and it is
[...] the power of substituting one organ for another, of articulating space 
and time, sight and voice [Blake’s voices of Celestial inhabitants are more 
distinctly heard, and their form is more distinctly seen —  TS], hand and 
spirit [Blaike: "My Fingers Emit sparks of fire with Expectation of my futu­
re labours” (K. 801), but the fingers are "under the direction of my future 
labours” (K. 801), but the fingers are "under the direction of Messengers 
from Heaven, Daily & Nightly” (K. 812) —  TS] it this this faculty of supple- 
mentarity which is the true "origin” —  or nonorigin —  of languages: arti­
culation in general, as articulation of nature and convention, of nature and 
all its others.60
In the already quoted passage from M ilton  Blake stresses a deep in­
volvement of existence in writing (Derrida: "There is no linguistic sign 
before writing”61), entanglement of life in the exteriority of signifiers. 
Thus, Milton, as any sign, undergoes a process of division which exterio­
rizes a part of himself called a "Shadow” . This "Spectre” , a messenger 
of "Eternal Death” is seemingly "in one wonderful body” , but on close 
inspection it reveals a fissure, the unretrievable loss of unity hidden un­
der the appearance of a perfect union; its form is "hermaphroditic” , i.e. 
"double” . It is interesting to observe that the form uniting the male and 
the female principle, thus organizing itself along the line of the utmost 
pleasure ("The virgin/That pines for man shall awaken her womb to 
enormous joys in the secret shadows of her chambers” , VDA. K, 194), 
becomes its own negation, as it undergoes a transformation into "a mourn­
ful form” . This is one of the places which betray the double bend of 
Blake’s mind: on the one hand, he seems to accept the position of the 
one who is lost in the play of signifiers, and thus refrains from looking 
for a central point in which a signifier could finally unite and coalesce 
with its signified, and still he longs for the ultimate consummation. He 
recognizes the "indelibility” of the line, inexorable character of writing 
and, at the same time, in numerous places he emphasizes his lack of 
acceptance of such a situation.
Hence, a "double” form of writing, its radical supplementarity, w ill 
never form a gaia scienca for Blake; in other words, existence is evaluat­
ed as ek-statidecstatic, i.e. as a process in which "man stands out towards 
the things in the world and the world itself.” 62 Man’s existence is made 
meaningful in the moment of reaching out, standing out towards the 
world which Blake discusses in his dialectic of passion and action ("He
who desires but acts not, breeds pestilence” , MHH. K, 151), and enhances 
in his concept oí man as a sense giving phenomenon, that is to say, as 
Heidegger’s "ek-sisting” man, a man standing out of the primal collec­
tedness of Being ("Where man is not, Nature is barren” , MHH. K, 152).
Where hides a difference is Blake’s attempt at matching truth as 
cilétheia and truth as homoiosis, truth as hesitant uncovering, and truth 
as agreement. That is why, although the diagnosis pf the ontological 
situation of man thrown into the world as dispersion, diversity, distance, 
and articulation, i.e. writing, is anti-Platonic, the cure, the pharmakon,
is taken out of the pharmacy of Plato’s philosophy of the privileged
position of the idea with regard to the object. When acknowledging a deep 
entanglement of man’s existence in writing Blake continues to dream of 
the fulfillment, of the presence, of the Voice. If this is the case, he has 
to display mistrust in a "double” form of writing which, like a book
[...] reproduces the logos, and the whole is organized by this relation of re­
petition, resemblance (homoiosis), doubling, duplication, this sort of specta­
cular process and play of reflections where things (onta), speech, and writing
come to repeat and mirror each other.63
In Blake’s Annotations to Reynolds we find a telling remark which 
reinscribes Blake’s Platonic inclinations into the problematic of writing 
as an echo, a garment of soul. Reynolds quotes Carlo Maratti’s opinion 
that a drapery was more of a challenge to the artist than the body, to 
which Blake replies;
I do not believe that Carlo Maxatti thought so, or that any body can think 
so; the Drapery is formed alone by the Shape of the Naked. (K, 462).
The point made by Blake is of practical (painterly) and theoretical (meta­
physical) significance. An analogous fragment from Flaxman’s lectures 
instructs us how to paint in agreement with the rules of styles:
Drapery, as a medium through which the human figure is intelligible may 
be compared with speech, by which ideas and thought are perceived [...]. 
This consistency of the original image with its outward appearance is proper 
and decorous, and cannot be violated without inflicting the shock of absur­
dity and folly; for as the noblest thought would be degraded by low and 
unbecoming speech, so would the person of a legislator or a prophet by the 
dress of a buffoon or a baccanal.64
Thus, the question of decorum is pertinent to a general discussion of spi­
rituality which is a way to restore the fundamental nakedness of Being 
which shines through the clothing of time.
So far we have been trying to misread Blake through the script of 
Heidegger and Derrida to produce our own text as a flowering (out) of
Blake grafted upon the Derridian/Heideggerian soil, disseminating Blake’s 
text in other and through other texts. W e have performed an act of what 
Derrida calls a "textual grafting” resulting from the "etymological coin­
cidence uniting the graft and the graph”65 To "misread” a text means, 
at least, two things: first o f all, it is to see it as a place where other texts 
do not end ¡but, just the opposite, as a maternal palce where all other texts 
start; and, secondly, it means to see this text as the area where all other 
texts interfere and mingle with one another. Paul de Man, in his impor­
tant article on Nietzsche, defines "a good misreading” as
[...] a text that produces another text which engenders additional texts66
and another critic would claim that
[...] literary history must be extended to include not only the series of criti­
cal misreadings of a given text, but also interrelationships among poems as 
they are interpretations, deconstruetions, of each other.67
When "misreading” Blake, when watching the growth of the "textual 
grafting” , we have to notice differences between various texts it produ­
ces. Thus, Blaike, like Heidegger, believes in truth as unconcealment, but 
betrays the Heideggerian discourse by allowing of the treatment of ma­
terial objects as mere shadows, "hindrances” of ideas; the Derridian mis­
reading would concentrate on the movement of signifiers, on language as 
doubling and supplement, but it would also uncover Blake’s longing for 
the center which gives a penetrating meaning to the parts. The road of 
truth is "crooked” (like in Heidegger and Derrida), but still at its end 
there stands a "palace of wisdom” (like in Heidegger but unlike in Der­
rida).
Hence, the belief in the final nakedness of Being which, from its 
central point, conditions shapes of the material clothing; when the Derri­
dian misreading would stress the impossibility of that nakedness, as there 
is always a veil of another signifier that prevents us from seeing the shin­
ing body, Blake would write in a letter to Thomas Butts:
Naked we came here, naked of Natural things, & naked we shall return; 
but while cloth’d with the Divine Mercy, we are richly cloth’d in Spiritual & 
suffer all the rest gladly. (K, 813).
Here Blake is trapped in the implacable logic of logocentrism which, 
drawing a careful distinction between the essential voice and the secon­
dary gesture of the pen holding hand, refuses to see and admit that when 
taking such an anti-writing stance it already commits an act of writing. 
Talking about the secondariness of writing is also inscribed in the move­
ment of the hand. Blake in his Platonism would hold that things are
"hindrances” , shadows of ideas, i.e. they are not what they present 
themselves to be. Hence, it is admissible for the sun to be and not to be 
a sun, for a plant to confirm and negate his being as a plant. The former 
conjunction is exemplified by a much quoted fragment from A Vision of 
the Last Judgment, the latter by a versified letter to Thomas Butts:
With my inward Eye, ftis an old man gey; with my outward, a Thistle across 
my way. (K, 817).
If, as Blake claims, we commit a mistake by identifying the inward 
and outward perception, then a thing is never itself (as the ontotheological 
tradition of life without difference would like to have it), but it can only 
be less or m ore than itself, but in this act of recognition difference is in­
troduced into the myth of in-different life. If we admit that a thing is 
less or more than itself, we distance it from itself, and understand it as 
existing in a constant, unceasing betw een  between itself and our un­
derstanding; the emphasis is switched from the "palace of wisdom” to 
the "crooked” path. A  thing is but a trace of itself, is a writing which 
prevents it from attaining the plenitude of the phonè that pretends it has 
not heard of any difference. Derrida defines the theatrics of the phono- 
centrism as
[...] the subordination of the trace to the full presence summed up in the 
logos, the humbling of writing beneath a speech dreaming its plenitude, such 
are the gestures required by an onto-theology determining the archeological 
and eschatological meaning of being as presence, as parousia, as life without 
difference: another name for death, historical metonymy where God’s name 
holds death in check.68
In the same way in which phonocentrism, claiming to be real, ideatio­
nal life of God, smuggles death into the world of significance, Blake 
unconsciously falls victim to writing when asserting its inferiority to 
speech, living, "Divine Presence” , "Divine Breath” , of the transcendental 
signifié called "God” . If, for a miser, the sun is less than it is ("a round 
disc of fire like a guinea” ), for the man whose eyes have "expanded” it 
is more than it is ("Innumerable company of Heavenly host” ), thus, the 
sun never is what is rea lly  is, i.e. it is never let "appear” "as it is” . In 
our effort to remove appearances we create another mask.
Similarly in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell a list of definitions 
quoted below betrays its embededness in écriture, as the things defined 
are described in terms of the concept which is external to them, and 
although its aim is to sanction the ultimate identity, it only introduces 
further distinctions. The only way to defend a thing against the invasion 
from the outside is to define it tautologically in its own terms. Definition 
of a peacock would, in a markedly Steinian fashion, read that a peacock
is a peacock, while Blake applies to it the external concept of God without 
being aware of the fact that God’s name "holds difference in check” at 
the expense of being a work of difference itself. God is to signify the 
plenitude, the original union, hut it defines an object as standing outside 
it. A ll the definitions in the Proverbs of Hell are contained within the 
dream of the living presence of speech dreamed by writing:
The pride of the peacock is the glory of God.
The lust of the goat is the bounty of God.
The wrath of the lion is the wisdom of God.
The nakedness of woman is the work of God. (K, 151).
Albrecht Fabri describes such a situation as a fundamental misunder­
standing of the Western metaphysics:
In so far as to understand means to understand something as something else, 
to understand the rose as a rose means precisely not to understand it. And 
that is whait the tautalogy accomplishes through its emphatic refusal to for­
mulate definitions.69
Understanding is embedded in the radical substitution, replacement, ex­
cess, since we can understand a thing only in terms of another thing, 
as an item in a chain of signifiers.
This brings us back to an important concept of excess which is fre­
quently used by Blake, and which has already been discussed in this
essay. "Excess” is the word in which logocentrism reveals its fold, as 
— on the one hand —  it strives to reach the ideal ("Exuberance is Beauty” , 
"Enough, or too much!” , K, 152), but is, simultaneously, caught in the 
game of suppiementarity. Exuberance, "too much” , is only a mirror re­
flection of "too little” , and a thing, a "between” , an "enough” , separating 
the two is irrevocably lost in this fissure.
What will always defy and baffle criticism is this effect of being a supple­
mentary double. There is always one extra rejoinder, one recess or represen­
tation too many, which also means too few.70
The problematic of excess meets the image of drapery in an impor­
tant notion of a "fo ld ” . In M ilton  Blake tells us the poet’s plunge into 
the Shadowy double as a story of a man lost in numerous folds, a story 
of a man enfolded in and by his form(s):
[...] and he enter’d into it 
In direful pain, for the dread shadow of twenty-seven fold 
Reach’d to the depths of direst Hell [...] (K, 496).
The idea of a fold is another version of a self-repeating structure, 
a "fold” is this moment of a history of an object in which it faces itself
along the line which bends it against itself. Language, i.e. literature, text, 
interpretation is, at the same time enfolding, unfolding, and refolding of 
a sign. It is enfolding because its essence lies in constituing the area 
where a text meets an interpreter, where a written sign is read; this ter­
ritory is not only a topographical location of this event, but it itself par­
ticipates in it. A  text enfolds us to the degree to which it is more than 
just its own explanation, to the extent to which it moves into the area 
more profound than a fragmentary "Reason” . It is enfolding because it 
introduces a sign into a complicated network of relationships within the 
original collectedness. Thus:
Knowledge is not by deduction, but Immediate by Perception or Sense at 
once. Christ addresses himself to the Man, not to his Reason. (AnBerk. 
K, 774).
A  contrast between "Man” (which in Blake’s philosophical algebra equal­
led "Imagination” as in "Man is A ll Imagination” . K, 775) and "Reason” 
or "Deduction” runs parallel to the juxtaposition of Auslegung and Deu- 
tung, explanation and interpretation, which Walter Biemel discovers in 
Heidegger’s thought:
An explanation is an attempt to work out clearly the structure of a text, its 
construction, its articulation, so that we may get into the text and under­
stand it. An interpretation attempts more: [...] we wish to understand what 
the text [...] is really about, what in changes in our horizon of understan­
ding, and the extent to which the text itself occasions a change in our own 
horizon.71
A  text enfolds us i.e. it envelops us in an area where the horizon of Being 
is common for the text and myself, for the God and the mortal ("God is 
Man & exists in us & we in him” , B, 775).
A  text is unfolding because it is either „too little” or "too much” , it 
never remains in a state of homeostasis, but is always delayed, "deferred” , 
it spreads only to form another fold. Thus unfolding does not mean 
attaining a smooth surface, virginal, untouched space, but pertains to 
the situation where even the surface is seen as another "fo ld ” ; unfold­
ing cannot be interpreted as a straightening out of a process of signifi­
cation, as introducing a space free of folds, but rather as un —  folding, 
i.e. a procedure which makes room for another fold, another signifier, 
postponing forever the achievement of a signified.
Finally, a text is refolding, as it, through creating another fold, 
creates another text, it always is a story of certain misreadings and 
their mutual interferences. Blake conveys this idea in The Marriage of 
Heaven and Hell where he speakes of the Bible read in its "inferenal or 
diabolical sense” (K, 158), and in The Everlasting Gospel where the
insistence on the multiplicity of meanings is introduced already in the 
initial part of the text:
Socrates taught what Meletus 
Loath’d as a Nation’s bitterest Curse,
And Caiphas was in his own Mind 
A  benefactor to Mankind:
Both read the Bible day & night,
But thou read st black where I read white. (K, 748).
As we can see a "fo ld ” is an important concept for a theory o f 
language and here as well Blake seems to be hesitant and undecided 
whether a "fo ld ” as a fundamental feature of writing ought to be reco­
gnized as an obstacle, a hindrance in a system of relationships between 
a signified and a signifier, or whether it ought to be celebrated as the 
only element in which communication is possible. On the one hand, the 
folds of Shadow reach to the "depths of direst H ell” , but they are also« 
connected with writing, deeply rooted in the ontology of the world. 
There seems to be no world outside the fold, i.e. there seems to be no 
world outside writing:
[...] the dread Shadow twenty-seven fold 
Reach’d to the depths of direst Hell thence to Albion’s land 
Which is this earth of vegetation on which now I write. (K, 496).
Still, Albion is called "the earth of vegetation” , i.e. of a secondary im­
portance in Blake’s hierarchy of existence, secondary to the phonic ple­
nitude of presence from which the "Divine Voice” speaks. This "earth 
of vegetation” is the domain and effect of the fold, of the territory 
where the fold
[...] will always have been not only a -replication of the tissue but also a re- 
petition-toward-itself of the text that is a re-folding, a re-plying, a supple­
mentary re-marking of the fold.71
It is also the earth of writing. Writing is the basic mode of pro­
duction in the vegetative universe, that is to say, in the universe where 
the spirit inexorably undergoes the process of materialization and sub­
stantivization.
Although, in majority of cases, Blake uses "vegetation” in a dero­
gatory context, there are also many examples where his stance is less 
decisive and seems to be reconsidering a meaning of the term as a possi­
ble indelible link in the chain of signifiers, what is more, its loss is an 
irretrievable impoverishment of existence. A fter a radical division into 
the Male and the Female the point upon which Blake focuses his atten­
tion is a question of the relationship between the material and spiritual,
but a decisive rift on the social (conscious) level is accompanied by the 
sense of contiguity on the plane of unconscious:
The Male is a Furnace of Beryll; the Female is a golden Loom.
I behold them, and their rushing fires overwhelm my Soul
In Londons’s darkness, and my tears fall day and night
Upon the Emanations of Albion’s Sons; the Daughters of Albion,
Names anciently remember’d, but contemn’d as fictions
Although in every bosom they controll our Vegetative powers. (J. K, 624).
A t least two points call for aur attention in this passage. One is the 
obvious tendency towards extending the distance between the material 
and the spiritual, i.e. between a signifier and a signified (men are "Ema­
nations of Albion’s Sons” , and only as such they conceal in themselves 
mysterious spiritual powers represented by the "Daughters of Albion” ); 
the other is a marked belief in the final transparency of a sign which, 
although delayed by a long detour of signification, w ill eventually reach 
its destination which "controls” it. In other words, Blake, recognizing 
entanglement of a sign in a winding road of signification which makes 
the distance to cover ever longer and less unequivocal, still maintains 
the reality of the spiritual which sanctions signs in their semiotic func­
tion: a sign may have a few  more signifiers on its way towards its signi­
fied, but the very existence of a signified is never questioned. Thus, 
Blake uncovering, unveiling, the concealed meaning as the heart of the 
signification process makes his writings more prone to the Heideggerian, 
hermeneutic reading than to the deconstructive, Derriaian message 
which claims that "the hermeneutic concept of polysemy [...] must be 
replaced by dissemination.” 73
Although the foundation of the Western science is for Blake uncer­
tain, if not totally false, in its rationalistic bias, nevertheless a philo­
sophical rescue mission that Blake launches to save the structure of 
human cognition is not radically different from what it criticizes. Blake 
attacks Bacon and Voltaire for their belief in "natural causes” but, 
when questioning the idea of the cause itself, he only removes it one 
step further from its natural, material immediacy. Thus, the following 
statement from Blake’s analysis of Bacon "There is no Such Thing as 
[...] a Natural Cause” (AnB . K, 403) has to be qualified by a quotation 
from Jerusalem which establishes a much less radical point of view:
We who dwell on Earth can do nothing of ourselves; every thing is conducted 
by Spirits, no less than Digestion or Sleep (K, 621).
Blake’s hermeneutics does not allow for a free floating among signs 
and texts although it encroaches upon the tradition of rationalism with 
its strict logic of causes and effects. When Blake launches a smashing
attack on Bacon’s principles of rationalism and empiricism, he centers 
on annihilating the very term "cause” trying to remove it from the phi­
losophical rhetoric: "The word Cause is a foolish Word” (AnnB. K, 403). 
This is undertaken with a view  of the ultimate spiritualization of the 
human being and, eventually, with his radical identification with the 
spiritual powers. If the word "cause” is to be eradicated, it is due to its 
wrong interpretation of existence as basically twofold, i.e. material and 
spiritual, while for Blake existence is exclusivelly spiritual, and the 
man is not even an effect of the spiritual, but only a tablet, a white 
page, upon which the invisible finger writes the "indelible line” .
The fundamental idea of Blake’s anthropological semiotics is that 
the man is not God’s sign mainly because he points at his transcenden­
tal signified, but because he has been written, inscribed, engraved, by God 
and, thus, is not a human sign of God, but God’s sign of God. The man 
is an element of the divine semiotics revealing its sacred mysteries upon 
the human ground. In Blake’s concept of semiotics as a divine discipline 
a man is a sign of God in two complementary senses: traditionally as 
a symbol, i.e. as an arbitrary, conventional, sign which refers to its sig­
nified on the basis of a certain, more general, scheme of agreement (the 
theory of Genesis, God’s intervention in the world which establishes 
a pattern of references from one, central starting point), or indexically, 
i.e. as an immediate manifestation of God’s presence in the world. Whe­
reas in the first group of signs the dominating rule is that of a methaphor, 
in the other the organizing principle is markedly metonymic, as a man 
is but an extension of God’s hand, is God’s writing in the world.
But writing stubbornly comes back, even though Blake insists on 
the phonocentric concept of the "Presence Divine” and the "Divine 
Breath” , and although his appeal is to the God’s finger to "cease to 
write” , the process of inscribing cannot be totally eradieaded. Already 
in the very fact that God in its divine semiotic mercy makes itself ma­
nifest to man upon human grounds introduces a theme of the fissure, 
a gap, a painful rupture: since language, a sign system, is born only of 
dispersion, then a manifestation of unity ("for they the Ancients were 
wholly absorbed in their Gods. I also hope the reader w ill be with me, 
wholly One in Jesus our Lord [...]” , J. K, 621) translated into the lan­
guage of dispersion can only be expressed in terms of this scatteredness, 
and the unity expressed in this way is but a dissemination of further 
dispersion.
This vision of language as trapped in the process of signification 
and, simultaneously, as the endless way towards its horizon, language 
as struggling to express what preceded language, is also traceable in 
Reynold’s aesthetics where it helps to point out a difference between 
the styles of Michael Angelo and the 18th century art. In the last dis­
course the old and retiring president of the Royal Academy speaks o f 
"grammar” and "dictionary” as of a necessary, incompetent, replica of 
the original, "dead” , language:
In pursuing this great Art it must be acknowledged that we labour under 
greater diffulties than those who were born in the age of its discovery, and 
whose minds from Itheir infancy were habituated to this style We are 
constrained, in these later days, to have recourse to a sort of Grammar and 
Dictionary, as the only means of recovering a dead language The style 
of Michael Angelo, which I have compared to language, and which may, poe­
tically speaking, be called the language of the Gods, now no longer exists, 
as it did in the fifteenth century; yet, we may in a great measure supply 
the deficiency [...] of not having his works so perpetually before our eyes, by 
having recourse to casts from his models and designs [...] to drawings or 
evep copies of those drawings [...]. (R, 278).
We see clearly that the myth of the Golden Age both Blaike and 
Reynolds promoted in their writings has its semiotic metaphor in the 
concept of language as the inevitable structure of communication: in 
both versions of the myth the modems are made to recapture, recover 
by means of copies the "dead”  original which, on closer inspection, turns 
out to be nothing else but another version of a copy. God’s reality is also 
circumscribed in and through language.
God, as the highest semiotician, is then hopelessly involved in the 
problematic of writing, although his entanglement is, at once, more ra­
dical (he is the first writer the origin of signs), and more discreet (he 
can keep silent, his finger "may cease to write” ). He is in a position o f 
Mallarm^’s Mime who epitomizes, for Derrida, one who, like God- 
-writer, Deus-scriblerus, is outspoken and deaf at the same time, who 
"inaugurates [...] breaks into a white page”
It is prescribed to the Mime that he not let anything be prescribed to him 
but his own writing, that he not reproduce by imitation any action [...] or 
any speech. The Mime ought to write himself on the white page he is; he 
must himself inscribe himself through gestures and plays of facial express­
ions. At once page and quill, Pierrot is both passive and active, matter and
form, the author, the means, and the raw material of his mmodrama.74
If. The Veil of Vala
Know, then, this veil is a type and 
a symbol, and I am bound to wear
it ever, both in dark and lightness,
in solitude and before the gaze of
multitude. [...]. No mortal eye shall 
see it withdrawn. This dismal shade 
must separate me from the world. 
—  Nathaniel Hawthorne, The M i­
nister’s Black V eil
The problematic of the multiple inscription, of a sign marked upon 
another sign, a mark re-marked, brings us again to the question of the 
io ld  and to the metaphor of the veil. This has already announced itself 
in the terminology which defined truth as "unveiling” , as aletheia, where 
the truth has been revealed as a temporary unconcealment, as a mo­
mentary lifting of a veil. What is then this unspecified, mysterious some­
thing that is lifted uncovering truth ¡but, at the same time, separating 
us from truth?
In Blake’s prophetic writings the veil appears as "Vala ’s Veil” , i.e. 
it is inherently related to Nature Vala is the goddess of, but —  para­
doxically —  it serves the purpose of estranging the spectator from rea­
lity which, for Blake, is purely spiritual. Thus, "Vala’s Veil” , is an ob­
stacle, it hides with a perverse purpose to distort and disfigure, and the 
concealment is here supplemented by a disguise which functions as 
a painful limitation of growth. The phenomenology of hiding present in 
the veil relies on the fact that the veil hides a thing not so much to, 
eventually, reveal it, but to hide it away from us. Hence, it precludes 
and erases the very possibility of the dialogue between two movements: 
towards the inside and towards the outside. In this sense, the veil is 
a negation of outline which, as a meeting place, constitutes a common 
territory of the inside and outside. Blake takes great pains to distinguish 
between the outline which can become a circumference and the veil 
which is "the Mundane Shell”  or "N et” :
And as Albion built his frozen Altars, Los built the Mundane Shell 
In the Four Regions of Humanity, East & West & North & South,
Till Norwood & Finchley & Blackheath & Hounslow cover’d the whole Earth. 
This is the Net & Veil of Vala among the Souls of the Dead. (J. K, 671).
A  more detailed description of the same process is given in third 
chapter of Jerusalem:
For the Veil of Vala, which Albion cast into the Atlantic Deep 
To catch the Souls of the Dead, began to Vegetate & Petrify 
Around the Earth of Albion among the Roots of his Tree.
This Los formed into the Gates mighty Wall between the Oak 
Of weeping & the Palm of Suffering beneath Mundane Shell,
The habitation of the Spectres of the Dead, & the Place 
Of Redemption & of awakening again into Eternity. (K, 691).
The dialectic of the veil consists in a movement from the sense of 
freedom to the sense of the loss of freedom, where there is a clear nos- 
talgy for both the past ("awakening again”) and the future ("awakening 
again” ). The veil is the interval between these two stages, between awak­
ening and again, a necessary caesura between a mark and its repetition. 
In other words, the veil constitutes the edge of now along which the
material is folded facing itself in the movement of repetition, réinscription. 
To put it concisely, the veil is the nostalgy for the past reanacted in the 
future.
Nevertheless, the veil/fold is not free of a fundamental ambiguity: 
on the one hand, it is limited and associated with death (it is used "to 
catch the Souls of the Dead” ) on the other hand, however, it is "the 
beautiful Mundane Shell” where the adjective qualifies its character as 
very distant from pure illusion and distortion. A  similar ambiguity is 
detected in the contrast of the "N et” and "habitation” which entails the 
play of the "homely” and "uncanny” , and both versions of this am­
biguity (death and beauty, domestication and uncanniness) are read into 
the very structure of the veil which is the eternalization of time. This 
is another analogy instrumental in the mechanism of veiling and unveil­
ing: a possibility of eternity suddenly revealing itselt in the temporal 
universe (cf. "Eternity is in love with the productions of time’’, MHH. 
K, 151) Thus, the veil is that between which separates two spans of 
eternity and, as such, carries in it an understanding of time as dreaming 
of eternity.
As Blaike’s disdain for the secretariat, bureaucracy, and institutiona­
lized religion, informs us the veil is also another name for the unexpected 
turn taken by the evolution of writing which, although designed as a mo­
de of transmitting laws (i.e. as a democratic influence in the society) 
suddenly found itself in a position of the essential instrument of overrid­
ing power. Writing is the veil, the between, separating the elite from the 
people. These are Derrida’s comments upon Warburton’s essay:
It is as if a catastrophe had perverted this truth of nature: a writing made 
to manifest, serve, and preserve knowledge —  for custody of meaning, the 
repository of learning and the laying out of the archive —  encrypts itself, 
becoming secret and reserved, diverted from common usage, esoteric. Natu­
rally destined to serve the communication of laws and the order of the city 
transparently a writing becomes the instrument of an abusive power, of 
a caste of "intellectuals” that is 'this ensuring hegemony, Whether, its own or 
that of special interests: the violence of a secretariat, a discriminating re­
serve, an effect of scribble and scrypt. This perversion is described as the 
violent effect of "veil”.75
The procès of uncovering, unveiling of a truth which was a descriptive 
way of dealing with truth as alëtheia, can also be interpreted in Blake’s 
terms as the interplay of dreaming and awakening, fallennes and re­
demption.
The veil, although superficially it can be explained away as "the 
film  of matter which covers all reality”76, circumscribes also an area whe­
re a possible breaking of that film, a tentative gap, a potential fissure, 
can take place. Since a rupture of the veil also occurs in and on the tex­
ture of the veil itself, what is glimpsed on the other side also belongs to the 
veil. The split in the veil demarcates that moment and place where eter­
nity mixes, commingles with the veil, constitutes one whole with it; thus, 
the veil is "[...] the place of Redemption of awakening again into Etern­
ity” . The veil speaks of the impossibility of life without and outside the 
veil.
It is easy to distinguish between two ways of understanding the very 
term "ve il” in Blake’s writings: to start with, it appears as a disguise 
which masks the reality by means of a "bad writing” , a dead letter of 
the Law:
He drew the Veil of Moral Virtue, woven for Cruel Laws,
And cast it into the Atlantic Deep to catch the Souls of the Dead (J. K, 646)
Thundering the Veil rushes from his hand, Vegetating Knot by Knot, Day 
by Day, Night by Night; loud roll the indignant Atlantic Waves & the Eryth- 
rean, turning up the bottoms of the Deeps. (J. K, 648).
The Law is described in more details in The Everlasting Gospel where it 
functions as the epitome of the old, restrictive moral code:
He [Jesus] laid his Hand on Moses’s Law:
The Ancient Heavens, in Silent Awe 
Writ with Curses from Pole to Pole,
A ll away began to roll. (K, 754).
On the other hand, however, the veil seems to be not only a letter 
inscribed upon a stone, but also makes its presence felt as the very tex­
ture of human existence, as a surface upon which a letter is written or 
engraved. Thus, a dream of the veil is a dream of uniting what W AS 
with what W IL L  BE in a kind of grammatical and philosophical space and 
time of W IL L  HAVE BEEN. The veil functions as an interval which 
dreams such a myth of unity, although it incessantly reinscribes itself in 
the space that separates one from the other. The veil is a folded desire 
of consummation. In Jerusalem Blake identifies the folds and the veil, 
and what is more interesting, mediates the two terms with the concept 
of "Cherubim” :
[...] Daughters of A lb ion  W eave the W eb 
O f Ages Generations, fo ld ing un fo ld ing it lik e  a V e il o f Cherubim. (J. K , 693)
„Cherubim” apart from their angelic connotations also introduce the 
subject of human sexuality. The "Veil of Cherubim” is this border terri­
tory which, separating the male from the female, prepares the way for 
a union of the two:
I discover thy secret places. Cordelia! I behold
Thee whom I thought pure as the heavens in innocence & fear,
Thy Tabernacle taken down, thy secret Cherubim disclosed. (J. K, 644).
In another passage a reading of the veil as the female sex organ is even 
more explicit, but —  simultaneously —  it is more profoundly trapped in 
a never attainable desire for consummation and fulfillment:
In Beulah the Female lets down her beautiful Tabernacle
Which the Male enters magnificent between her Cherubim
And becomes One with her, mingling, condescending in Self-love
The Rocky Law  of Condemnation & double Generation & Death. (J. K, 656).
What is revealed in the passage is the veil, the hymen, as a myth of 
Oneness, as the identification of desire and consummation which is com­
prised by a réinscription of division and difference: in the moment of 
a supposed fulfillment the sttructure of a fissure reappears, a redoubling 
of dispersion, a version of the distance which prevents the partners of 
a dialogue concentrating instead on "Self-love” . The world of generation 
is an inherently divided world, and Blake carefully underscores that the 
distinction between the two sexes is of crucial importance:
To Create a World of Generation from the World of Death,
Dividing the Masculine & Feminine, for the comingling 
Of Albion’s & Luvah’s Spectres was Hermaphroditic. (J. K, 690).
Entering, a sexual process of gratification of one’s desire, is shown as 
illusive since it introduces the man into a further distance and, tearing 
of the veil, breaking of the hymen, is demonstrated to be just an unfold­
ing of another fold, a reinstatement of the veil and the hymen. The figure 
of a hermaphrodite is significant as the one which in a clear way points 
out a tentative character of the union which, while seemingly removing 
the difference (between the sexes), emphasizes its existence by the im­
possibility of the final consummation. A  hermaphrodite is a suspension 
of desire under the pretence of unity which, as a matter of fact, un­
dercuts the very possibility of fulfillment of this desire. To demonstrate 
the intricacy of Blake’s concept of the veil it is good to set it together 
with Flaxman’s reading of the same motif. In the second lecture on 
sculpture Flaxman presents the "ve il of the tabernacle [...] adorned with 
cherubim” as a marlk of approbation given to artists who are, unlike in 
Blake, "the ministers of God’s providence, or the guardians of His Holy 
Laws” . Eventually, Flaxman reads the veil simply as a sign of the final 
impotence of art and artists who can pride themselves in their status of 
"the handmaids of religion” .77
In Blake’s interpretation the veil is a territory which mingles the 
opposites but which, at the same time, introduces itself between them.
Analogically, the veil mixes up what W AS and the future, but places 
itself as an apposition to both: it is neither the memory o f the past, nor 
the intuition of the future.
The shortest definition of the veil would hold that the veil is the 
between. To enter means not so much to be inside, but to be entre, to 
be between. This is a problem that draws Derrida’s attention in his Mal­
larmé essay:
[...] the hymen, the confusion between the present and the nonpresent, along 
with all the indifferences it entails within the whole series of opposites [...] 
produces the effect of a medium as element enveloping both terms 
at once; a medium located between the two terms. It is an operation that 
both sows confusion between opposites and stands between the opposites at 
once. What counts here is the between, the in-betweenness of the hymen. 
The hymen takes place in the "inter-”, in the spacing between desire and 
fulfillment, between perpetration and its recollection.78
The veil as betweenness oscillates in the spectrum designated by 
two possibilities: it is a film  concealing reality and, at the same time, it 
unconceals reality as nothing else than the film. The veil as a hymen 
can be penetrated, but the penetration is far from final since all it leads 
to is more folds; entering is to tear the veil in order to be envelopped by 
more folds of the veil, to be caught entre. Hence, a sexual union is both 
consummated and unfulfilled, the central point, the final signified is ne­
ver reached, and the penetration is shown as a movement from one veil 
to another:
A lb ion  hath en ter’d the Loins, the place o f the Last Judgment,
An d  Lu vah  hath drawn the Curtains around A lb ion  in V a la ’s bosom.
The Dead awake to Generation ! A r ise  o Lord , &  rend the v e il! (J. K , 656).
Penetration,' entering, breaking of the hymen, insemmination, turn 
out to be consecutive stages of the movement of tearing the film  which, 
on the one hand, opens another fold in front of the penetrator and knits 
back the wound in the veil behind him, on the other. One could say that 
the veil VEILS itself, and penetration is nothing else but a constant 
dream of the floating curtains; the fold folds itself once again (a con­
ception of something new, original) becomes a dissemination (a repetition, 
re-marking of the same).
Blake’s hesitant and dialectic approach towards virginity is an ex­
tension of the problematic of the veil. Virginity is destroyed by a grati­
fication of a desire (Blake warns that we should not be mislead by "pale 
religious lechery” to call "that virginity that wishes but acts not” MHi?. 
K, 160), but the act of penetration is a healing of the amorous wound in 
the hymen, as it reinstates virginity, restores the hymen, introduces 
another between to overcome. Hence, Oothoon having been raped by
Bromion still considers herself a virgin and, it is interesting to note, the 
language of her virginity has a marked sexual overtone, as it is a lan­
guage of the hymen which endlessly reproduces itself. Juxtaposing herself 
to Theotormon who seeks "this hypocrite modesty” , Oothoon "is not so” :
[...] a virgin fill’d with virgin fancies 
Open to joy and delight where ever beauty appears;
If in the morning sun I find it, there my eyes are fix ’d 
In happy copulation; if in evening mild, wearied with work,
Sit on a bank and draw the pleasures of this free born joy. (V D A . K, 194).
Virginity interpreted, as Northrop Frye suggests, as an "attempt to erase 
every »stain« of sexual suggested in the Gospels” 79, is a misreading of the 
idea of virginity which, first of all, inscribes itself in the pattern of Blake’s 
thought where the active is always given the priority over the pas­
sive, but —  mode profoundly —  it tries to attain purity by means of the 
inadmissible short-cuts, trying in vain to disregard the inevitable detour of 
the "road of excess” . Virginity as a "happy copulation” is embedded in 
the problem of a self-repetition of sign, of the fold, of the veil. Derrida 
(despite a fundamental difference which prevents him from allowing for 
the existence of the transcendental signified) speaks in the same way of 
the fold which is but a metaphoric figure for writing (écriture) with its 
endless movement of signifiers:
The fold is simultaneously virginity, what violates virginity, and the fold 
which, being neither one nor the other and both at once, undecidable, remains 
as a text, irreducibe to either of its two senses, it.,.] But in the same blow 
[...] the fold ruptures the virginity it marks as virginity. Folding itself over 
its secret (and nothing is more virginal and at the same time more purloined 
■ and penetrated, already in and of itself, than a secret) it looses the smooth 
simplicity of its surface. It differs from itself, even before the letter opener 
can separate the lips of the book.80
The "lips of the book” are not only a mouth that speaks, but also labia 
of the female sex organ, the "tabernacle” and Jerusalem’s "secret places” . 
Thus, the veil is enveloped in a complex problematic of the distinction 
between illusion and reality, male and female, time and eternity etc., 
but all these contrasts stem from this basic spacing between two marks, 
two signs, that constitutes writing by, simultaneous, putting them toge­
ther and spacing, splitting them apart. The veil is another name of diffe­
rence.
This movement between tearing the film  and its inexorable restora­
tion is markedly present in Blake. Thus, love is depicted as an embrace 
which tears, rends, the veil:
Albion lov’d thee; he renit thy Veil: he embrac’d thee: lov’d thee! (J. K. 643)
[...] that Veil which Satan puts between Eve & Adam  
[...] a Veil that Saviour born & dying rends. (J. K, 686)
Hence the Infernal Veil grows in the disobedient Female,
Which Jesus rends & the whole Druid Law  removes away [...] (J. K, 708).
The erotic is synonymous with the act of "rending” , tearing apart of the 
"Infernal Veil” of inscription (the Law "removed away” ) and, apparent­
ly, of doing away with distance ("embrace” ), dispensing with writing 
which is, in all its forms, cutting and splitting. John Evelyn in his 
Sculptura provides us with a long list of various materials used for writ­
ing only to conclude in a most Derridian mode:
But whether in all these, or whatever the subjects were [...] it was still my 
Insculping, Scarrifying, and making a kind of incision into it
Nevertheless, the act of tearing, breaking the hymen, the veil, is accom­
panied by a countermovement towards a healing of the wound, knitting 
up the rent. Thus, Albion obsessed with the idea of sin complains of 
the nakedness of Gwendolen and Ragan, and unchastity of Vala:
All is Eternal Death unless you can weave a chaste 
Body over an unchaste Mind! Vala! O that thou wert pure!
That the deep wound of sin might be clos’d up with the Needle 
And with the Loom, to cover Gwendolen & Ragan with costly Robes 
Of Natural Vitrue, for their Spiritual forms without a Veil 
Wither in Luva’s Sepulcher. (J. K, 643).
What Albion refers to as "the deep wound of sin” is a result of a double 
illusion: firstly, there hides a profound misunderstanding of the idea of 
sin and virginity usually read into the immaculate conception of Christ, 
the idea of sin originally present in a sex act which, according to Blake, 
"makes a Virgin Birth essential to the divinity of Jesus and which is 
founded upon a misunderstanding”82; secondly, the wound expresses well 
a paradoxical nature of writing, of écriture —  it opens the way for a pe­
netration but, at the same time, it knows that a penetration is impossible 
because the movement of rending is constantly controlled by stitching up 
of the rent. Albion does not seem to be aware that the optative mood of 
his pronouncement has already been made true, that there has never 
been anything else but such a steady interplay of a knife, a sword, 
a pen, of tearing up blankness of skin and incessant healing, closing up 
of the perspective behind the movement of those sharp devices.
John Evelyn quotes the French name of etching and its instrument, 
the name which openly supports Blake’s terminology of the "amorous 
theft”  or "deep wound of sin” , a mixture of the erotic and the criminal:
The French call it in particular Taille  douce, Sweet or tender cut.83
It is only logical, then, that a wound is dealt ("cut” ), healed, ani 
desired ("tender” ) at the same time. A  curtain is momentarily spaced out 
to close again, the veil displays the inside which turns out to be only 
a version of the outside, and such a procedure becomes the very structu­
re of existence. We have nothing but a constant readjustement of the 
veil which envelops us like in swaddles or a shroud ("In  the Veil I fold 
my dying Limbs” , J. K, 646). Hence, the veil is subject to at least three 
qualifications:
1. It is treated as an obstacle, but an obstacle of the absolutely ne­
cessary type, a hindrance which cannot be simply overcome and closed.
2. This obstacle is, at the same time, dangerous and beautiful, thus 
free of an unequivocal evaluation.
3. It becomes a place where the contrast (inside/outside, good/bad, 
illusion/reality) meet, where "Contraries mutually Exist” (they do not 
exclude each other) or call each other out. It is made possible by Blake’s 
doctrine of Contraries and Negations according to which " I f  thou sepa­
rate from me, thou art a Negation, a mere Reasoning and Derogation 
from me” (J. K, 639) which brings us to the conclusion that the veil is 
the very texture of life. L ife  does not exist without the veil. A ll these 
points appear in the following passage from Jerusalem:
My Soul is melted away, inwoven within the Veil.
Hast thou again knitted the Veil of Vala which I for thee 
Piltyiing rent in ancient times? I see it whole it whole and more 
Perfect and shining with beauty! (K, 645).
Of special interest is the first line where Blake, by locking human life in 
the texture of the veil, inscribes it within his constant predicament con­
stituted by the voiced belief in the sartorial character of reality hiding 
"the Naked Beauty” , and the intuited suspicion that the veil, the gar­
ment, is all that is accessible to us. As we can see, Blake not only rejects 
the concept of truth as agreement but also he seemes to, surruptitiously, 
doubt in the possibility of truth as aletheia; if the veil is the element of 
life, then what it can display when rent is only more veil. Although des­
perately clinging to the notion of "Naked Beauty” , to the image of reali­
ty  different from the ''Vegetable world” , Blake sees a possibility of such 
a world where the signified is separated from its signifier by a long 
detour, by an endless wandering of signifiers. This, as Derrida has notic­
ed, largely undermines truth as unveiling of a thing, as aletheia:
The white veil that slips between the blanks, the spacing that guarantees 
both the gap and the contact, enables us no doubt to see the blanks; it de­
termines them. It could therefore never be lifted without blinding us to 
death, either by closing or bursting. But inversely, if it were never lifted, if 
the hymen remained sealed, the eye would still have no greater capacity to. 
The hymen, therefore, is not the truth of an unveiling. There is no aletheia 
only a wink of hymen. A  rhytmie fall. A  regular (w)inclined cadence.84
In the discussion between Jerusalem and Albion in the first chapter 
of Jerusalem Blake would also concede to the inevitability of the veil 
as the existential element of man; the veil is necessary since we cannot 
distinguish our life from it, and the only choice seems to be between va­
rious kinds of the net:
Why should Punishment Weave the Veil with Iron Wheels of War 
When Forgiveness might it Weave with Wings of Cherubim? (J. K, 645).
The verb that usually describes a mode of production of the veil is 
to "weave” :
[...] beautiful net of gold and silver twine, thou hadst woven it with art 
(J. K, 643);
[...] the Veil of Mortal Virtue, woven for Cruel Laws (J . K, 692);
Other Daghters Weave on the Cushion & Pillow Network fine (J. K, 692); 
[...] till the Victim rend the woven Veil [...] (J. K, 701)
Once, in a long fragment of the Plate 67, the same verb is used in 
reference to the life-forming process which has already been announced 
in the line about the soul "inwoven in the Veil” :
[...] and they drew out from the Rocky Stones
Fibres of Life to Weave, for every Female is a Golden Loom. (J. K, 704).
Weaving as the mode of production of the veil introduces two moments 
of critical importance for Blake’s theory of truth. First, it implies a sche­
me of general interrelatedness present in the work in which all threads 
have to be interwoven ("Everything in the text is interwoven”85 claims 
Derrida) to form a coherent whole.
Second, if this is the case then it becomes impossible to find a be­
ginning of the work, to demarcate a place or a zone where a given tex­
tile, gauze, veil, begins. If everything is interconnected, and particular 
threads function as a veil to each other (i.e. the "guarantee both the gap 
and the contact”), if everything is stitched together, then what we have
in front of us is a game, a play of elements without a starting, final, or
central point. Such a situation is considered by Derrida to be the impossi­
bility of totalization resulting from writing as a fundamental feature of 
language:
If totalization no longer has any meaning it is [...] because the nature of
the [...] language [...] excludes totalization. This field is in effect that play,
that is to say, a field of infinite substitutions only because it is finite, that 
is to say, because instead of being an inexhaustible field, instead of being 
too large, there is something missing from it: a center which arrests and 
grounds the play of substitutions [...] this movement of play, permitted by 
the lack or absence of a center or origin, is the movement of supplementa- 
rity.8S
The veil is enveloped in the problematic of supplementarity, i.e. of in­
terpretation which is deprived of the unequivocal destination point, 
since to "supplement” means not only to replace, but also to add some­
thing new to an old scheme. Supplementarity is a game of replacement, 
and —  in Blake’s terms —  human life melted into a pattern of threads 
enwrapped in the veil becomes a life without a center, an everlasting 
detour. L ife  without a center is a reformulation of a thesis that claims 
that life is another version of writing, anoither reading of écriture. Derri­
da convincingly quotes a fragment from Littre ’s dictionary in which, 
having shown the etymology of the word "to weave” , the lexicographer 
states that "in that long ago era when writing was unknown, most of 
the words used to designate a poetic composition were borrowed from 
the art of the weaver, the builder, etc.”87
The veil which is woven is the veil which is played, and which plays 
at the same time; we are caught in the play of the veil. According to 
Derrida, a play is constituted by the absence of a center, that is to say, 
by the nonpresence of a sanction which would impose its rules upon the 
field of a play from the outside. A  play remains a play as long as it is 
self-oriented and self-governed. Spontaneity of human reaction so strong­
ly  emphasized by Blake is congruent with the idea of the game the mode 
of which
[...] is that of spontaneous act, of vital impulse. Play is, as it were, existence 
centered in itself. The motivation of play does not coincide with that of other 
human activities.88
Nevertheless, the transcendental shines all the time through the Vegetable 
world. On the one hand, Blake seems to accept the self-centeredness of 
the play, but this is counterbalanced by an explicit tendency towards 
a breaking of the shell, towards seeing THROUGH not W ITH  the eye.
A  difference between the two prepositions makes all the difference 
between the two philosophies: one which agress upon a movement of 
signifiers circling within the magic boundary of the play, and the other 
which tries to establish a clear-cut relationship of priority of the trans­
cendental signified over a chain of signifiers. Thus, we w ill have a philo­
sophy of "eternity in love with the productions of time” complemented 
by a theory of material things being images of eternal truths. Blake, very 
far from underestimating a role of the material universe, sees its func­
tion precisely as a signifier of the signified transcendental reality:
The connoisseurs and artists who have made objections to Mr. B ’s mode of 
representing spirits with real bodies, would do well to consider that the 
Venus, the Minerva, the Jupiter, the Apollo, which they admire in Greek 
statues are all of them representations of spiritual existencies, of Gods 
immortal, to the mortal perishing organ of sight [...], (DesCat. K, 576).
Blake codes in his productions a desire for originality ("spiritual 
existences” ) which is another version ■ of the Golden Age which demar­
cates a beginning of the degradation of huimanity. Although very cri­
tically biased against Rousseau, Blake repeats the French philosopher’s 
tendency towards reinstating the origin, the source, without which human 
thinking becomes nostalgic and decentered. The world, as Blake sees it, 
is 1) a steady retracing of the phenomena to their origin, and 2) a mo­
vement .towards a reestablishment of the place that has been originary 
ascribed to them:
1. All had originally one language and one religion [...]. (DesCat. K, 579) 
Greek Fables originated in Spiritual Mysitedy & Real Visions. (L.J. K, 605)
2. Human power cannot go beyond either what he does, or what they have 
done; it is the gift God, it is inspiration and vision. (Des Cat. K, 579). 
The human mind cannot go beyond the gift of God, the Holy Ghost. 
(DesCat. K, 579).
The regularity of these two movements is, however, disturbed by 
a theory of contraries which emphasizes a relative character of certain 
fundamental concepts, thus alluding to the Golden Age as escaping ra­
tionalistic categories ("Without Contraries is no Progression” , M M M [ 
K, 149). The Golden Age desribed as "the religion of Jesus” (DesCat. 
K, 579) is the origin, the source, and the beginning, still there lurks in 
this order a possibility of a further disorder, or an order of another kind, 
thus questioning the absolute character of the originary area. The rule 
of the moral code (Ten Commandements) are bracketed by the spontane­
ity of action, by impulse, i.e. by the play which is the element of discour­
se rejecting "a ll reference to a center, to a subject, to a provileged refe­
rence, to an origin, or to an absolute archia,” 89
12. The Unapproachable Center
Masks, or names.
The name makes it so; vocare est 
invocare. It’s all in a name. I ’m 
a noun, the schizophrenic girl said
—  Crazy Jane said —  noun, none, 
nun. I ’m a nomen or no man; my 
name is no man, Odysseus, Every­
man, said.
—  Norman O. Brown, Love ’s Body
When Blake claims that "no virtue can exist without breaking these 
ten commandements. Jesus was all virtue, and acted from impulse, not 
from rules” (M H H . K, 158), he attracts our attentiom to the presence of 
the origin (Jesus), but, at the same time, he questions the objective all-
-encompassing character of such a center by reducing it to the sphere of 
impulses, i.e. by translating a center into a language of a decentered 
individual. Such a transition from the generalizing center to the particu­
larizing individual inscribes itself within the development of writing 
which, from the sacred script, evolved towards a more democratic form 
o f notation. Hence, it is noticeable in ancient Greece that
[...] sales, bequests, keeping of accounts and registration of contracts and 
trade ties followed the spread of writing. A  commercial class opposed land­
owners and the nobility and supported individualism and the rise of ty­
rants.90
We ought to carefully steer away from confusing Blake’s insistence 
upon particulars with the economy-induced individualism which was but 
a mutation of the old, hieratic centralism, and thus it is far from coinici- 
dence that Urizen, Blake’s God of oppression, is a tyrant and a God of 
writing at the same time. Blake presents here the last phase of the evo­
lution of writing which, as historical documentation suggests, spreads slow­
ly from the domain of economy to master finally even the sphere of re­
ligion. This is what René Labat finds in his research on a role of writing 
in ancient Mesopotamia:
[...] cette évolution est accélérée par la generalisation progressive de l ’écritu­
re. De l ’économie, elle gagne successivement d’autre domaines: le notariat 
d’abord, vers 2600, pour les contracts de vents et achats, ou plus exactement 
d’échange; puis, vers 2400 le domaine du droit, sous forme de jugements, de 
procès, de promulgation de lois... Le domaine re lig ieux  et proprement litté ­
raire est le dernier que les scribes conquièrent sur la tradition orale.91
The very word center which lies at the very heart of Derrida’s sys­
tem, makes its appearance also in Blake’s writings where it is originally 
associated with Luvah, and consequently it relates to music, love, desire, 
moon, heart, and nostrils. In the first chapter of Jerusalem, a "center” 
is first presented as operating in the system of the four directions, "Four 
Points” :
And the Four Points are thus beheld in Great Eternity:
West, the Circumference: South, the Zenith: North,
The Nadir: East, the Centex, unapproachable for ever.
These are the Four Faces towards the Four Worlds of Humanity 
In every Man. (K, 632).
A  qualification of the center as "unapproachable for ever” signifies 
two things: (1) it is shown as present, as a source of material existence 
("The Vegetative Universe opens like a flower from the Earth’s center 
in which is Eternity” , J. K, 633); but (2) its presence is only intuited. 
Since it cannot be attained the center translates itself from the spatial
categories into the language of time, Eternity lies in the center to the 
degree to which it institutes the direction of a neverending march, in­
cessant movement towards the center which, thus, acquires a character 
of the horizon. We have, then, two translations involved in the way Blake 
understands "center” : first, from the language of space into the lan­
guage of time, second —  from a peculiar type of a spatial orientation
that may be described as centripetal (a "center” as a central point located 
in the middle into a centrifugal movement) a "center as a horizon. In this
wise, the center, at the same time, articulates and disarticulates itself, is
simultaneously absent and present, is thé origin of which we know but 
which we cannot achieve, reconstruct; thus, it becomes a nonoriginary 
origin, the one that functions as its own myth, its own sign born in and 
out of distance and, as such, it can be only a trace of the origin. As 
Derrida puts it:
From the moment that, the sign appears, that is to say from the very begin­
ning, there is no chance of encountering anywhere the purity of "reality”, 
"unicity”, "singularity”.92
A  movement towards the center is not only never-ending, but also it 
has all the symptoms of a fall. In Blake’s cosmology the "chaotic” four 
universes surrounding the Mundane Egg start a rapid degradation when 
they are compelled to move towards the Center:
But when Luvah assum’d the World of Urizen to the South
And Albion was slain upon his mountains & in his tent,
All fell towards the Center in dire ruin sinking down. (M . K , 500)
Similarly, in Jerusalem where only the word order is different ("A ll 
fe ll towards the Center, sinking downwards in dire ruin” , K, 691). The 
fall leaves in the North "solid Darkness Unfathomable without end” 
(K, 691), and the Center itself loses its traditional requisites of radiance 
and shining and becomes (1) darkened, (2) dislocated. In both cases, while 
still functioning as a center, it is deprived of its fundamental status of 
the originator; a center is its own shadow, and appears as a bracketed 
center.
1. Albion’s Circumference was clos’d: his Center began dark’ning Into the 
Night of Beulah, and the Moon of Beulah rose Clouded with storms. 
CJ. K , 642)
2. In a sweet vale shelter’d with cedars, that eternal stretch
Their unmov’d branches, stood the hall, built when the moon shot forth 
In that dread night when Urizen call’d the stars round his feet;
Then burst the Cnter from its orb, and found a place beneath. (Am. 
K, 204)
Further characteristics of the center include (3) selfishness (a center as 
centralization), and expansionism (4) (a center as a form of monstrosity, 
a polypus).
3. What is Above is Within, for every-thing in Eternity is translucent:
The Circumference is Within, Without is formed the Selfish Center,
And the Circumference still expands going forward to Eternity,
And the Center has Eternal Etates; these States we now explore. 
(J. K, 709)
The center is not only qualified as "selfish” , but it acquires a malevol­
ent immobility: while the circumference expands, the center remains fold­
ed upon itself along the edge of error. The center becomes the seat of 
"Eternal States” , that is to say o f the frozen island of error through 
which a man has to struggle his way. Not only is the center degraded to 
a domain of error, but also it loses somehow a central location and be­
comes a transit area through which the man moves. What we have then 
is rather a chain of "centers” , a horizon of immovable points demarcat­
ing the existential itinerary of the man ("Man Passes on, but States re­
main for Ever; he passes through them like a traveller” , LJ. K, 606).
In (4) the center is demonstrated to be a product of Selfhood and its 
expansion in the form of a monster. The passage to follow, in its use of 
words referring to a production of organs of the body and the termino­
logy reminiscent of a biological gestation, helps to present the center as 
a process, a place, a womb where the unnatural being is gestated, hatch­
ed, and finally born:
So spoke the Spectre to Albion: he is the Great Selfhood,
Satan, Worship’d as God by the Mighty Ones of the Earth,
Having a white Dot call’d a Center, from which branches out 
A Circle in continual gyrations: this became a Heart 
From which sprang numerous branches varying their motions,
Producing many heads, three or seven or ten, & hand & feet 
Innumerable at will of the unfortunate contemplator
Who becomes his food: such is the way of the Devouring Power. (J. K, 659).
The center in (4) is a place from where the unnatural birth dominates 
and expands over the whole universe. The process of "branching out” of 
the "polypus” , of an amorphous creature deprived of a circumference 
and outline extends in a long line of monstrous birthgivings: "a white 
Dot” produces a Circle, this gives a "Heart” which, in turn, produces 
"numerous branches” , and they branch out again into "innumerable 
Heads” . A  deadly character of such a delivery is exemplified in another 
text where Blake identifies the unnameable and formless creature, some­
thing that Derrida calls a "terrifying form of monstrosity” 93, with death:
The Empyrean groan’d throughout. A ll Eden was darken’d.
The Corpse of Albion lay on the Rock; the Sea of Time Space
Beat round the Rock in mighty Waves, as a Polypus
That vegetates beneath the Sea, the limbs of Man vegetated
In monstrous forms of Death, a Human polypus of Death (FZ. K, 304).
Blake’s "monstrous forms of Death" expresses the degradation com­
ing from a Satanic center and contains in itself a major breakthrough in 
philosophy which unexpectedly started to see a danger present in the 
center, but still makes use of this concept not only with a view  of certain 
philosophical nostalgy but, first of all, hoping to elevate "monstrous 
forms" to the level of the spiritual.
Derrida’s "terrifying form of monstrosity" with which he closes his 
famous essay on Structure, Sign, and Play is a reaction to, and a des­
cription of, a situation where the center has been eventually erased, or 
—  more strongly —  where the center has been demonstrated to have ne­
ver existed. Hence, Derrida’s phrase inscribing itself between the Nietz- 
schean acceptation and Rousseaistic refusal of "a world of signs [...] w i­
thout truth, and without origin”94 renders the center thoroughly impossi­
ble. If, for Blake, a maternal womb was the place of unity and the act 
of delivering a child was interrupting this unity, still there was a radical 
innocence present in the infant. Monstrosity is, in Blake, a form of Death 
which has to be elevated to life with the dramatic ambiguity, maiiked or. 
better, re-marked nonpresence of the origin, of the center in the back­
ground.
For Derrida monstrosity is the only form possible, since the process 
of delivery never stops, maternal womb never fu lly ceases to bear the 
child, in the same manner as a signifier never identifies with its signi­
fied. Thus, the Derridian „form  of monstrosity” refers rather to the pro­
cess than to the product; the umbilical cord, placenta, and the waters 
are more radically present in Derrida’s version of the childbirth than the 
infant itself. Thus, while in Blake a child remains nameless as a sign for 
its innocence, a relative closeness to the original source of Being, in Der­
rida namelessness of the suckling marks its nonoriginality, nonspecifica­
tion, muteness: the child is there to the extent to which it is dramatically 
interwoven with its mother’s organism. Significantly, while in Blake’s 
obstetrics the child is finally named with a name of an existential mood, 
in Derrida the child remains nameless, preserves its status of a non-child:
"I have no name:
I am but two days old”.
What shall I call thee?
"I happy am,
"Joy is my name”.
Sweet joy befall thee! (SI. K, 118)
Blake’s minimum of the name is preserved in the belief, typical of the 
poet, that it is possible to establish an individual character of an essent 
without, however, submitting it to the fu lly individualized, personalized 
economy of the written name. Henri Lévy-Bruhl in his essay on L ’écritu­
re et le droit emphasizes the fact that a written name usurps the place 
of the person and becomes the closest modern continuation of the magical 
practices which unite
[...] la personne au nom qu’elle porte Ainsi s’expliguerâit que l’écriture... 
ait pu créer à l’éncontre d’une personne une malédiction qui, en vertu d’un 
processus bien connu de laïcisation du droit, se serait progressivement muée 
en une damnation ayant perdu son character religieux pour etre désormais 
sanctionée par la loi civile.95
Derrida’s version of the childbearing process differs considerably, 
although both are ponderings upon life as a form of monstrosity:
Here there is a kind of question [...] whose conception, formation, gestation, 
and labor we are only catching a glimpse of today. I employ these words, 
I admit, with a glance towards those who, in a society from which I do not 
exclude myself, turn their eyes away when faced by the as yet unnameable 
which is proclaiming itself and which can do so, as is necessary whenever 
a birth is in the offing, only under the species of the nonspecies, in the form­
less, mute, infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity.96
15. Drawing. Mimesis as an Ontological Gesture
Quand j ’écris le mot "vin” avec de 
l ’encre celle-ci ne tient pas le rôle 
essentiel, mais permet la fixation 
durable de l’idée de vin. L ’encre 
contribue ainsi à nous assurer du 
vin en permanence. Écrir et dessi­
ner sont identiques en leur fond.
—  Paul Klee, Philosophie de la 
Creation
[...] le dessin est au centre de mon 
concept. Je veux parler du dessin 
qui existe à l ’interieur même de ma 
peinture.
—  Barnett Newman interviewed by 
Dorothy Seckler
Since Blake himself says "Enough, or too much’’ (K, 152), and "you 
never know what is enough unless you know what is more than enough” 
(K, 152), his definition of life must be based on a kind of surplus. A  life 
seen within the horizon of the copy elevated to the original, a sexual 
union aufgehoben to virginity, is a reduplication of itself, is an endless
repetition, self-commentary of a phenomenon upon itself. What is per­
ceived from the outside as life is only an excess o f life within a phenome­
non, this life in what Blake calls "Corporeal Vegetation” is a surplus of 
life in "Eternity” :
In Eternity one Thing never Changes into another Thing. Each 
Identity is Eternal [...] Eternal Identity is one thing Corporeal 
Vegetation is another thing. (LJ. K, 607).
Thus, an object is in Blake’s theory seen constantly against the back­
ground of the eternal "Identity” , that is to say, is foregrounded as rooted 
in eternity, is a changeable extension of the unchangeable original. One 
could define a thing as a movement from the stability of Eternity to­
wards the instability of the earth, although such a movement can never 
be completed as it is measured precisely by the distance, by the between 
which separates the two regions. This between is the shortest definition 
of life in Blake’s philosophy which saw the existential process as growth, 
development, blossoming of a thing out of itself through the openness, 
a sudden rift in the unity, in the unnameable, in-different structure of 
Being. Thus, life is but a synonym of difference as played against the 
primeval, originary unity that foregrounds it.
This is how we can interpret aphorisms like "The apple tree never 
asks the beech how he shall grow; nor the lion, the horse, how he shall 
take his prey” (MHH. K, 152), or "The rat, the mouse, the fox, the rabbit 
watch the roots; the lion, the tiger, the horse, the elephant watch the 
fruits” (MHH. K, 151) summarized well in the famous ending of The
Marriage of Heaven and Hell: "One Law for the Lion & Ox is Oppress­
ion” (K, 151). In all these sentences a thing is present as a fulfillment of 
a process which brings a thing from Eternity to the material world. 
Characteristically enough, Eternity is viewed as the fullness of a given 
object, its anchoring in Being; Eternity is nothing else but a thing which 
flows from itself, i.e. it lies in the area that separates but at the same 
time joins the inside and the outside of a thing. Eternity, in Blake’s ca­
tegories, is an outlining of a thing, is uncovered in the movement of a line 
which draws a thing from Being, pulls a thing out of itself. This is 
how Meister Eckhart understands life as a fundamentally selfgenerating 
process traceable in a thing flowing out of itself:
Life means a certain overflow by which a thing welling up within itself,
first completely floods itself, each part of itself interpreting every other,
before it pours itself out and wells over into something external.37
Life is, then, caught in the process of self-emergence, self-multiplication, 
which is also how Heidegger sees it in his reconstruction of the old 
Greek concept of physis:
What does the word physis denote? It denotes self-blossoming emergence (e.g. 
the blossoming of a rose), opening up, .unfolding, that manifests itself in 
such unfolding and perseveres and endures in it; in short, the realm of 
things that emerge and linger on. According to the dictionary phyein means 
to grow or make to grow [...]. This opening up and inward-jutting-beyond- 
-itself must not be taken as a process among other processes that we observe 
in the realm of the essent. Physis is being itself, by virtue of which essents 
become and remain observable.98
We can see that both in Heidegger and the unusual fourteenth cen­
tury German thinker life is a certain double quality, of a thing: it is the 
ability, a mysterious tendency, to transcend itself, to call into existence 
an object which is and is not identical with a thing anchored in Eternity. 
L ife is inherently wrapped up in this awkward mimesis through which 
an object stands out from Being as external to itself while remaining 
profoundly rooted and related to its essence, to its "thingness” . Eckhart’s 
object which "wells within itself”  only to "w ell over into something 
external” is a more descriptive version of the same play of inside/outside 
Heidegger notices in elaborate formula "inward-jutting-beyond-itself” (in- 
-sich-aus-sich-hineinstehen). Such an ontological mimesis is far from me­
re copying since what it consists in is the significance of the between 
that seperates in-sich and aus-sich, a territory where both the essence o f 
a thing (a so called "original” ) and its externalization, its surplus (a "co­
py” ) belong, where they stand together.
As we can see, Blake’s ontological mimesis entails not a relationship 
between the copy and the original but a possibility of their union, of 
standing together in the act of growing, in physis. In other words, mi­
mesis, imitation, copying, ah act of pedagogical value Blake’s seven year 
apprenticeship with Basire is an act of recognition of, belongs to the region 
which is more powerful than man, and which precedes man as an indivi­
dual. In the ontological mimesis the copist and the object copied belong to­
gether in a common realm of Being. Hence the objection Blake raises 
against Reynolds and his concept of a forced independence which suppos­
edly, outrules and erases the dangers of copying viewed by Reynold as 
a debilitating and enslaving practice. Blake must have been annoyed by 
Reynolds’s insistence on the personality of the artist who is represented 
as a center of the aesthetic act, as one who imposes his own rules rather 
than, as Blake would believe it, one who is subject to the same juris­
diction as the object copied. Thus, Blake comments critically on Rey­
nolds’s dictum that "the man of true genius, instead of spending all his 
hours [...] in measuring statues and copying pictures, soon begins to thihk 
for himself [...]”  (K, 448).
Reynolds’s call for the artist’s independence is founded upon a signi­
ficant movement of the 18th century philosophy according to which only 
man’s intervention in nature can bring out its truth. In short, man is
a being in which nature obtains awareness of itself. Pope’s adage about 
"Nature methodiz’d” rings in the following fragment of one of the dis­
courses:
[...] he [artist] corrects nature by herself, her imperfect state by her more 
perfect. His eye being enabled to distinguish the accidental deficiencies [...] 
and deformities of things, from their general figures, he makes out an 
abstract idea of their forms more perfect than any one original [...]. This 
idea of the perfect state of nature, which the artist calls the Ideal Beauty it 
the great leading principle, by which works of genius are conducted. (R, 44)'.
This, howewer, is linked with the acceptation of a central point which 
can justify such a transition from a specific to abstract, ideal form. Only 
from such a privileged position is it possible to speak of, as Reynolds 
does, deficiencies and deformities of objects.
A  Platonic belief in the "central form” located outside a thing which 
is analysed, methodized, corrected separates Reynolds from Blake who 
limited his analysis to a thing itself erasing, in his theory of drawing, 
the division of outside/inside. In Discourse I I I  we read:
Thus it is from a reiterated experience and a close comparison of the objects 
in nature, that an artist becomes possessed of the idea of that central form. 
[...] from which every deviation is deformity. (R, 45).
As we can see the inevitable consequence of the central form theory 
is the idea of order which operates as an absolute law regulating factor 
in the world. The order suggested by Reynolds, worked out by man and 
imposed upon reality, is the effect of strictly listed procedures "digest­
ing, methodizing, and comparing our observations” (R, 44) and as such, 
is totally alien to things analysed and wholly dedicated to eliminating 
their most constitutive features. Reading Reynold’s instruction we cannot 
help thinking that his aesthetic theory defines a thing by overcoming, 
erasing differences between a given object and other things:
[...] the power of discovering what is deformed in nature, or in other words, 
what is particular and common, can be acquired only by experience; and the 
whole beauty and grandeur of the art consists [...] in being able to get above 
all singular forms, local customs, particularities, and details of every kind. 
(R, 44).
It is only logical, then, that Reynolds w ill relegate any painting 
which concentrates on differences, on the clear-cut outline to the level of 
lower, or ornamental style which tries "to exhibit the minute discrimi­
nations, which distinguish one object of the same species from another” , 
while the heroic style focuses on "nature in the abstract” , and represents 
in any object "the character of its species” . In other words, a thing is 
not a partner of man but is offered to him and his methodizing strate­
gies, does not enter into the ontological relationship with man, but 
exists outside him as a testing ground of his analysing cleverness.
A  difference between a mimesis as a mirroring procedure and a mi­
mesis as an ontological gesture lies in the status of the object which is 
copied. If, as Reynolds believes, such an object is given once and for all 
totally at our disposal, then object is merely a model, a prototype, radi­
cally external to the copist; if, however, the object appears as demanding 
our assertion, that is to say as a subject to our Care, then we do not 
remain outside it but are gathered together with it in something larger 
than either of us. What matters is a tension between the object copied 
and the copist, a tension which makes them different from one another, 
and still helps them to remain within a common field. In Blake’s terms 
such a strife is translated into a conflict and compatibility of "This” and 
"The World of Imagination” :
And I know that This World Is a World of Imagination & Vision. I see 
Every thing I paint in This World, but Every body does not see alike. To the 
Eyes of a Miser a Guinea is More beautiful than the Sun [...]. The tree which 
moves some to tears of joy is in the Eyes of others only a Green thing that 
stands in the way. Some See Nature all Ridicule & Deformity, & by these 
I shall not regulate my proportions; & Some Scarce see Nature at all. 
(K, 793).
Blake’s ontological mimesis implies a necessity of such a bridge between 
the seen and the unseen. Blake’s terse formula describing the consequen­
ces o f an expiry of such a strife is given a more elaborate treatment in 
Heideggers’s Introduction to Metaphysics where it is analysed in terms 
reminiscent of the Blakeian dychotomy of seeing W ITH  and THROUGH 
the eye:
Where struggle ceases, the essent does not vanish, but the world turns away. 
The essent is no longer asserted (i.e. preserved as such) Now it is merely 
found ready-made; it is datum. The end result is no longer that which is 
impressed liinita limits (i.e. placed in its form); it is merely finished and as 
such available to everyone, already there, no longer embodying any world — 
now man does as he pleases with what is available [...]. The original world- 
-making power, physis, degenerates into a prototype to be copied and imita­
ted. The original emergence and standing of energies [...] becomes a visibili­
ty of things thait are already there and can be pointed out. The eye, the 
vision, which originally projected into potency, becomes a mere looking over 
or gaping at. Vision has degenerated into mere optics.99
In this longish passage we immediately recognize places where Blakeian 
philosophy shines through in the clearing only slightly clouded and veil­
ed by another, more metaphysical, terminology. Heidegger’s opposition 
of an object "impressed into limits” and a mere "datum” is synonymous 
with Blake’s consistent claim that material objects are rooted in the ce­
lestial reality ("The roaring of lions, the howling of wolves, the raging 
of the stormy sea, and the destructive sword, are portions of Eternity, 
too great for the eye of man” , MHH. K, 151). Besides, the very phrase 
"impressed into limits” considers the lifegiving process of physis as a ge­
neration of lines, as a fundamental outlining of objects, that is to say, as 
asserting them through the power of a contour which draws the object 
from its maternal region of Being, tears it away from it, but at the same 
time provides it with life, makes it accessible to the human eye. A  hu­
man realization of physis is precisely this existential drawing where 
a double meaning of the verb to "draw” is carefully preserved: it 
"draws” , i.e. supplies a thing with a contour, and also "draws” it out of 
Being. Such a philosophy of drawing is close to Blake’s who, as we have 
already demonstrated not only proclaimed the aesthetic importance of 
the line, but also established a marked ontological-existential character 
of the outline. Hence, we move from aesthetics ("Every Line is the Line 
of Beauty” , PA. K, 603, which ought to be compared with Heidegger’s 
statement: "Beauty [Schönheit] is the highest way of Being, which 
means: pure emerging out of itself and shining [Scheinen], The oldest of 
the Greek thinkers said physis” 100), through a vision of life as the outlin­
ing power (Blake’s equivalent of physis as "self-blossoming emergence” : 
"The great and golden rule of art, as well as life, is this: that the more 
distinct, and wirey the bounding line, the more perfect the work of art” , 
DesCat. K, 585), to an all-inclusive concept of drawing as a meta-acti­
vity:
Painting is drawing on Canvas, & Engraving is drawing on Copper, &  Noth­
ing Else; & he who pretends to be either a Painter or Engraver without 
being a Master of drawing is an Imposter (PA . K, 594).
Drawing is Execution, & nothing Else, & he who draws best must be the 
best Artist (PA . K , 602).
We should not let go unnoticed a change in the grammatical voice; when 
Heidegger speaks of the "asserted” thing he blurs the agent, darkens 
our vision, makes the man a go-between, an intermediary stage, between 
the world of gods and the earth of the mortals, to which he juxtaposes 
a situation where the man facing a "datum” is free to do with it "as he 
pleases” . Such a grammatical movement from the passive to the active 
has nothing to do with a depreciation of human efforts, but it definitely 
locates the man in the sphere where he loses his central position from 
which he manipulates and distributes things, in the realm in which he 
belongs together with things. This is a region where the man does not 
claim but is claimed again by Being:
Before he speaks man must first let himself be claimed again by Being, ta­
king the risk that under this claim he will seldom have much to say.101
The appearance of man must inevitably be concommitant with his 
disappearance. Blake does not say anything different when he describes 
his own writing process as a "Dictate” , a copying, a hearing and listening 
to the celestial voices. A  poet, for Blake, is one who, first of all, is able 
to listen before he starts speaking, and even then he speaks from within 
the territory that he cannot claim as his own, but in which he belongs 
on equal terms with the things he is speaking about.
Imagination is the Divine Vision not of the World, or of Man, nor from Man 
as he is a Natural Man, but only as he is a Spiritual Man (AnW ords. K, 783);
I hear his advice & eevn now write from his Dictate. Forgive me for ex­
pressing to you my Enthusiasm which I wish to partake of Since it is ito 
Me a Source of Immortal Joy: even in this world by it I am the companion 
of Angels (Let, K, 797).
In this context it is appropriate to quote Heidegger’s dictum that 
a man is needed "w ith respect to the bringing of a tidings [Kunde], with 
respect to the preserving of a message” 102, and his definition of a poet 
as "inconsequential [...] almost like a passageway that destroys itself in 
the creative process for the work to emerge.” 103
Consequently, the distinction between "vision” and "optics” is near­
ly  a literal repetition of a clear-cut differentiation between the "fourfold 
vision” and "single vision” in Blake. Even the association of a degenerat­
ed vision with "optics” is essentially Blaikeian. In a letter to Thomas 
Butts Blake quotes his own poem composed "while walking from Felp- 
ham to Lavant” :
Now I a fourfold vision see,
And a fourfold vision is given to me;
'Tis fourfold in my supreme delight 
And threefold in soft Beulah’s night 
And twofold Always. May God us keep 
From Single Vision & Newton’s sleep! (K, 818).
Finally, Heidegger sees the continuation of optics in a "mere looking” 
and the discrepancy between that and the eye as "potency” rephrases 
Blake’s dychotomy of seeing W ITH  or THROUGH the eye.
15. Signs, Signals, Ciphers
We have lost the cosmos, by coming 
out of responsive connection with 
it, and this is our chief tragedy.
—  D. H. Lawrence Apocalypse 
How can I be in my brain if the 
brain is part of the picture of me?
—  R. D. Laing, The Facts of L ife
There is, however, one more point in Heidegger’s quotation from the 
previous chapter which calls for our attention, as it is particularly im­
portant for this frontier of thinking where hermeneutics borders on 
semiotics. In his description of the degradation of vision into optics H ei­
degger seems to be questioning the primeval and originary status o f 
a thing as a sign. An object becomes a sign only after the fall, that is 
to say when the "original emergence’’ has been translated into "already 
there” . A  thing can function as a sign, can be "pointed out” only when 
it has lost its energy of physis, of selfemergence. A  thing which can be 
pointed out can also point out to the originary sphere, but in this very 
way it betrays it, becomes secondary and lifeless. As a critic of Martin 
Heidegger’s thought notices:
The literary work [...] does not point to Being as a sign would; instead, 
within the text’s unique realm, the literary work brings forth Being as 
a symbol does [...] the literary work alone "shines”, but the light it har­
bours is Being.104
The distinction described by the critic as a rift between a sign and a sym­
bol is less obvious in Heidegger’s original writings, although definitely 
not less decisive. In Unterwegs zur Sprache Heidegger unveils a basic 
fissure as one between a sign (Zeichen) and signal (Wink):
Ernuntert durch Ihren Hinweis, das Wort sei Wink und Nicht Zeichen im 
Sinne der blossen Bezeichnung.105
The main controversy between the two notions lies in the fact that 
while signs are founded upon the principle of a difference between the 
signifier and the signified, signals are inherently co-present with what 
they are signals of. Thus, while signs are "activist” in the sense of point­
ing out ("im  Sinne der blossen Bezeichnung” ), signals are "inactive” as 
they do not speak but are spoken by language, do not point out but mark 
a sort of impossible trace which is to bring us to the source of thinking. 
This trace is called "impossible” because the spring is already contained 
in the thinking, does not exist outside its horizon. In other words, si­
gnals are, so to say, natural and immanent growths blossoming out of 
life, and may be figuratively described as "gestures of life ” in opposition 
to "words of life ” , i.e. as manifestations with minimum or no difference 
at all. They are what Derrida calls forth in Rousseau and terms a myth 
of a language without difference, a dream of immediacy within langu­
age:
[...] a first moment of sign without speech, when passion, beyond need but 
short of articulation and difference, expresses itself in an unheard of way: an 
immediate sign [...] The movement of the magic wand that traces with so
much p leasure does not fa ll outside o f the body, U n like the spoiken or w ritten  
sign, it does not cut itse lf o ff  from  the desiring body of the person who 
trace or from  the im m ediately  perce ived  im age of the other.109
The gratification of desire so markedly manifest in Blake’s writings 
{"Those who restrain desire, do so because theirs is weak enough to be 
restrained’’ MHH. K, 149), and a revaluation of certain fundamental dy- 
chotomies between Good and Evil as paralled to Active and Passive ("the 
chains are the cunning of weak and tame minds which have power to 
resist energy” , MHH. K, 155) generate on a semiotic plane a distinction 
between a "Fable” or "A llegory” on the one hand, and "Vision” , on the 
other.
The Last Judgment is not Fable or Allegory, but Vision. Fable or Allegory 
are a totally distinct inferior kind of Poetry. Vision or Imagination i's a Re­
presentation of what Eternally Exists Really & Unchangeably (LJ. K, 604).
A  literary theory with which this quotation is saturated holds that 
the basic criterion which enables us to draw a line between "allegory” 
and "Vision” is the absence or presence of life. If "vision” is "a Repre­
sentation of what Eternally Exists, Really” then "A llegory” is character­
ized by the absence of a "real” existence which is substituted for by the 
supplement of the sign. It is true, as one may object that Blake uses 
the word "representation” when speaking of "vision” , but what is imp­
lied here is not so much an act of substitution, of using a sign instead of 
a thing but rather a re-presentation, an act of a thing making itself pre­
sent, a gesture of a thing presencing itself. A  re-presentation is a process 
in which a thing presents itself anew in its essence, and what is more 
important, it is a dynamic quality of this occurence which enables 
a translation of something eternal into a language of the temporal world. 
Thus, re-presentation is simply another name for the ontological mimesis 
which has already been discussed in this essay, a mimesis which combines 
"servile copying” with "criticism” through the insistence on the pro- 
cessual character of imitation. As a critic notices, even the English term 
Be-ing is basically gerundive and fictive, berce, when it comes 'to Hei­
degger and Blake’s "even the word Presence is deceptive; better by far 
is to say Presencing.” 107 "A llegory” is not a representation because it 
lacks the quality of existence, of re-presentation:
[...] in an allegorical abode where existence hath never come. (Eur. K, 240).
It is what Heidegger would call a "sign” {Zeichen) because it establishes 
a strict pattern of equivalences in which economy meets semiotics; in the 
same way as a signifier is a substitute and replacement of a signified, 
labour is a sign, an equivalent of value:
Shall not the Councellor throw his curb 
Of Poverty on the laborious,
To fix price of labour,
To invent allegorical riches? (SLos. K, 247).
An allegory, a sign as a supplement, as a trace which marks the sad 
absence of its origin, is thus a domain of illusion: Jerusalem is doomed 
to live "in allegoric delusion & woe” (J. K, 735). A  sign is, then, a form 
of a tyrannous God, a version of a "Mathematical Diagram” , i.e. a form 
of death, or another name for the absence of life. In his remarks upon 
Dr. Thornton’s book Blake does not fail to notice that the God of the 
learned theologian "is an A llegory of Kings & nothing Else” (K, 789). 
From Inni’s work we know that a combination of secular and priestly 
power also took place within the paradigm of writing.
We should not forget, at the same time, what Blake is trying to 
define is not so much an abstract concept of allegory but ilts appearance 
within the structure of the world, where it does not occur in a pure 
state but exists as place of allegoricity in the movement of signifiers. 
Analogically, "Vision” is no more than a place of visionality which sud­
denly discloses itself in the world. Thus, there w ill be inlets of vision 
within the alegoricity of experience:
Note here that Fable or Allegory is seldom without some Vision. Pilgrim’s 
Progress is full of it, the Greek Poets the same [...] (LJ. K, 604).
We have seen how Heidegger’s distinction between a sign and a si­
gnal can become an interpretative tool for Blake’s semiotics distinguishing 
between "A llegory” and "Vision” . Foster Damon in his invaluable book 
on the ideas and symbols of William Blake calls "vision” "symbolism 
[...] which fails when its entire meaning is obvious.” 108 However, North­
rop Frye seems to evade the question of symbolism in Blake claiming 
that most of the meanings attached to the word are irrelevant to Blake.” 109 
Indeed, while treating the concept of a symbol as an operative ca­
tegory we remain trapped in the tradition which relegates it to the do­
main of equivalents which, although numerous, establish some kind of 
outside reality, a reality existing externally with regard to the sign. 
Thus, a symbol becomes only a more complex mode of reinstating the 
pposition between the inside and the outside, and in this sense it res­
tores the outside as a sanction securing funcionality of the sign.
What shall we call this strange semiotic construct in Blake’s theory 
which unites transcendence and immanence, defines difference and, at 
the same time, returns it to the inferiority of the world and things, make 
them belong to one primal area from which all things blossom in the 
process of physis? What is a name for this vehicle which like a symbol 
displays a range of possible meanings instead of one, but, unlike a sym­
bol, erases a difference between itself and these meanings? What is 
a term that would refer to this semiotic formation which does not stand 
for a meaning, but out stands together with a meaning in Being?
It is at this moment when we ought to rethink suggestions contained 
in the work of Karl Jaspers. Jaspers essentially supports the rupture 
between different types of traces:
Appearance is described and thought in concepts. Signs convey what I am 
and can be as myself. Transcendent reality [...] is manifested in ciphers
[...I110
and in a footnote the philosopher specifies his preference for the term 
„cipher” as opposed to the word „symbol” :
"Cipher”, a word I prefer to the word "symbol”, denotes the language 
of a reality that can be heard and addressed only thus and in no other 
way — while a symbol stands for something else, even though this may not 
exist outside the symbol. What we mean by a symbol is the other thing, 
which thus becomes objective and comes to be present in the symbol.111
What the philosophy of ciphers embodies is a belief we find in our 
Heideggerian misreading of Blake, a belief Derrida sneers at from the top 
of his deconstructive hill: a story of a possible way of attaining the state 
which precedes all beings, and from which all essents derive, the myth 
which Derrida calls "nostalgic” in its refusal to find joy in the interplay 
of signifiers, in a world without a center, i.e. without truth. This is how 
Blake defines his activity:
The Nature of m y W ork  is V is ionary or Im ag ina tive; it is an Endavour to 
Restore what the Ancients ca ll’d the Golden Age. [emphasis added —  TS ] 
(LJ. K , 605).
A  restoration of the Golden Age is a retracing of a trace to its beginning:
A ll these things are w ritten  in Eden. The artist is an inhabitant o f that happy 
country; and if  e very  thing goes on as it has begun, the w orld  of vegetation 
and generation m ay expect to be opened again to H eaven, through Eden, 
as it was in the beginning [emphasis added —  TS1. (DesCat. K , 478).
It is also an act of the ultimate "letting be” (what Heidegger calls Ge- 
lassenheit), of the inactive nonintervention in the being of things which 
only in this way can uncover the original region of Blake’s "Eternity” , 
or Heidegger’s "Being.” That is why the grammatical structure of tenses 
in the passage is dominated by the Present Perfect. Things ought to go 
the way they have begun, i.e. man cannot interfere with the course of 
things because he himself is also one of the phenomena of the world, he
also is "the letting happen of the advent of the truth” 112, which phrase 
Walter Biemel interprets in the following way:
B y speaking of "letting come to pass” rather than of simply "positing” or 
"creating”, Heidegger implies that in the final analysis the taking place of 
the openness f Lich tung] is not merely an aehievemnt of man but that [...] man 
can receive only what the Being itself sends him and may open himself to 
or shut himself from this.113
Finally, the Golden Age may turn out to be lost, nevertheless its ex­
istence is never doubted:
The two pictures of Nelson and Pitt are compositions of a mythological cast 
i...] being copies from some stupendous originals now lost or perhaps buried 
till some happier age. (DesCat. K, 565).
Other qualifications emphasizing its eternal character ("Real, Unchange­
able” ) support the view that what Blake is trying to retrace is the ex­
perience of ousia which Heidegger defines as "permanent presence.” 114 
The movement towards ousia, towards what Blake calls the "Visionary 
or Imagination” is a journey towards the unknown. What we have then 
in a bulk of work known as writings of William Blake is a collection of 
visions (symbols, ciphers in opposition to "allegories” ) where the word 
hears the language of the Transcendence. Although Blake does not seem 
to heed the importance of language, nevertheless in the only fragment 
where he does speak openly about language he makes sure that it func­
tions as a steady movement counteracting "melancholy” and "Dumb des­
pair” :
Los built the stubborn structure of the Language, acting against A lb io n ’s 
melancholy, who must else have been a Dumb despair. (J. K , 668).
Language acts against melancholy which, otherwise, would have had 
to remain dumb. This sudden voicing of a human mood —  despair —  
opens language as a space of dialogue, first of all, a profound and prima­
ry dialogue with the totality of Being which must precede any dialogue 
with a human partner. If despair and melancholy are moods, and moods 
or "affective dispositions” are, according to Heidegger, a typical and in- 
dispensible characteristic of a being whereby "Dasein always seems: to be 
enlightened in one way or another about its own position among the 
things for which it is naturally open”115, then language as a voice of 
mood must be tuned into Being where man does not come as a center 
and where the space of dialogue is opened by language prior to man.
This is what Heinrich Ott in his commentary upon the personal struc­
ture of language in Heidegger’s philosophy calls "the hermeneutic struc­
ture of language” :
[...] when man speaks he does not only name individual things for the pur­
pose of the exchange of information about them. This would have been the 
state of affairs if man had been the master of language, if language had been 
indebted to man and man had not been indebted to language. In reality [...] 
while man names individual things and discusses them, he simultaneously 
lets appear the horizon within which these individual things appear to him 
and affect him. Both of these [...] things and world, are not produced by 
man; he receives them. Insofar as things affect man, they are already in the 
world, and the world in the things. Speech merely brings to the fore their 
being in one another.116
Language, as we can deduce it from Blake’s concise comment, is 
a "stubborn structure” which reveals a mysterious plenitude from which 
it was derived, and which listens to the voice of the world preceding the 
voice of language. Hence, marks and traces constituting language are 
imag-es which are manifestations of mood, that is to say of our co-ex- 
istence with things in the world which is prior to both. As Jaspers puts 
it in his philosophy of ciphers (the word, I assume, is a more likely equi­
valent of Blake’s "vision” than a "symbol” ):
Ciphers mean a language that is heard in ciphers alone, that does not refer 
to something else, and whose speaking subject is unknown, unknowable, 
untraceable. They can be interpreted, but only so as to leave their meaning 
inexhaustible.117
Language as a cipher, a vision, an image-e is then related to imag-ination. 
First, because it revaluates a mystery and becomes not a vehicle of 
a secret solving reason but of a willing participation in the Unknown. 
What ciphers (Blake’s "visions” ) do is not pointing out or at, but amal­
gamating language with a mystery. This is evident in Jasper’s quota­
tion, as well as in the following passage from The Last Judgment:
The Nature of Visionary Fancy, or Imagination, is very little known, & the 
Eternal nature & penmeruence of its ever existent Images is consider’d as 
less permanent that the things of Vegetative [...] Nature; yet the Oak dies 
as well as the Lettuce, but its Eternal Image & Individuality never dies, but 
renews by its seed; just so the Imaginative Image returns by the seed of 
Contemplative Thought [...]. (K, 605).
Second, it overcomes the distinction between the objective and sub­
jective. Blake is only a messenger of Unknown Voices, thus his idea of 
himself cannot, by definition, be of an imposing kind:
O Saviour pour upon me thy Spirit of meekness Love!
Annihilate the Selfhood in me: be thou all my life!
Guide thou my hand [...] while I write [...] (J. K, 623).
In Jaspers’s work the annihilation of self is voiced as the identification 
of the subjective and objective. Thus, Jaspers insists that:
[...] objectivity and subjectivity are inseparable. The object of the cipher has 
no substance if it does not carry existential weight; as a mere fact is an 
empty concept. The subject side concerns the existential origin that is illu­
minated in the abject side.118
That insistence is reiterated in his definition of a cipher:
Ciphers are statements about both Transcendence and the individual that 
encounters it. The truth in them is never purely objective, nor never purely 
subjective.119
Similarly in Heidegger where a man is relegated from his privileged 
position of the master of Being to the one to whose Care Being is tem­
porarily consigned, and who must tend Being, nurse, and keep an eye 011 
it, in general —  he has to be necessarily W ITH  it, not above it. That is 
why, man is referred to in a later phase of Heidegger’s thought as "the 
Shepherd of Being” 120 (der Hirt des Seins), where the very term "shep­
herd” identifies material and spiritual care.
Third, image as a manifestation of imagination is a place of partici­
pation. Since it overcomes the distinction between the known and the 
unknown, the subject and the object, it has to be a meeting place, a ter­
ritory where not only do the contraries meet each other, but where they 
also meet and experience the world in which they meet. In other words, 
Blake’s "visions” or "images” , Jaspers’s "ciphers” and Heidegger’s "hints” 
(Winke) are of existential-ontological character, and only secondarily per­
form a semiotic function. Jaspers repeatedly comes back to the notion 
of "existential guidance” as inherent to ciphers and interweaves it with 
a surmounting of yet another pair of opposites, that of abstract, specific 
truth and individual phantasy:
We are not looking for the immense realm of facts from mythological or 
religious or philosophical history, nor do we follow psychological or sociolo­
gical lines of questioning. What concerns us Is the question of truth as such 
— more specifically, the question of the truth of ciphers that cannot be 
known, that can only be experienced existentially. In the historic form of 
ciphers we look for their appeal as possible truth. Thus, we are not acting 
objectively — that is to say, not scientifically, not historically, psychologi­
cally, or sociologically — but neither are we following subjective tastes and 
inclinations. Instead, we yield to the impacts that turn thinking into inner 
action wherever we are engaged.121
What for Jaspers is entailed in the act of "existential guidance” which 
transmutes both science and impressionistic introspection into "inner 
action” , is what we discover as a deep foundation of Blake’s doctrine of 
Imagination defined as the ontological and existential core of man. Thus, 
"Man is A ll Imagination” (AnBerk . K, 775), and as such it is imagina­
tion which becomes a core of existence "A ll Things Exist in the Human 
Imagination’’ (J. K, 707).
We have to be very careful not to commit a mistake of another vers­
ion of humanism interpreting man in Blake’s statement as a center of the 
world. A ll Blake’s enunciation says is that man can possibly be a center 
to the extent to which he himself is a part of a center, in other words 
man is a center of existence only to the degree to which he is aware that 
he also belongs only to the horizon of existence. Man, experienced exis- 
tentially by the world and experiencing the world existentially, is only 
the seat of imagination, and thus, in the Heideggerian rhetoric, the "lett­
ing-lie-forward” of the world (Vorliegenlassen), in the same way as any 
other object in the world performs the same action:
The V egeta ting  C ities are burn’d &  from  the Earth,
And the Bodies in w h ich all An im als &  Vegetations, the Earth &  Heaven
W ere contain ’d in the A l l  G lorious Im agination  [...] (J. K , 679).
Hence, Blake’s "Man [which] Is A ll Imagination” represents a re­
duced model of a man with regard to what is assumed to be a definition 
of a man: it leaves aside man defined in the ontic categories of the ma­
terial world as existing without any link with its ontological source, and 
concentrates on a man as a phenomenon of participation, of a being 
with and in the world. Thus, Blake’s "natural Man” is a man understood 
ontically, while "Spiritual Man” demonstrates man's rootedness in exis­
tence, man as overwhelmed by a situation no longer sanctioned by his 
domination, man as an "overflow  of Being” . "Man [which] Is A ll Imag­
ination” is reminiscent of Heidegger’s Dasein and Meister Eckhart’s 
Fünklein which are terms depicting man in a constant relationship with 
the totality of Being, that is to say man out-lined, out-standing, existing 
out of the depth of physis.
What Blake is trying to capture in his famous dialectics of "seeing 
through” and "seeing with” the eye is precisely this transference from 
the mundane semiotics of wordly signification (signs, allegories, fables) 
to the foregrounding of the object, and man as its perceiver, in such 
a common horizon where he lets the objects stand out from Being (words 
as ciphers). When in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell Blake convinces 
the reader that "To create a little flower is the labour of ages” (K  152), 
or that "One thought fills immensity” (K, 151), he draws our attention 
to the fact that the very existence of aa object conceals in itself what 
Heidegger calls "the primordial signification” which, according to the 
German philosopher, presents itself in the phenomenon, i.e. in what 
"shows itself, the manifest.” 122
In other words, a cipher, a vision, a hint, is the place where what 
is merely talked about as an external object, a center of our descriptive
procedures (Heidegger’s "present-at-hand” [vorhanden]), changes into 
what is a manifestation of itself, a manifestation of its own essence in 
our contact with it, with our practical use, i.e. existential, not analytic, 
experience of the object. A  vision, or a cipher, is a domain where the 
participation materializes in the fundamental praxis, where difference 
tends to become blurred and, in the moment of particular intensity, dis­
appears; in a cipher, God becomes man and vice versa. Hence in Blake:
They  [A ris to tle  and P la to ] [...] consider’d God as abstracted or distinct from  
the Im agina tive  W orld , but Jesus [...] consider’d God as a M an in the S p ir i­
tual or Im agina tive  V ision . (AnBerk . K , 774).
Similarly, Jaspers would emphasize the marked tendency evident in 
ciphers to refer to where both man and a cipher are rooted:
Ciphers point beyond themselves, at the root of things. They  point to what 
w e call "B e in g ” , or "Noth ingness” , or "A b o ve -B e in g ” , or ,,b e fore  all B eing” , 
or "beyond a ll B ein g” [...].123
If we followed the Derridian radical instruction that all interpretation 
speaks already with a borrowed voice, as all interpretation is aleready 
a dissemination, we could represent the movement of ciphers in the Hei- 
deggerian terms as movement from the vorhanden ("ready-at-hand” ) to­
wards the zuhanden ("ready-to-hand” ), which movement Joseph Kockel- 
mans describes in the following manner:
In  our prim al praxis an intended thing is firs t ready to hand as a tool. I f  
this thing becomes the ob -ject of com munication [...] then along w ith  the 
ennunciation a m odification  of the character of the intentional orientation 
must be firs t enacted. The ready-to-hand thing w hich w e w ere orig ina lly  
concerned w ith  in our "p rac tica l” achievem ents changes now  into something 
about w hich w e are going to enunciate something [...]. Though this new  w ay 
o f looking at, precisely that which at firs t was ready-to-hand becomes con­
cealed as ready-at-hand.124
To recapitulate: a trace becomes a cipher when we let-it-lie-forward 
as an object ek-sisting out of Being, and the act of such a Gelassenheit 
is synonymous with praxis in which a thing reveals its essence in an 
imaginative, non analytic way. Heidegger speaiks of the "proper use” 
(Brauchen) as of a procedure which brings "what is used into its essence 
(Wesen) and holds it there.” 125 Blake in his Laocoon, the final and most 
mature manifesto, insists on the significance of practice. Thus, we have:
Praise is the P ractice o f A r t  (K , 776),
W ithout Unceasing Practice nothing can be done. Practice is A rt.
I f  you leave o ff you are lost (K , 777).
Imagination transforms traces into ciphers, allegories into visions 
and, by being of the ontological-existential nature, it places man in 
a process of retracing of the origin. Blake describing his own pictures 
speaks of images, ciphers, visions (vehicles of Imagination) as of the only 
possible mode of recapturing the originary past:
The Artist having been taken in vision into the ancient republics [...] has 
seen those wonderful originals [...]. (DesCat. K, 565).
The most valuable agglomeration of ciphers, the most essential ma­
nifestation of Being, is the sphere of praxis, the real of the original ma­
king primal forming of poiein, that is to say, of arts.
As we have said, art is the field of manifestation of Being, the place 
of the closest proximity to the original source, the moment where the 
delay of the sign is the least:
The Eternal Body of Man is the Imagination, that is, God himself,
The Divine Body. (L. K, 776).
At the same time, however paradoxical it may seem, imagination is 
already inscribed in 'the horizon of detachment; it heralds proximity and 
unity, but does it by means which introduce distance and separation. In 
other words, imagination itself, this primal signification process trans­
cending and uniting all marks, is already a mark. From a short list of 
opposites which Blake left us in his visionary sketch The Ghost of Abel 
it is evident that imagination is distiguished from Nature precisely on the 
basis of a certain linearity which enables things in imagination to stand 
out, i.e. to exist, while objects in nature tend to be blurred into one mass 
of indistinguishable phenomena. We are prepared for this ontological 
juxtaposition of "standing out” and "melting” of forms by "Memory” 
and "Inspiration” which underlie Blake’s theory. In his late remarks on 
Homer and V irgil Blake, launching a violent attack against the militaris­
tic culture of Rome and Greece, concludes:
Grecian is Mathematic Form: Gothic is Living Form, Mathematical Form is 
Eternal in the .Reasoning Memory: Living Form is Eternal Existence. (K, 778).
Thus, an implacable paradox which Derrida uncovers in Western thought, 
a paradox of a myth of the origin uniting and overcoming all individual 
differences, a myth which itself is ultimately rooted in such a difference. 
One could say concisely that the unutterable is finally reduced to the 
utterable, or —  in a more Derridian way —  that the element of writing, 
of existential delay, is present already in speech which supposedly is 
expressive of the original un-differentiated plenitude. Similarly, Blake 
in his attempt to retrace the origin of the mark, to move towards the
"wonderful originals” , towards the realm of the primal unity preceding 
all differences (God is one with man, the process of physis is a slow 
movement from the original unity to the forgetfulness of such a unity 
which, paradoxically, breeds memory and abstraction: "[...] men forgot 
that A ll deities reside in the human breast” , M ffff. K, 153), eventually 
speaks the language of the outline, i.e. of diference. Let us revert to the 
already signalled opening fragment of The Ghost of Abel:
Can a Poet doubt the Visions of Jehovah; Nature has no Outline but Imagi­
nation has. Nature has no Tune, but Imagination has. Nature has no Super­
natural dissolves: Imagination is Eternity.
But the language of difference, of the outline, is the language of 
writing. Any talk of Eternity (source, beginning, origin) is aleady em- 
bedden in temporality (copying, nanoriginality). John Evelyn who, in 
many statements, reveals an unexpectedly "deconstructive” bias, derives 
writing from such an act of a fundamental difference:
We shall not with Epigenes in Pliny depose that this Art had its being from 
Eternity; because it is not sense, and would condradict its invention; but, if 
that may passe which St. Augustine affirmes that the Protoplast our Father 
Adam, or others his good Genius the Angel Rasiel, were the first invenitor 
of Letters, Sculpture may derive its Pedegree from the Infancy of the World, 
and contend for its Pre-eminence with moat of the Antiquities which it 
so much celebrates.126
Blake’s definition of an object within the realm of imagination lo­
cates it in the line of synonyms like "L iving Form” , "Outline” , "Tune” , 
"Eternal Existence” . As we can see such a placement inherently abounds 
in the language of difference. "Eternal Existence” is already distanced 
from the in-different plenitude by its insistence upon the contour and 
form. Eternity which is identified with Imagination is a region where 
objects originally belong ("Eternity Exists, and A ll Things in Eternity” , 
LJ. K, 614), but this sphere is already under the powerful impact of 
difference ("In ' Great Eternity every particular Form gives forth or 
Emanates its own peculiar Light [...] J. K, 684). Eternity, or Imagination, 
is shining forth of an object, its abrupt and sudden emergence, differen­
tiation from other objects in which it is foregrounded. Shining, under­
stood in the Heideggerian way as radiance (each object "emanates its own 
peculiar Light” ), as appearing ("every particular Form emanates [...]” ), 
and as a mere appearance, a physical shape of a thing ("every particular 
Form” ).
Imagination as a dialogue of separate forms, as a factor indispensible 
for the development of language which is, as we have already noted, 
born "out of dispersion” , appears also in Derrida’s reading of Rousseau’s 
Essay on the Origin of Languages. Analysing Rousseau’s text augmented
by fragments of his letters where we come across a very Blakeian sen­
tence "Only imagination is active and one excites the passion only by 
imagination” , Derrida concludes:
[...] reason, a function of interest and need, the technical and calculating 
faculty, is not the origin of language, which is also a human property and 
without which there would be no perfectibility. Language is born of the 
imagination which arouses or at any rate excites sentiment or passion.127
It is far from incidental then that in Jerusalem it is Los, represent­
ing the principle of creative imagination, who erects "the stubborn struc­
ture of language” . If, however, for Blake and Rousseau, the mastername 
of the game of interpretation is life, "Eternal Existence” , for Derrida the 
play of distance and images appearing from it is another name for death:
[...imagination belongs to the same chain of significations as the anticipation 
of death. Imagination is at bottom the relationship with death. The image 
is death [...] the image is a death or (the) death is an image.128
This is not to claim a fundamental, insurmountable gap between the 
two interpretations of imagination; it is rather to state that Derrida draws 
the ultimate conclusion which Blake stops short of, although both speak 
the same language of articulation which Blake calls "Outline” and Derri­
da écriture. What differs these two lessons of writing/dra wing/engraving 
is that while Blake still maintains the notion of the origin, no matter how 
affected by difference and articulation, and thus adheres to the metapho- 
ricity of breath and sound as closer to the source of Being, Derrida overt­
ly confesses the fundamentally human inability to reach such a point. In 
a final section of his comments upon Rousseau Derrida defines the driv­
ing force of language as:
[...] the power of substituting one organ for another, of articulating space 
and time, sight and voice, hand and spirit, it is this faculty of supplementa- 
rity which is the true "origin” —  or nonorigin — of languages: articulation 
in general, as articulation of nature and of convention, of nature and all its 
others.129
Yet the presence of the significatum is never present in 
itself, lit Is present in the effect thus bearing "in itself” ais 
an effect of presence the imprint of another presence, the 
trace of another trace. Each significatum is therefore also 
in the position of a significant.
—  René Denizot, Readings
Truth, i.e. true being, i.e. what is constant and fixed, be­
cause it is the petrifying of any single given perspective, 
is always only an apparentness that has come to prevail, 
which is ¡to say, it is always error.
—  Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche
Could it be that the actual silence is composed of messages 
that obliterate each other? That the silence is full of con­
tradictory signals from primordial, highly developed civili­
sations that have long since seen through it all? [...] The ga­
laxies continued to spin, and intergalactic signals became 
increasingly infrequent. Why bother to signal, when for 
each message there was probably an anti-signal, a refu­
tation.
—  Peter Nilson, A Labirynth in which we Are A ll Lost
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CIEŃ OBDARZONY KONTUREM. FENOMENOLOGIA, GRAMATOLOGIA, BLAKE
S t r e s z c z e n i e
Autor stawia sobie dwojakie zada­
nie. Po pierwsze, usiłuje wprowadzić 
do badań humanistycznych podstawo­
we pojęcia zaczerpnięte z filozofii Mar­
tina Heideggera (roz. 1) oraz dekon- 
struktywistycznej filozofii Jacquesa 
Derridy (roz. 2). Po drugie, po wyjaś­
nieniu aparatu pojęciowego autor po­
dejmuje próbę jego aplikacji w  kon­
kretnych badaniach tekstowych (twór­
czość Williama Blak’a, roz. 3).
Przedmiotem pracy jest pewien 
etap ewolucji współczesnej hermeneu­
tyki, która od kategorii metafizycznych, 
takich jak „początek”, „źródło”, „pier­
wotny głos”, zmierza w  stronę grama- 
tologicznej filozofii rzeczywistości jako 
strumienia znaków pozbawionego wy- 
raźnnego obramowania ontologicznego 
(Derrida kwestionuje zarówno pojęcie 
początku jak i końca). Ewolucja ta od­
powiada również przekształceniom ję­
zyka krytyki, który przechodzi od me­
tafory fonetycznej (jak u Heideggera) 
do metafory skrypturalnej (jak u Der­
ridy). Stąd szczególny nacisk położono 
na wyjaśnienie podstawowych katego­
rii filozofii Derridy, takich jak écri­
ture, différance, dissémination, trace 
itd.
Twórczość Williama Blake zostaje 
poddana działaniu tych właśnie katego­
rii, przy czym zasadniczą rolę bodźca, 
jak i motywu przewodniego dalszej
analizy odgrywa Blake’owskia teoria ma­
larstwa oparta na silnym przeciwsta­
wieniu rysunku i światłocienia. Stąd 
rysunek i kontur spełniają w  pisar­
stwie i malarstwie Blake’a zadania nie 
tylko estetyczne, lecz rozumiane są 
przede wszystkim jako podstawowe ka­
tegorie ontologiczne. Rysunek, kontur 
są momentem wyłaniania się przed­
miotu, grą obecności i nieobecności, po­
zoru i rzeczywistości (tutaj autor wyko­
rzystuje spostrzeżenia Heideggera za­
warte w  jego „Wprowadzeniu do me­
tafizyki”). jak i nieustannej różnicy, 
wyróżniania się danego przedmiotu spo­
śród innych (tutaj przydatna okazuje 
się kategoria differance Derridy). Po­
jęcie rysunku jako kategorii filozo­
ficznej wprowadza również w  proble­
matykę znaku, znakowości i proble­
mów semiozy, która po szczegółowych 
analizach okazuje się podatna na Der- 
ridiańskie kategorie, takie jak detour 
czy voile, gdyż tak Blake, jak i filozo­
fia dekonstryktywistyczna kwestionują 
jednoznaczność i jednokierunkowość 
procesów semiotycznych. Hermeneuty­
ka Heideggerowska okazuje się szcze­
gólnie użyteczna dla omówienia pism 
profetycznych Blake’a, w  których po­
wraca mit początku, praźródła, czy ory­
ginalnej jedni bytu wspólnej dla osiem­
nastowiecznego poety i dwudziesto­
wiecznego filozofa.
ТЕНЬ, ОДАРЕННАЯ КОНТУРОМ. ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЯ, ГРАММАТОЛОГИЯ,
БЛЭЙК
Р е з юме
В работе поставлена двойная цель. Во-первых, делается попытка ввести 
в гуманистические исследования оснрвные понятия, почерпнутые из философии 
Мартина Хейдеггера (гл. 1) и деконструктивистикой философии Джекса Дер­
риды (гл. 2). Во-вторых, после выяснения понятийного аппарата автор пытается 
применить его в конкретных текстовых исследованиях (творчество Уильяма 
Блэйка, гл. 3).
Предметом работы является определенный этап эволюции современной гер­
меневтики, которая от метафизических категорий, как например, „начало”, 
„источник”, „первичный голос”, направляется в сторону грамматологической 
философии действительности как потока знаков, лишенного отчетливого онто­
логического окаймления (Деррида поддает сомнению как понятие начала, так 
и конца). Эта эволюция отвечает также преобразованию языка критики, который 
переходит от фонетической метафоры (как у Хейдеггера) к скриптуральной 
метафоре (как у Дерриды). Поэтому особое внимание уделяется выяснению 
основных категорий философии Дерриды, как например, écriture , différence, 
dissemination, trace и т. д.
Творчество Уильяма Блэйка подвергнуто влиянию именно этих категорий, 
причем, основную роль стимула и лейтмотива дальнейшего анализа играет 
блэйковская теория живописи, основанная на резком противопоставлении рисунка 
и светотени. Поэтому рисунок и контур исполняют в писательстве и живописи 
Блэйка не только эстетические задания, но понимаются прежде всего как основ­
ные онтологические категории. Рисунок, контур являются моментом выделения 
предмета, игрой присутствия и отсутствия, мнимого и действительности (здесь 
автор использует наблюдения Хейдеггера, содержащиеся в его Введении в ме­
тафизику), а также неутомимого различения, выделения данного предмета 
среди других (здесь пригодной оказывается категория différance Дерриды). 
Понятие рисунка как философской категории вводит также в проблематику 
знака, признака и проблем семиоза, которая после подробных анализов оказыва­
ется податливой на такие Дерриданские категории, как detour или же voile, 
т. к. Блэйк и деконструктивистская философия берут под сомнение однознач­
ность и однонаправленность семиотических процессов. Герменевтика Хейдеггера 
оказывается особенно полезной для обсуждения профетических произведений 
Блэйка, в которых возвращается миф начала, первоисточника, оригинального 
единства быта, общего для поэта восемнадцатого века и философа двадцатого 
века.
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Andrzej Szewczyk, A d a m  a n d  E v e  (m a n u scrip t) Andrzej Szewczyk, F iv e  pa rts  o f  the  w o r ld
Andrzej Szewczyk, The  p ro m ise d  land  is a l i t t le  l ik e  the  p ro m ise d  
c lo u d
Andrzej Szewczyk, A lc h e m y  (m anuscr ip t )
The author wants to express his gratitude to Mr. An­
drzej Szewczyk, the most Blakeian Polish painter, for his 
kind permission to use his works as the illustration to 
this book. Nowhere can we find a more ontological use of 
contour that in his works.
Tadeusz Sławek 
„THE OUTLINED SHADOW”
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i Strona
i
i
od
góry
od
doiu
' Jest
1
Pow in n o  być
'
9 3 labirynth labyrinth
9 10 desribed described
11 23 conside consider
13 8 sence sense
14 9 Spano's Spanos'
1 20 16 VIX X IX
27 9 unifished unfinished
j 35 5 labirynth labyrinth
j 40 19 labirynth labyrinth
1 46 14 labirynthian labyrinthine
47 20 unprodictive unproductive
50 15 beaurocratization bureaucratization
! 51 16 writtem written
1 63 9 his this
66 5 tropiqus tropiques
69 13 reffered reffered to
70 4 desparate _ desperate
1 79 3 belance balance
89 16 pereived perceived
1 102 9 is it
104 5 in it
107 2)1 methaphor metaphor
107 15 eradicaded eradicated
113 2 apposition opposition
119 19 The rule The rules
130 i 8 13 14
132 7 paralled parallel
' 133 12 Inni’s Innis’

